Final Table Takedown: Andy Frankenbergerby Craig Tapscott | Published: Feb 01, 2012 |
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Andy Frankenberger has won over $2 million in live tournament play since he burst onto the poker scene last year. He was named WPT season IX player of the year after winning the Legends of Poker, final tabling Festa al Lago, and coming in 16th at the Bellagio Five Diamond World Poker Classic. He also won a 2010 Venetian Deep Stack tournament for $162,000, finishing 2010 ranked seventh in Card Player’s POY rankings.
In 2011, he followed up this incredible rookie year by besting a field of 2500 players to win a WSOP bracelet in a $1,500 no-limit event, and then went on to final table WPT Foxwoods. Prior to 2010, Andy was a successful equity derivatives trader on Wall Street.
Hand No. 1
Key concepts: Button versus blind end-game dynamics.
Frankenberger raises to 12,000 from the button holding Q J. Dempsey reraises to 60,000 from the small blind.
Craig Tapscott: What was the table dynamic between you and James Dempsey up to this point?
Andy Frankenberger: This was not the first time that we had had this preflop action. The last time that it folded to me on the button, I made the same raise to 12,000 and folded when Dempsey three-bet to 60,000. He knew that I would be opening with a wide range, not only because I was on the button, but also because Andrew Feldman was in the big blind playing tight.
CT: And now he is hammering your button raise once again.
AF: Yes. The second time he made the same move I was obviously more skeptical that he had a big hand. A more standard three-bet size would be to 25,000-35,000, but by making it 60,000, he is putting me in a very difficult spot where I need to commit more than 15 percent of my stack. This was one of the most difficult decisions I had to make at the final table. Even in position, I wasn’t thrilled about playing such a large pot with Q-J suited. Knowing that James could expect me to open the button with any two cards and being in position, however, I felt my hand was on the high end of his perceived range. So I…
Frankenberger calls.
Flop: 5 6 K (pot: 126,000)
Dempsey checks.
CT: What’s the most optimal play here?
AF: Well, I had to decide whether to continuation bet or see another card for free. I thought that checking back the flop against a good player like James would raise a red flag on my flush draw and kill the action if another heart fell. I would have been happy to take the pot down right there, or to get it all in on the flop with my draw, so I decided to bet the pot rather than slow-play or c-bet small.
Frankenberger bets the pot. Dempsey re-pots all in. Frankenberger calls.
Turn: 7 (pot: 666,000)
River: A (pot: 666,000)
Frankenberger wins pot of 666,000.
AF: When James re-potted all in, I had already made my decision that I would call. While I was fortunate to catch the A on the river, the key takeaway from this hand lies in the button vs. blind dynamics.
CT: Please explain.
AF: He pressured me into making a very difficult call preflop, and he rightly concluded that my pot-size bet on the flop meant that I had a draw. He surmised his weak kicker didn’t matter, as I likely would have four-bet a big king or aces preflop, or bet smaller with a K-T, K-J type of hand. If you are going to attempt to use a strategy like James did, you must be very confident in your post-flop abilities, as you’ll be at a severe disadvantage playing out of position if called. Versus a strong opponent like James, aggressively defending his blinds, you must be willing to widen your range and call an oversized three-bet and see a flop. You’re in position, but your positional advantage won’t matter if you get it all in preflop. Calling to make your opponent play a big pot out of position is the best way to defend against this type of aggression.
Hand No. 2
Key concepts: Bluffing: the importance of telling a consistent, plausible story.
CT: Set the stage for heads-up play.
AF: Leading up to this hand, I had been the dominant chip leader for most of heads-up play. Feldman had recently doubled up when his flush draw got there versus my top pair on the flop. He had been playing tight throughout the tournament and heads-up play was no different. Now that he had chips, however, I figured he would be loosening up a bit and trying to steal some hands.
Feldman limps the button. Frankenberger raises to 90,000 holding A9. Feldman reraises to 235,000.
CT: What now?
AF: When Feldman limped the button, I raised figuring I had the best hand and there was a good chance I could take down the pot right there. When he came over the top I had to re-evaluate.
CT: A-9 is not a great hand in this spot. What do you make of his three-bet after limping?
AF: Well A-9 offsuit is generally a tough hand to play out of position for a big pot, but I interpreted his limp/raise preflop with skepticism.
CT: Why?
AF: Feldman had been betting the button enough of the time, and with me three-betting often enough, that I figured that he would have simply raised the button preflop with a premium hand, rather than limp. I weighed the merits of a four-bet, but decided I would have to fold if he shoved, so I opted to flat.
Frankenberger calls.
AF: I also figured that flatting his three-bet from out of position would look even stronger than a four-bet, and would therefore be a good setup to steal the pot if I didn’t connect with the flop.
Flop: K K 10 (pot: 470,000)
Frankenberger checks. Feldman bets 95,000.
AF: While the flop was certainly a miss for me, it was an excellent flop for me to continue to represent a big pair or K-x, either of which I might have raised or called preflop as I did. Feldman bet only 95,000 after I checked. If he had a big pair or A-K, I figured he would either c-bet more than 20 percent of the pot or check behind looking to trap. I decided to just call again, because I figured that would continue to tell the story of my holding a premium hand.
Frankenberger calls.
Turn: 3 (pot: 660,000)
Frankenberger checks. Feldman bets 165,000.
CT: What do you make of such a small bet?
AF: While it’s possible he could have been stringing me along with a king, I felt there was a decent chance I could steal the pot if I continued to play the hand exactly how I would have if I had an actual big hand. For bluffs to be effective versus a good player, they have to tell a consistent story of strength. On a dry board, that may mean betting every street. On a draw heavy board, that may mean betting big when a flush or straight draw would get there. In this hand, up until the turn, every action I took was telling the story of a premium hand. I can’t say that I knew Feldman was as weak as he was, or that I knew I had the better hand with my A-9, but I was confident that min-raising would continue to tell a plausible story of strength.
Frankenberger raises to 330,000. Feldman folds. Frankenberger wins the pot of 825,000.
AF: When Feldman folded, I instinctively turned my cards over and showed the bluff. I rarely show my bluffs, and I didn’t show because I thought he would tilt. In such a big spot, and with the championship on the line in heads-up play, I couldn’t pass up the opportunity to confuse him about my style of play. In this hand, flatting A-9 from out of position and check-raising the turn with air, that was pretty unorthodox, even for me.
CT: To what do you attribute your meteoric rise to the top of poker’s elite tournament players over the last two years?
AF: While I have only been playing poker professionally since 2010, running an equity derivatives trading desk on Wall Street prepared me extremely well for the types of decisions I make at the poker table. I spent my career making quick decisions in the face of uncertainty, where I learned to focus on the knowns rather than the unknowns in tough spots, trust my instincts, and not let my emotions cloud my decisions. My job could also be extremely confrontational – millions were on the line with each decision – to succeed you needed to make high-pressure decisions with the utmost confidence, lest someone would, appropriately, question your judgment. JP Morgan couldn’t have devised a better 14-year training program for my future as a professional poker player.♠
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