Blind Robbery

I had arrived at Bellagio earlier than usual on this particular Friday night. The tourist crowd had not yet arrived and I was playing against a tight group of local $30-$60 hold'em players. Amongst other tighties, my golfing pal Mark Gregorich was in the game. Mark is a great person, and one of the few people I can beat on the golf course. While that makes him grand to go golfing with, he is not the fellow I am looking to see in any of my poker games.

I was on the button with the 8 7. The field had folded to me and two tight players were in the blinds, so I shot it right up, firing $60 forward. As a general rule, I raise on the button if I am going to play a hand. There are some unusual circumstances in which I may just call, but raising is almost always a much better play. I'll often win the pot uncontested, and even if I don't, I can always make a hand (although sometimes when I haven't made a hand in two hours, it doesn't feel that way) and win the extra money the raise provided me. The combination of those plausible scenarios makes raising almost always the correct play from the button when first in.

The small blind mucked his hand and the big blind threw in the extra $30. We took the flop heads up. It came 10-9-3 rainbow, giving me the bottom-end open-ender. It was not the flop of my dreams, but there were lots of worse flops for my hand. My opponent checked and I bet. When I bet, I was hoping he would fold and give me the pot right there. But opponents are not always cooperative; this one unsociably check-raised me.

He was a tight and somewhat unimaginative player who played in a straightforward manner, so I was pretty sure he held a real hand and was not messing around with me. That said, he would not play back at me again if he did not hold a hand that could beat one pair. I reraised, thinking that if he called and checked the turn, which I thought was a very likely play considering the style of this player, I could take a free card if I missed my hand, yet get the added value of the raise in the event I made it. That play had a greater gain if I made the hand on the turn and a smaller loss if I missed. He called.

The turn card was an ace, and my opponent dutifully checked to me. I had intended to check on the turn, but the fact that an ace came changed my mind. I thought there was a chance he would lay down a 9 or a bad 10 in that spot, fearing that if I had just been playing my hand aggressively, it was likely my hand included an ace and the turn card just hit it. Even if he called my turn bet, I could still hit my hand, and if I did, I would win an extra bet. The fact that I could still win if my opponent called made the expectation cost of the bluff significantly less. Once again, he refused to cooperate and called. Still, there was potential for me to take this puppy down.

A queen hit on the river. Now, it seemed that my opponent would have a tough call with a weak 10 or any 9. The queen completed lots of my potential holdings, but missed my actual holding completely. A high-end straight draw would have made a bigger pair. Any two big cards would beat him. The only hand I could conceivably have that he could beat in that spot was the one I actually did have. I decided to follow through and bet the river. Had a total blank come on the river, one that would not have been intimidating to my opponent, I might not have bet, notwithstanding the fact that betting was the only way to win the pot with 8 high. Since my opponent had called when the ace hit on the turn, I felt fairly certain that he would call on the end had a card that couldn't possibly have improved me hit. So, I liked the fact that the queen had come to enable me to bet.

Finally, I got some cooperation. He folded his hand.

Mark jokingly said, "Two sevens?"

"I couldn't beat two sevens," I replied, not sure if Mark believed me.

The expectation cost of bluffing is lower if you have a hand that can make the best hand, rather than one that requires your opponent to fold in order for you to win. Also, this hand demonstrates the greater gain/smaller loss concept. When you can play your hand in a manner that will enable you to win more if you win and lose less if you lose, that is a great value.

This hand also shows how the fall of a card can affect your decision. Don't be totally set in what you are going to do before you have all the information needed to make your decision. If my mind had been totally set on the play I was planning to make on the turn, I would not have won this pot. One poker author once wrote about my going into a "huddle" in the middle of a hand. I make my decisions when it is my turn to act, when the information is at its greatest level. Simply stated, if I make my decisions based on more information than my opponents have, I should be able to make better decisions than they can make. And making better decisions than your opponents is what playing winning poker is all about.

Betting an 8-high hand all the way down is not a play that often has a lot of expectation. But, as I have often said, you have to adjust your play to the current situation. Now, if I could only figure out how to use that idea to help my golf game.

Editor's note: Roy Cooke played winning professional poker for 16 years. He is a successful real estate broker/salesperson in Las Vegas - please see his ad below.