Final Table Takedown: Justin Young

Justin Young is a former mechanical engineer who quit his job to play poker full time in 2006. Though mainly a cash-game player, Justin has career tournament cashes that exceed $3,600,000 including two World Poker Tour final tables. In 2010 Young won the Bellagio Five-Diamond Classic no-limit event #11 for $171,836. He also finished second to his neighbor and close friend, Eric Baldwin, at the PokerStars North American Poker Tour $5,000 Bounty Shootout.

Hand No. 1

Key Concepts: Playing draws, opponents tendencies, and general tournament play

Young raises to 45,000 from the button holding A 9. Aljanedi calls from the small blind.

Craig Tapscott: What type of read do you have on Aljanedi?

Justin Young: He plays a wide variety of hands regardless of position, so at this point I feel a suited ace is way ahead of his range.

Flop: 2 3 5 (pot: 108,000)

JY: This is a huge flop for me in that it contains the nut-flush draw, a gutshot-straight draw, and two overcards.

Aljanedi bets 65,000.

CT: What’s your initial reaction when he bets out into you?

JY: Against the majority of opponents in this spot I would raise with the intentions of playing the hand as aggressively as possible, but Sameer’s style is such that it forces you to play against conventional wisdom.

CT: Had you seen examples of this from him before?

JY: Yes. Through the three days we were playing together he lead the flop numerous times with two types of hands. One being hands he refuses to lay down: sets, two pairs, and overpairs to the board. The other being draws that he will give up on fairly easily if you put a raise out there.

CT: So what’s your plan?

JY: Normally, a large portion of my hand’s strength is the ability to get some strong hands to fold. But knowing my opponent’s tendencies shows me that the only hands I can get to fold are the ones that I’m either a small favorite against or ones that I have smashed. Because I liked the way the final table was shaping up I took a passive approach with my hand.

Young calls.

Turn: 10 (pot: 238,000)

Aljanedi bets 140,000.

JY: At this point I’m still guessing whether he has the goods or is on a draw. The A 9 has a great deal of value, not only to make a hand, but also to simply showdown.

Young calls.

JY: I called with the intentions of hitting my draw, but also to evaluate Sameer and his bet on the river if I brick.

River: 9 (pot: 518,000)

Aljanedi bets 200,000.

CT: Is this a good or bad card for you?

JY: Let’s just say this is an interesting card for me. The 9 gives me second pair in a pot that started on a 5-high board. Sameer’s bet sizing and his mannerisms don’t indicate that he is bluffing, but now I have to face the possibility that I am up against A-5, 5-4, or a pocket pair sixes through eights.

CT: What do you make of his bet sizing?

JY: His bet of 200,000 into 518,000 could be for thin value or a blocker bet if he puts me on a similar hand.

Young calls. Aljanedi reveals 10 4. Aljanedi wins the pot of 918,000

CT: Any regrets on how you played the hand in retrospect?

JY: Though I lost a sizable pot, my reads were pretty good throughout the hand. Most people would argue I just should have raised the flop and taken down a small pot, but I was looking for bigger value from my ace high.

Hand No. 2

Key Concepts: Floating, bluff sizing, psychology in heads-up play

Young raises to 70,000 holding A K. Aljanedi calls.

Flop: Q 10 4 (pot: 148,000)

Aljanedi bets 80,000.

CT: Once again he’s leading into you. How are you going to approach it this time?

JY: The logic changes a bit from the first hand; because we are playing heads-up and his attitude has shifted quite a bit after I took over the chip lead. I guessed his hand range was either a really bad queen or a hand that contained a ten. These types of hands are tough to play out of position when faced with any type of pressure. Sameer’s typical plan of attack was to fire, fire, and fire until someone showed resistance.

CT: So the time has come to resist?

JY: Yes. I was confident I could take this hand from him at any point, so I didn’t see a reason to raise at this point.

Turn: 7 (pot: 308,000)

Aljanedi bets 120,000.

CT: What do you make of this bet sizing?

JY: The bet sizing reinforces my belief he has a weak hand, but a hand that is better than ace high at this point. My only real decision at this point is whether to raise now or to just call and raise any river. Call it greed, but I elected to…

Young calls.

JY: I really thought my read was spot on, so I wanted to see the river and have him bet out again just so I could take it away from him. By doing this I would gain an approximate extra 200,000 – 225,000 in the pot.

River: 3 (pot: 548,000)

Aljanedi bets 150,000.

CT: How do you feel about your read now?

JY: The river card and the bet sizing could not have worked out better for me. The 3 puts three spades out there and his bet sizing is one of extreme weakness. Not that it would have changed my mind in this spot, but it also helped that I had the A in my hand.

CT: So what’s the best way to take advantage of this spot?

JY: Well the key to the hand was to raise an amount that he will fold his marginal holdings to without risking a huge amount of chips if I was wrong. I made my bet on the smallish side thinking he had already mentally folded or snap called my bluff.

Young bets 430,000. Aljanedi folds. Young wins the pot of 698,000.

JY: Before I put the bet all the way out there he folded, giving me a nice sized pot and more confidence in the heads-up match.

CT: Let’s go back to Aljanedi’s tendency to bet into the raiser from out of position. A lot of players struggle with what to do when a player donk leads into them. Can you give some general advice on how to combat this?

JY: I always thought “donk lead” was a bad term. At a high level it is an extremely effective tool to have in your bag of tricks. The key to doing it properly is to have a plan against what the raiser will do in response to your lead. To be the raiser in the situation and have to react to a lead can be difficult unless you know your opponent’s game.

CT: So let’s say it’s a player you don’t know very well.

JY: Then I always assume they have top pair or an overpair like pocket eights on a 5-4-4 board. With those assumptions, the hand plays relatively easily. At that point it’s about what you have and either figuring out if the player is capable of being bluffed or getting maximum value from your hand.

CT: And against a player who thinks on a higher level?

JY: Against higher-level opponents it’s more about the flow of the game and the history you have with the player. Because it’s very much player dependent it’s difficult for me to give any solid advice like min-raising, floating, or just calling down. The one piece of advice I will share is to have a plan. Workout in your head some of the most likely scenarios and be prepared for them. Not everything will be black and white, but the more situations you are mentally prepared for will then allow you to focus on the proper reaction.

CT: How does your thinking change when a player bets into you when it’s a tournament and not a cash game?

JY: Reacting to a lead is much more difficult in tournament play due to the shallowness of the typical stacks. This leaves less room to obtain information and creates larger pots. A popular idea is to raise small to regain control over the pot for the duration of the hand. The problem with this is that it’s popular, meaning if the opponent is competent they have already planned out what they will do in that scenario. In order to make the best decisions you must gather as much information as possible. So even if you are not in hands, paying attention to betting sequences, bet sizes, and all the hands shown down is imperative.♠