Hands From Tunica

In January, I spent two weeks in Tunica, Mississippi, at the World Poker Open. I have a number of interesting no-limit hold'em hands that I would like to detail for you. But before I do, I'd like to describe the most amazing final-table comeback I have ever heard of in my life. This description is excerpted from various places in the official tournament bulletin report, with the key hand told to me by an eyewitness.

In the Omaha eight-or-better event, the two finalists were Gary Jones of London, England, and Sirous Baghchehsaraie of Los Angeles. Gary at his zenith had a monster chip lead over Sirous, $437,000 to $5,000. In fact, Sirous had to use his last 5 grand to post the small blind, as the stakes were $5,000-$10,000 at that point. The cards were dealt, and Sirous held 5-4-3-3 against a Jones hand that included a queen and a 7. The flop came Q-9-7, giving Gary two pair, queens and sevens, against a lowly pair of threes. Who would guess that Sirous would go on to scoop this pot – without catching a 3 – and go on to win the event a mere 35 minutes later?! The turn and river were two running nines, counterfeiting Gary's two pair and giving Sirous a full house of three nines and two threes! After this amazing hand, the bulletin stated, "At no time during the rush did Baghchehsaraie lose any part of his stack." Top that one!

Here is a hand I saw that came up in a cash game where I was waiting for a seat. (After I relate it, you will understand why I wanted to play in the game!) It shows how much action you can get if you do a lot of bluffing. The game was $5-$10 blinds no-limit hold'em. A bunch of players limped in for $10 and the big blind raised the pot $200 more. He was a heavy-set fellow who had a mountain of chips in front of him. He had been playing extremely aggressively and was slaughtering the game. A player in middle position was the only caller. The flop came down A-7-4 rainbow. The preflop raiser bet $400, his opponent raised to $800, and the preflop raiser put his opponent all in for about $1,200 more. His opponent agonized and finally called. The hands were quite a bit less in value for what you might normally expect for this kind of betting. The preflop raiser had moved all in with A-10 offsuit. His opponent had called a $1,200 reraise with pocket sixes! The aces held up, and the sixes quit the game. I was first up and happy to get a seat, but would have preferred to have a different player departing to give it to me.

The next hand is from my own play in a no-limit hold'em tournament event. While playing it, I encountered the toughest poker problem that I have faced in a long time. In fact, I gave this hand to four of the best players in the world – and got four different answers! One said call, one raised a small amount, one raised a medium amount, and one moved all in. Here is the controversial hand.

I was on the button with the 10 9. The blinds were $100-$200, with no ante. It was a rebuy tournament, but the rebuy period had just expired. I mention this because my view of the opposing players had been during the rebuy phase, when the play was quite loose.

A player limped in from first position, a short stack in middle position called, and I called. The small blind folded, so four players were in for the flop. The flop came nicely for me, 10 9 8, giving me top two pair. The big blind checked, the under-the-gun player checked, and the short stack bet all of his money, $975, which was $75 more than the pot size. I had about $5,500 left, while the other two players had slightly more than that. What should I do?

If there's anything I hate in poker, it is making a committal move against another player and having someone who had checked the nuts – and been ignored – get the present of the Ponderosa given to him when the betting gets back to him. Committing all of my money here goes against my grain, although I did consider it. The more I thought about the situation, the more I liked the idea of not raising at all, so that an opponent who called would be contesting a pot with me in which I had position and a player was all in. This meant he would likely not try a bluff, because he would still have to beat the all-in player. Even though there were lots of straight draws, I felt that if he hit a straight, he would not check it and give me a free draw at a diamond flush. He would bet and reveal the fact that he had helped. If I let him pay a grand to draw, he would have to hit his hand on the turn, because I could blow him out of the pot if a blank came, or even a straight card that he chose to check. So, I just called the all-in wager. Even in retrospect, if the same situation arose again, I would take the same action, despite hearing some arguments of merit for other courses of action.

After I called the all-in bet, the big blind folded. However, the under-the-gun player quickly raised all of his chips! I had to rethink the situation. True, I had just called to avoid being dinner for someone who had checked the nuts on the flop. My first inclination was to fold. But, the more I thought about it, the more I felt there was a good chance that I had the best hand. First, my opponent had moved in quickly. A lot of people with the nuts would Hollywood a bit, or bet a lesser amount, hoping to get called. Second, I was probably sized up as being on a draw, because of my failure to raise – or, as possibly having a made hand that was too weak to commit any more chips. My actual strong holding of top two pair would not be expected. So, I thought there was some chance that my opponent had limped in with a big pair, and an even better chance that he held two pair. I did not think a set was likely, since my opponent had open-raised several times with pocket pairs the size of the cards that had flopped, rather than just call. So, I called all in, and we showed our hands. It turns out that he had the 10 9, essentially the same hand as mine. (He had a runner-runner diamond freeroll, but the turn was a black deuce, squelching that possibility.) The all-in player had a black K-J, which was an open-end straight draw. When another blank arrived on the river, I got half the pot.

Had I moved all in on the flop, could I have won it all? There is no telling whether my opponent would have called or folded, since he would have been faced with an extremely tough problem, something like the one I myself had faced. I was happy that my read turned out to be right, but I of course expected to have a big advantage if he had two pair; I didn't expect him to have the identical two pair that I held.

The whole situation reminds me of the famous Mark Twain poker quote: "Learning how to play two pair is as expensive as a college education – and worth just about as much." I have been playing poker for more than a half-century, and still sometimes have difficulty playing two pair correctly. But, then again, so do Ulliott, Harrington, Cloutier, and Bonetti, the fearsome poker foursome I had given the problem, as they all disagreed with each other on the best answer! (I know you are interested in who advocated what, but that is a secret. My poker friends would not like info about how they play to appear in my column.) Is there a poker player anywhere on the planet who always knows how to play two pair correctly? If so, he's a rich man.

Bob Ciaffone has authored four poker books, Middle Limit Holdem Poker, Pot-limit and No-limit Poker, Improve Your Poker, and Omaha Holdem Poker. All can be ordered from Card Player. Ciaffone is available for poker lessons: e-mail [email protected]. His website is www.pokercoach.us, where you can get his rulebook, Robert's Rules of Poker, for free. Ciaffone is the cardroom director for ChecknRaisePoker.com.