Looking for Clues

A great many games players whose main field of expertise is chess are now making all or part of their living from poker. Switching to poker is a fairly natural move for chess players, especially since the rewards in chess – for all except the very top players – are quite feeble. The mentality of a strong chess player is, in general, quite well-suited to poker. Chess players are usually fairly aggressive creatures; they like to be in control of situations and often have a bit of "gamble" in them. All of this helps when playing poker.



I suspect that a compensating weakness may well be a tendency to go on tilt. Most very strong chess players really hate losing – and I mean really hate it. They will fight like tigers to defend bad positions because the pain of investing several hours of nervous energy in a game, only to end up with a big fat zero on the scorecard, is so great. However, in poker, even consistent winning players have to spend much of their time – maybe even most of it – losing. Many times, the result of a hand, session, or tournament is simply beyond your control. You just have to get used to it, and that is a difficult feature for chess players to adapt to.



However, I have always suspected that bridge players ought to make very good poker players. They already have card skills and are attuned to the vagaries of fortune that naturally accompany games with a random element. They also understand that their opponents are often trying to deceive them, they have a good eye for technical detail, and they are adept at looking for clues in previous play and making assumptions based on what they remember.



This final skill is one that poker players would do very well to develop. Strong bridge players have this ability in spades (ha-ha!). The very best players can examine a hand in forensic detail and make deductions such as, "My opponent on my left opened one heart, but when I bid two clubs, he passed rather than overbidding two hearts, so the hearts probably break 5-4 rather than 6-3, so I should play the heart suit by … ," and so on.



An individual hand of hold'em is not played in isolation. It is one hand in the context of a longer session, and during that session, you have the chance to observe your opponents and watch how they play their hands. It is also important to remember exactly what happened at an earlier stage of a hand, as this can provide crucial information as to how you should play. Here is an example:



This is an eight-player game and you are in the big blind with the A 10. The under-the-gun player, who is to your immediate left, is pretty loose preflop and likes to get involved in a lot of hands. However, you have noticed that although he handicaps himself by playing too many hands, he is actually quite skilled post-flop. He has a good feel for what is going on and is quite capable of making plays – raising appropriately, bluffing, semibluffing, and so on. In fact, he likes to make such plays.



On this occasion, he limps in and everyone folds around to you. Of course, you can check, but you know that he probably has quite a feeble holding. Your A-10 is likely to be the best hand right now, so, quite reasonably, you elect to raise. He calls. There are four and a half small bets in the pot and the flop comes down 10 9 7, giving you top pair, top kicker. This is not a bad flop, by any means, but you have to be concerned about its coordinated nature, especially considering that your opponent limped in originally. Players who like to get involved will often limp in with middling cards, and there is a danger that this flop has hit him big time.



Nevertheless, you of course bet, and he calls fairly quickly. There are now three and a quarter big bets in the pot and the turn is a harmless 2. You bet, and he again calls. There are five and a quarter big bets in the pot and the river brings the 6. This is a rather ugly card because it makes both a flush and a straight possible. So, now what do you do?



Many players like to decide instantly, reasoning, "That's not going to frighten me – bet," or, "Uh-oh – that's a scary card; I'd better check and call."



However, the best course of action is not to do anything at all, at least not immediately. The best plan is to use the big thing between your ears and think – specifically about what has happened in the hand to this point, what you know about your opponent, and how likely it is that this card has made a hand for him.



First of all, you know that he plays well post-flop and likes to make plays. However, in this particular hand, he has simply called your flop and turn bets rather than raise. If the 6 really has helped his hand, it is probable that he has an 8 in his hand and has now made a straight, or has two clubs and has now completed a flush.



So, are these holdings likely? Not really. If he had a hand that included either an 8 or a couple of clubs, he would have had a very good drawing hand on the flop and most likely would have raised. But he didn't raise – he just called. This strongly implies that he has some sort of mediocre made hand. Furthermore, if he had such a hand on the flop and turn, he still does, and will probably call a bet on the river. So, you bet, he calls, and you win. The hand history shows that he had the 4 4 and was speculating on your holding unpaired overcards. If you had played a safety-first game and checked, he would have checked it back and one big bet would have slipped through your fingers.



Here is another example: This is a 10-player game and you are in the big blind with the J 9. The under-the-gun player (UTG) is a moderate, solid player who has very tight preflop standards. Let's consider two ways that this hand can be played:



1. The UTG opens with a raise, a middle-position player calls, and you call. There are three players in the pot and six and a half small bets. The flop comes Q 10 8, giving you a straight. There are various ways to play here, but you decide to check. The UTG bets, the middle-position player folds, and you raise. The UTG now three-bets, you cap, and he calls. There are seven and a quarter big bets in the pot and the turn brings the 4. You bet and he calls. There are nine and a quarter big bets in the pot and the river is the A. You bet, and he raises.



2. The UTG limps in and a middle-position player raises. You call, as does the UTG. The play from here on in is identical to that in No. 1 above. Again, you bet the river and get raised.



The A has made a flush possible, as well as created the possibility of a Broadway straight. Rather than just make an instant call and hope for the best, let's think about what the UTG might actually hold.



We know he is a moderate, solid player. Therefore, he is raising the river for value, genuinely believing that the A has given him the winning hand. Well, has it?



If he is now beating you, his hand must be either K-J or two clubs. You can beat everything else. What is the strongest two-club hand he can have? The A and the Q are on the board, so the best he can have is the K J. In No. 1 above, our opponent (who – remember – is very tight preflop) open-raised from under the gun.

Therefore, he "cannot" have the K J. He can, however, have A-A, A-K, or A-Q. All of these hands would justify his play to this point (actually, three-betting the flop with A-K would be a bit optimistic, but it is not a ridiculous play). In No. 2 above, in which he originally limped in, he can certainly be holding K-J and can certainly have a random holding that features two clubs.



Thus, in No. 1, we should reraise for value, and in No. 2, we should be more circumspect and call. When playing poker, always stay alert, watch the play, and look for clues. You may spot some useful stuff.

Byron Jacobs is the author of How Good is Your Limit Hold Em? with Jim Brier, and Beginner's Guide to Limit Hold'em. They are available through bookshops and at http://www.dandbpoker.com/. Byron may be contacted at [email protected].