One of the silliest things I hear at the poker table is, "I almost raised." After all, what is an "almost raise"?
Sure, I know what the speaker means: He thought about raising but talked himself out of it, preferring to take the safer route, either because he did not want to risk the money or he was unsure of the situation. But to me, "almost raising" really means that he had prepared poorly.
The time to think about a situational play such as a marginal raise is long before it is your turn to act. In fact, in many cases, it is even before you get to the cardroom. One of the most important ways to improve your play is to think about and discuss the hands you have played and how you should have played them, after your sessions have concluded. You can do this with friends, on Internet forums, with a professional coach, or even on your own.
As you review hands, do not think just about whether you won or lost, but how you could have played better. Thinking about the right plays during non-playing times makes your actual plays more familiar, better thought out, and more automatic when you finally do recognize particular situations at the table.
Another time to think about raising is during a session. As you watch your opponents and characterize their play, determine which ones you would like to engage and which to avoid. As you find people who play weakly, too often, or too wildly, decide under which circumstances you would like to get involved with them, preferably by raising. Then, as a hand develops, you will be prepared to make your raise in tempo when the time is right.
Finally, you have to accept that your aggressive plays will not always win, but - if you have thought through the situations and made good decisions - raising is the most powerful weapon in your arsenal, and can provide a substantial part of your long-term profits.
In short, you have to be
ready to raise by preparation, and
willing to raise by temperament. Let's look at a $60-$120 hand that brought these factors together for me.
Background: As always, hands do not exist in glass cases to be examined, but must be looked at in context. While the context of this hand was complex, two things stood out.
First, one player was a frequent bluffer. During the session, he had bluffed several times and recently had been caught a few times in a row.
Then, a hand arose in which, after a middle-position limper, I raised from the cutoff with K-J. The button cold-called, the big blind (I called him "Bluffer" to myself so that I would remember this tendency) called, and the limper called. The four of us saw a flop of 9-6-3. After two checks, I elected to check, having nothing, a cold-caller behind me, and three opponents. After a deuce on the turn, we all (surprisingly) checked again. A 3 on the river brought checks from everyone, and in an upset, my K-J was the best hand.
I know that most of you would have bet the flop or at least the turn. I would do so about 40 percent of the time, but I do not automatically bet when I flop nothing against three opponents, at least two of whom have shown some strength. I strive for balance in all parts of my game, and I don't think betting automatically qualifies as being very balanced. I also check some very powerful hands in a situation like this, often check-raising a loose button bet or slow-playing until the turn.
After the hand, Bluffer appeared to be seething. Here, finally, was a great bluffing opportunity in which almost any bet would have won, and he had not tried to bluff after several failures. I could see him resurrect his determination to bluff at the next opportunity, to make up for this missed chance.
The hand: An orbit later, I held the A
K
in the cutoff seat. Like
déjà vu, a middle-position player limped, I raised, the button cold-called, Bluffer called from the big blind, as did the limper. The flop was 10
7
6
, giving me nothing, including the wrong color A-K. After two checks, I checked, just as I had done with the K-J hand. The button also checked. The turn was the 5
, putting two hearts and two diamonds on the board. Now, Bluffer bet and the next player folded.
This was the moment of truth. It does not take a genius to decide to raise here, as the chances that Bluffer does not have values for his bet are much greater than they would be for any other player. The board was full of draws, Bluffer was chomping at the bit, and he would bet a huge variety of hands, many of which would be draws.
On the other hand, there were only five big bets in the pot (plus a small blind) after Bluffer bet, and a raise by me would require me to put in two more. I was getting only 2.5-to-1 for my raise, with no pair and no draw. Many players would see this opportunity as an "almost" raise, deciding instead to call or even fold, rather than put in $240 while hoping that this time, Bluffer had nothing.
I decided that the plusses outweighed the minuses, and raised. My risk tolerance is high, and I had thought about this raising opportunity for several hands at that point. I pulled the trigger, and raised in tempo.
The nut-flush draw: My raise had an interesting consequence. I found out later that the button had the nut heart-flush draw, which he decided to fold to my raise. Was this correct?
It was very close. He was getting just over 3.5-to-1 (counting the small blind) to cold-call two bets on the turn with no guarantee that it ended the betting. He had probably nine outs, but may have had only seven, as my play was consistent with a flopped set. Also, as we have seen, he was trying to play a low-volatility game (there's nothing really wrong with that), and a call here could have been expensive.
Finally, a cold-call of two bets here would have looked like a flush draw, and his implied odds almost certainly would have been one bet or nothing. Nor could he even count on a call from the bluffer on the turn to add to his odds, as Bluffer may have folded a pure bluff in the teeth of a raise and cold-call. It was a tough situation. It is rare that one should lay down a nut-flush draw in limit hold'em, but this may have been a correct laydown.
Back to the hand: After the button folded his heart draw, Bluffer called. The river was a small heart, breaking the button's heart. Bluffer checked, and I had one last decision to make. I love betting the river, so I always consider it. In this case, though, my bet could not be a value bet, since there was no worse hand that could call. Should I bet just in case Bluffer has a small pair and would lay it down?
That would put me in the position of bluffing, and it is generally a mistake to bluff into a frequent bluffer who has checked. First, because he bluffs a lot, he is suspicious, and second, he gave up a chance to bluff, so he may have some values.
I checked, and Bluffer showed down the Q
2
. I won the pot, although he had many more outs than I had hoped.
In retrospect, checking the flop and raising the turn won this pot for me. Had I either bet the flop or called the turn, I could not have won the hand.
Conclusion: Playing a frequent bluffer to be bluffing was not an especially insightful play, but you still have to believe in yourself and make the raise. And I got a bit lucky that the guy with the nut-flush draw was playing conservatively, and that Bluffer in fact held nothing but a draw and did not make it.
My raise was not a spur-of-the-moment, heat-of-battle decision. It was based on many years of study away from the table, determining which plays may work, and when. It also was based on observation of the previous hands, and a reasonable guess as to the mindset of the active players. Had I just sat down at the table during that orbit, I never would have made the play or won the pot.
Poker decisions can be improved over time by study and analysis between sessions, and by focus, concentration, and planning during sessions. When the time comes, will you be an "almost" raiser, or will you be ready and willing?
Barry offers poker lessons tailored to the specific strengths and weaknesses of the individual student. Please visit his website at www.barrytanenbaum.com, or e-mail him at [email protected].
