Final Table Takedown: Adam Hendrix Scores Big Win At Wynn

Just five years ago, Adam Hendrix was working in Virginia as a contracted software engineer for the government. It was a steady gig, but the Anchorage, Alaska native was winning more on the side playing poker than he was at his day job.

After building up his bankroll online, Hendrix turned pro. He went straight to the WSOP, and finished second in a bracelet event for his first six-figure score. In 2019, he made another WSOP final table before finishing second in a big event at EPT Barcelona for a career-best $384,615.

Once live tournaments resumed in 2021, Hendrix made yet another WSOP final table, and added a runner-up showing at the L.A. Poker Classic, and wins at the Lucky Hearts Poker Open and Poker Masters. This year has been more of the same, with a victory at the U.S. Poker Open in March, and a fourth-place showing in the WSOP $5,000 no-limit event.

He also scored a win just down the street, taking down the $1,600 buy-in no-limit event at the Wynn Summer Classic for $257,885. The 30-year-old now has career live tournament earnings of $3.6 million, which is no. 1 on Alaska’s all-time money list.

Card Player caught up with Hendrix to break down a couple of key hands from his most recent win.

Event: Wynn Summer Classic
Buy-In: $1,600
Entrants: 1,446
Prize Pool: $2,096,700
First-Place Prize: $257,885

Craig Tapscott: How did you approach the myriad of events this summer?

Adam Hendrix: A few weeks into the grueling summer I found myself bouncing around casinos seeking tournaments I could late register, only to bust and go to another venue and do it over again. The previous four tournaments I found myself with an early top 10 stack only to fizzle out near the bubble and barely min cash.

CT: That can’t be too good for your confidence.

AH: Not at all. These results got in my head. I found myself at the Wynn $1,600 with a huge stack. I battled hard going into the bubble and found myself bagging in the money with 18 blinds. But I felt as if it was happening again. 

That night I decided to reflect on the past few weeks as I fell asleep. “What had I not been doing since the beginning of the grind in Vegas?” Three weeks of poker and multiple tournaments each day, and my daily routine had gone out the window. I woke up earlier and went to the gym. I found solitude in the sauna and cleared my head. I found myself focused as the event resumed.

Stacks: Adam Hendrix – 138,000 (17 BB) Villain – 550,000 (68 BB)
Blinds: 4,000-8,000 with an 8,000 big blind ante
Players Remaining: 150
Players: 9

Hendrix raised to 16,000 from under-the-gun holding A Q. Villain called quickly in the cutoff.

AH: I had no initial reads except that he was a recreational player.

CT: What pregame research do you do?

AH: Before the start of day, I always look up every player [at my table] and get an idea of what stakes they play. Also, if they’re professional or recreational. Our Villain in the hand has some decent results, usually plays lower- to mid-stakes, and is a recreational around 40-50 years old. 

CT: Armed with that info, did you have a solid read on his range?

AH: Villain’s range should be a lot of Broadway combinations, A-J offsuit plus, a mix of suited A-x, pocket pairs and some traps like A-A and occasionally K-K, with some of that range three-betting preflop. And a Villain who quickly calls, probably calls a bit too many suited connectors, A-x, and doesn’t fold some of the smaller pocket pairs enough. 

Flop: 10 8 3 (pot: 52,000)

CT: It wasn’t the best flop for you. Was a continuation bet here appropriate?

AH: As the preflop raiser we want to be betting about two-thirds of combinations for a mixed size, but mostly betting 50 percent of the pot. And upon adjusting for the cutoff’s range through solver work, this number comes down as Villain has a lot more 8-x, 10-x, and draws that interact with this flop than it should in theory land. 

Hendrix checked.

AH: I decided to check my hand versus this opponent, as well as a lot more of my range. My hand specifically does not benefit from creating folds, and does benefit in keeping in worse Q-x, and A-x. We let him probe with worse hands, and we won’t get bluffed off our backdoor equity and ace-high showdown if we had decided to bet ourselves.

Villain checked.
Turn: 4 (pot: 52,000)

CT: Pretty much a blank.

AH: When the 4 came in it doesn’t complete any flush draw, no other draws, and doesn’t interact with Villain’s flatting range very much. Again, I think for the same reason as on the flop, our hand does well to check. We would start bluffing with hands like wheel A-x, offsuit hands with a club, and mixing in some straight draws. But for this turn in general we should check.

Hendrix checked. Villain bet 15,600.

CT: What was your take on his bet sizing? Was he just taking a stab?

AH: I think this size seemed very showdown heavy with the weaker portion of his range, as well as he could have had some random bluffs in his range that can create folds from some A-x on the turn such as K-J, Q-J, K-Q, K-9, Q-9, J-9 etc.

CT: So, you deduced he was weak from the bet sizing?

AH: Primarily the Villain should be betting 50-75 percent pot about 40 percent of the time and checking the rest. This makes our options very easy to proceed as the size they are using is not efficient.

CT: You’re saying you would have folded pretty easily if he had bet over 50 percent of pot?

AH: I’d probably still call even if he bet bigger but may not have proceeded to call on the river or find bluffs as frequently. With a bigger bet I’d have more frequently called than raise, whereas I contemplated raising here, because of such a weak stab.
Hendrix called.

