Value-Bet on the End?

If you never bet the worst hand on the river, you're not value-betting enough. Yeah, I know - when you get called by a better hand, you feel like you have egg on your face. But did you make the incorrect play? Maybe not! As long as all plausible scenarios play out in a manner that gains you value as a whole, your bet is correct. Furthermore, if you bet for value only when you're absolutely sure you have the best hand, observant opponents will pick up on it quickly and you'll have trouble getting paid when you know you hand is good.

I was playing $30-$60 limit hold'em at Bellagio. A woman in middle position in front of me opened the pot for a raise. I looked down to see the A 10. I thought about the options I had with my holding. The woman had raised with a wide range of hands. As a matter of fact, she raised with almost any hand she played, which was many more hands than conventional wisdom might dictate.

I really had two available plays with my hand: I could flat-call, letting other players into the pot, and play my hand for volume. The value of playing the hand this way was to let in players who might make a second-best hand and give me action. This trapping play is stronger with suited hands, particularly nut suited hands, because when you make a flush, the players giving you action are often drawing dead; therefore, very high-value bets are gained. That said, my other choice - isolating a player when I might have the best holding that could win unimproved - also had high value.

Obviously, these two concepts were not congruent in this situation. When faced with such dilemmas, I look to any other issues that add or subtract value from one of the concepts. In this situation, the players yet to act behind me were solid; they played their hands well. This reduced the likelihood that they would call multiple bets and also give me action if I made a hand. Furthermore, the woman was someone whom I read well, so I could likely play my hand optimally against her without having to take the nuances of a third or even fourth contestant for the pot into account.

When I weighed the variables, I chose three-betting the woman, hoping to force the rest of the field out and play her heads up with position.

Of course, the best laid plans do not always work. Part of quantifying the equation for or against three-betting is the chance that you won't fold the field behind you. This is a particularly bad result if a player who calls/raises has a hand or even might have a hand that dominates yours.

A tight-passive player called the three bets cold. He was the type of player who overvalued hand selection. He waited for a good hand, then always seemed to take it to the river, expecting that his starting requirements would make him an overall winner. Of course, that strategy doesn't beat players who play their hands well, especially if they read well. All of that said, the caller could very well have a holding that dominated my rather marginal mitt.

The rest of the field folded, the woman called, and we took the flop off threehanded. I thought the caller behind me had a good but not great hand, probably a pair from 8-8through Q-Q, and perhaps A-K,A-Q, or 7-7. I believed he'd have hit me again with A-A, K-K, or A-K suited. As a whole, my hand did not play well against his range of hands. That said, what a difference a flop can make!

The flop came 10 7 6, giving me top pair, top kicker. While there still were holdings that the caller behind me might have that I couldn't beat, the flop put me ahead of some that had me in trouble preflop, particularly A-K, A-Q, and, of course, 8-8 or 9-9. The woman checked, I fired $30 into the pot, the man behind me called, and the woman folded.

The turn card was the 4, adding a flush draw to my holding. I fired $60 into the pot. Once again, my opponent flat-called. The river brought the 2. I missed my flush, and now was faced with the dilemma of what to do here on the river. I thought about my opponent's range of possible hands and the style of his play.

His passiveness dictated that he would not raise with a pair that he thought might not be good. He didn't bluff much, but he did bluff a little, especially when last to act. There was some small chance that he had a big hand, most likely a set, and was waiting until the river to raise. I had seen him make a similar play earlier in the session.

If I bet the river, I thought he would call with any pair, thinking I might have A-K. If he was slow-playing a monster, he would raise me. If I checked, I thought he would bet any overpair, but I was not sure how he would treat an underpair to the tens. I thought he might bluff - not every time, but often enough that I would be correct in calling a pot of this size. Since the range of pairs I had him on included eights, nines, jacks, and queens - only half of which I could beat - was betting correct? Could he have flopped a set of sevens and waited until the end to make his move?

I thought his most likely holdings were 8-8, 9-9, J-J, or Q-Q. If I was correct in my analysis, I thought he would bet J-J and Q-Q if I checked, and just call with them if I bet. If he held either of those hands and I checked and called his bet (as I likely would, for the size of the pot), the situation would play out the same in regard to number of bets. If he held 8-8 or 9-9, he would call, but might check if I checked. So, if I bet, I would gain from the situation if he would check those hands.

The fact that I was unsure of whether he would bet needed to be included in my analysis. It made betting a superior play if he held those hands. If he would check those hands but then call with them, I gained a bet. If I bet, I took away my chances of picking off a bluff by check-calling down. I also risked getting raised if he had slow-played, but the way I read him, I didn't think that scenario was likely.

I bet my hand, thinking it more likely that I would gain more from him calling with 8-8 and 9-9 than I would by check-calling and picking off his bluff. It was a "feel" decision, as much of the equation was subjective, with my best estimate of his reactions. I didn't have to be right with those estimates. When in hindsight I find that I was wrong with my feel, I analyze my thoughts, and if they were well-founded on past events and made logical sense, I don't beat myself up over my decision.

I bet! He called, and showed two nines before tossing his hand into the muck. I wanted to ask him if he would have bet if I had checked, to verify my thinking, but chose not to do so out of respect for the man I had just beaten. Also, it's never a good idea to put thoughts into opponents' heads that they might not otherwise have and could use the next time you're in a hand together.

My opponent could just as well have called my river bet and shown me J-J or Q-Q, and I'd be sitting there with egg on my face, going over the hand and wondering if I'd made the right play. Or, he could have raised my river bet, putting me to a tougher decision. Dragging the chips sure made it feel correct, but that doesn't make it so! Still, if I erred, I erred on the side of trying to make the extra bet on the end by value-betting - and that is always my preferred error!

Roy Cooke has played winning professional poker since 1972, and has been a Card Player columnist since 1992. He serves as a freelance consultant to the I-poker industry and has a successful Las Vegas real estate brokerage firm. He has written six poker books, which are available from www.conjelco.com/cooke. His website is www.roycooke.com. His longtime collaborator, John Bond, is a freelance writer in South Florida.