Poker Strategy With Ed Miller: Turn Your Hand Into A Bluff

I make some bone-headed mistakes sometimes. One I’ve noticed that I make all too frequently is that I fail to turn a hand that has some showdown value into a bluff when appropriate. It’s not a situation that comes up all the time, but missing the opportunity when it arises can mean losing a big pot I should have won.

It’s a $2-$5 cash game in Las Vegas during the World Series of Poker. With so many visitors in town from all over the world, games can be unpredictable during WSOP time. But my opponent in this hand is playing to an archetype I’m very familiar with—he’s playing like the typical Las Vegas $2-$5 nitty regular.

We start this hand with about $450. A loose raiser opens from middle position for $20. My main opponent calls next to act. A very weak player prone to making undersized, hopeless bluffs calls on the button, and I call in the big blind with K 9.

The flop comes 9 6 6.

Since there’s a good chance my hand is best, I can consider betting out. But I was fairly certain in this hand that if the raiser and the nitty player checked, then the bluffer on the button would take a stab at the pot. The chance of it checking through was relatively low, so I checked.

The preflop raiser checked. The nitty player bet $45 into the $82 pot. The button player folded.

I was unhappy that the nitty player was the one who chose to bet, since he would have the strongest betting range of my three opponents. But my hand can still be best, and I’m getting nearly 3-to-1 to call, so I called. The preflop raiser folded.

The turn was the J, giving me a flush draw. I checked, and my opponent bet $70 into the $172 pot.

After the $70 bet, we have $315 behind. I should shove. Here’s why:

My opponent is fairly tight preflop, and he called an early raise from way out of position. It’s possible he has 7-6 or 6-5 or A-6 suited, but he’s unlikely to have any of these hands in an offsuit form. This gives him six combinations of possible trips. He might have 8-6 or even possibly 6-4, but I thought he was probably too tight preflop to call with these hands in that situation.

He can also hold 6-6, 9-9, or J-J. These are five combinations of nutted hands.

He can also have diamond draws that have a jack in them. The reasonable possibilities are probably A J, K J, Q J, and J 10. That’s four more combinations.

Altogether, we have 15 hand combinations that both have me beat and are locks to call a shove. I’m drawing dead against the five full house and quad hands, but I’m live with significant outs against the other ten hands.

In addition to these hands, my opponent can be betting A-9 (likely suited if that’s what he has), 10-10, Q-Q, and possibly K-K or A-A if he chose not to reraise these hands preflop. (Given his position preflop, my experience is that players like my opponent sometimes slowplay big pairs preflop.)

There are two combos of A-9, and six each of 10-10 and Q-Q. If we assume that my opponent would reraise K-K and A-A about two-thirds of the time and slowplay one-third, that leaves two combos each of those hands as well.

That makes 18 total combinations of hands that are ahead of mine, but that I believe my opponent likely would fold to the shove. While I wouldn’t assume that every player would fold A-A in this situation, players like my opponent are trained to fold one pair hands on the turn when check-raised, particularly when it’s “obvious” that my check-raise means I have a six. I would actually be pretty surprised if my opponent chose to call a shove here with A-A.

By the raw numbers, it’s a bit better than 50/50 that my opponent will fold if he holds a hand better than mine. A few other factors, in my opinion, sway this decision solidly toward a shove.

1. I’m forced to at least call my opponent’s bet since he bet so little, and my hand has considerable equity against most of the hands in his range. Thus, I’m deciding between raising and calling, not raising and folding.

2. I think there’s a bet-sizing tell here. This is decidedly a small bet on a scary board with two flush draws and many straight draws. If my opponent held a six, I’d expect him to bet bigger to protect his hand. He might bet this size with one of the full house or quad hands, since he has nothing to fear with those hands. And it’s possible he might bet this size with the top pair plus flush draw hands. But I think the bet size makes a six pretty unlikely. Whereas, I think this bet size is consistent with all the hands I think he would fold to a shove.

3. I have a lot of river outs if my opponent calls with a flush draw plus top pair hand.

4. It’s possible my opponent is betting a hand weaker than mine—a hand like 8 7 or 8 7 for instance. On the offchance my opponent has one of these hands, shoving is far better than calling.

5. I don’t think I have great implied odds on the river. I can’t expect to hit my hand on the river, check, and have my opponent bet a worse hand. He’s going to check down anything but a lock hand. So I’ll have to bet out if I hit my hand. If I hit a flush or a nine, I’m unlikely to get paid on a big bet, since players like these are trained to fold to big river bets on scare cards. So my implied odds amount to hoping to hit my hand and then hoping I can get a small bet paid.

It’s a risky shove, to be sure, but I believe shoving will be more profitable on average in this situation than calling, and that’s what matters.

In the actual hand, I didn’t think this through clearly and played my hand for its showdown value (of which it doesn’t have a whole lot at this point). I called.

The river was the 5, making the final board 9 6 6 J 5. Here, I missed a final chance to turn my hand into a bluff. The pot is $312, and we have $315 behind, so I have a pot-sized river shove. This has to work 50 percent of the time against hands better than mine to be worth it. (I’m assuming that the chance my opponent bets a hand worse than mine if I check is negligible.)

With this player, on this river card, with these stack sizes, I think a bluff clearly works more often than that.

But I checked. He checked back and showed 10-10. Oh well. At least losing forced me to analyze the situation and learn something. ♠

Ed’s newest book, The Course: Serious Hold ‘Em Strategy For Smart Players is available now at his website edmillerpoker.com. You can also find original articles and instructional videos by Ed at the training site redchippoker.com.

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