A Good Play Against Ken Lennaard

Last June I visited Barcelona, my favorite city. The whole combination of sun, beach, bars, good food, discos, and so on is really fantastic – both in Port Olympic and the rest of the town. I always try to visit Barcelona at least two times per year, usually when there's a big tournament week.



The hand I am going to discuss took place during the tournament week that was staged there this summer. We are playing a €2,000 buy-in tournament, no-limit hold'em. We started with €10,000 in chips, and the blinds are now €50-€100.



About half an hour into the tournament, the following hand comes up. There is an early call and Ken Lennaard – an excellent Swedish player – raises to €300. He gets one caller behind him and I wake up with K-K in the big blind. My stack size is €8,500. Normally I would make it something like €1,600 or €1,800, but this time I decide to take a little bit more risk, by raising to only €1,300. I really want to try to double up with this hand, and think reraising a bit smaller than usual could be the way to accomplish this. Ken is the only player who calls, having about €10,000 in chips left. The pot size is €3,250.

Two cowboys – and there we have it, the inevitable ace on the board



The flop comes A-10-8, with two spades and a diamond. When you are holding K-K and you see a flop with an ace, your first feeling is one of disgust. But before starting to whine, let's first look at how bad this flop really is. Maybe it isn't as bad as it appears.



To tackle this correctly, we first need to analyze the hands my opponent is likely to have. Because he quickly called my reraise without much thinking, my first idea was that he had a pair from 8-8 to Q-Q. But Ken always plays quickly, so it doesn't say that much. Still, I think that there is a good chance that with a hand like A-A or K-K, he would have taken a bit more time, and probably would have put in a reraise.



A-K is not all that likely, either, because I have K-K; plus, there is some chance that he would have reraised with A-K, as well, instead of the flat-call that he made. How about A-Q? Well, I think calling with A-Q in this situation is not such a good play, and one that a player of Ken's calibre is not likely to make. OK, so maybe A-Q suited would be a possibility. But because I respect his game very much, I would almost skip the possibility that he would have called me with an A-Q offsuit here.



Time for some calculations



So, let's do a bit of math now, all based on the range of hands that I think Ken would have called my reraise with. I am losing to A-A, A-K, A-Q suited, 10-10, and 8-8, and I beat Q-Q, J-J, and 9-9.



With an A-10-8 flop and two kings in my hand, we have the following count:



• There are three A-A possibilities left, but because I think he would probably reraise two out of three times, we count only one A-A possibility.



• With three aces and two kings, we have six A-K possibilities. Inasmuch as I think he would have reraised me with A-K at least one time out of six, let's be generous and count five A-K possibilities.



• There are three combinations each for the A-Q suited, the 10-10, and the 8-8.



Adding this all up, there are 15 hands that beat me.



Now let's take a look at the hands I beat – Q-Q, J-J, and 9-9. With none of these cards out, they are all possible in six different ways. So, I beat 18 hands.



Surprise, surprise … I am probably winning, despite this scary ace on the board.



OK, so I am probably a slight favorite to have the best hand. But now – how do I play it?



Nice, this feels better already, I guess. But how can I use this information to come up with the best possible decisions from now on?



Well, we have €3,250 in the middle, I have €7,200 left, and I think I am probably about an 18-to-15 favorite. What am I going to do now? Would it be possible for me to consider making a laydown if it turns out that Ken shows much strength? The answer is: No, I don't think so. If I would simply fold any decent hand just because he is showing strength, I would be giving up a bit too much. So, because I am not laying down, the best thing to do for me is to induce a bluff from him.



Now my only task is to make him put money in the pot while I have the best hand. (Remember, if I am beat, I will lose my chips anyway – regardless of whether I put in the chips or he does.) I decide to bet €1,000, a small bet compared to the size of the pot – a bet that could be analyzed as, "Hmm, Rob doesn't want to give away the initiative by checking, but his bet suggests that he may be afraid of the ace." Anyway, Ken calls quickly. So, I still don't know where I am. The pot size is €5,250 – and I have €6,200 left.



A blank comes on the turn. Now what?



Well, in my view, the situation hasn't changed all that much. Again, I have to try to prevent a situation that when all the money goes, I am beat for sure. So, betting my last €6,200 all in would be a very bad bet, as Ken would probably just call when he has me beat, and fold all the hands that I could beat.



So, again I decide to go for the €1,000 bet. Now Ken moves all in. OK, since this is the way I play it, there is no way back for me now. I don't feel so confident, but of course I call. He shows me J-J, and I double up.



Is there a lesson?



I have chosen specifically this hand for this column not because I happened to win it, but because, in my opinion, there were a lot of interesting things involved. Looking at it from Ken's point of view, I think he did nothing wrong. I really played it post-flop as if I had K-K or Q-Q, so I think he had good reason to make a move to try to bet me off my hand.



He correctly figured that if indeed I had one of these holdings, he could make me lay it down. But, fortunately for me, I chose to do otherwise.



Rob Hollink is the 2005 European Poker Champion, and can be found playing under his own name at www.robspokerroom.com. For more information, visit www.robhollinkpoker.com.