River: 7 (pot: 83,200)
Hendrix moved all-in.

AH: On the river 7 the front flush draw completed. I decided to donk jam. When you run this hand through a solver we get no lead jams. So why did we do it? 

CT: You read my mind. You didn’t have the A blocker.

AH: Because having the queen of clubs is very good here, as we blocked his most likely flush draws that play somewhat passively such as K Q, Q J, Q 9. And through population reads, I believe A-x of clubs would either bet flop, or once having checked flop, would again check turn. Therefore, the lack of A in our hand is not super relevant. Our hand did have some small amount of showdown beating a lot of the hands described on the turn. But a lot of his hands had snap folds and very few in this line can call. He tanked then…

Villain folded. Hendrix won the pot of 83,200.

Stacks: Adam Hendrix – 655,000 (43 BB) Villain – 600,000 (40 BB)
Blinds: 5,000-15,000 with a 15,000 big blind ante
Players Remaining: 60
Players: 9

AH: I turned my short stack on day two into an above-average stack, and my table broke. I ran through a mental checklist to get acquainted with my new opponents.

Anyone I know? What are my reads on them? Then I glanced at everyone’s stack sizes. I also really paid attention to the players closest to me, what were they wearing, how did they seem emotionally, and where were they from? I tried to strike up conversations.

I immediately played a hand versus seat 1. I opened, he defended the big blind and swiftly slammed in a check-raise. I folded a close spot, where previous table knowledge would have been important. I have none. Again, I opened, and he instantly moved all-in from the small blind. I folded.

CT: And your immediate read was what?

AH: The way he moved his chips, the speed at which he played, as well as his look, I deduced that he was an aggressive professional. I paid close attention to him. He was two to my left and posed the biggest threat, with a similar chip stack. Then this hand went down with him.  

Villain raised to 30,000 from UTG. Hendrix called from the big blind holding J 2.

CT: Seems like a bit of a loose call.

AH: Preflop we have a standard call. Sometimes versus aggressive opponents you can start folding the big blind a little more, if you think you can’t realize the equity of your hand and navigate to showdown without being at risk. In our case, we don’t fold suited hands.

Flop: J 8 4 (pot: 80,000)
Hendrix checked. Villain bet 50,000. Hendrix called.

AH: That was a pretty good bet sizing, putting a lot of our hands instantly at indifference. But in our case, we had an easy call with top pair and backdoor flush draw. With our range we want to start check-raising a few better J-x hands, some semi bluff 4-x with backdoors, as well as some hands like Q-10, Q-9. Here we don’t fold pairs, but versus some opponents that are tighter and maybe only bet this size with big hands, we would have comfortably folded.

Turn: 5 (pot: 180,000)
Hendrix checked.

AH: We can have a small portion of our range lead sometimes. But with his bigger flop stab and aggressive nature, I liked checking.

CT: What were your thoughts on his range?

AH: This turn was unique in the fact that it was hard for the Villain to improve his range much. He lacked turned two pairs as the preflop raiser from an early position. He shouldn’t have J-5, 8-5. Sometimes will have 4-5 in his range, but may not opt to bet two-thirds pot on the flop. And 6-7 suited is a big concern, overpairs, sets etc., but still the turn didn’t improve too much of his range.

Villain bet 125,000.

CT: Did you pick up any other reads?

AH: This time he tanked much longer. That was odd for the hands we’ve seen leading up to this. It’s usually a sign of uncertainty, especially if players are not balanced in their timing. But it’s not the total deciding factor; more like in a 50/50 decision we can use that as a factor to push the needle one way or other. Still with top pair, and an improved flush draw, we have an easy call.

Hendrix called.
River: K (pot: 430,000)
Hendrix checked. Villain moved all-in.

AH: On the river, a “scare” card appeared as some of his bluffs now had improved, and a king doesn’t usually help us. He jammed after less hesitation than the turn. And I think our hand is a theory call. And also with the deuce I held, unblocking his bluffs like 10-9, 5-6, A-6, A-7, A-9, A-10, Q-10, Q-9, J-9, J-10, etc.

When you dive deeper into the hands we call with, J-2 is preferred to hands like J-10, J-9, J-7 as well as hands that include an ace or queen (his primary bluff candidates). But do people triple barrel in live poker effectively? No. But do people value bet thin enough? No. Now this hand really comes down to the opponent and the short amount we had played with him.

CT: What were the main decision factors?

AH: This is live poker. There are many avenues we can use to figure out a decision. I started to compile what I had seen: an aggressive nature, the long pause on the turn, and how he acted in the hand. Would he have a lot of hands that would want to jam quicker on the river? The J-x doesn’t value bet and would one pair Kx always be all-in or take its showdown value?

I started to table talk with our opponent, trying to gather a read. I jokingly looked down at my stack and said, “You left me with a few blinds. I’ll still be in the tournament if I call,” as I had him slightly covered. He smirked and responded laughing, “chip and a chair right.” As I contemplated a decision, another player called for the clock. When the clock was called my opponent’s smile appeared to grow more comfortable. So I…

Hendrix called. The Villain turned over Q 10, and Hendrix won the pot of 1,205,000.

Find Hendrix on Twitter @AdamHendrix10. ♠