When playing large pots in limit hold'em games, unless your hand is virtually unbeatable, the most important concept is to give yourself as great a chance to win the pot as possible. When the pot is large, even hands with a small chance of winning are often correct in calling because of the great odds the large pot is offering. And when your opponent is correct in calling, your hand will have stronger edge if he folds. Good players play their potential winning hands in a manner that manipulates their opponents into either folding their drawing hands or paying as high a price as possible to draw, thereby reducing the odds the pot is offering their opponents.
It was tournament time at Bellagio, the
Five-Diamond World Poker Classic. Lots of players were in Las Vegas looking to fatten their bankrolls with either a good tournament showing or from the increased action in the lucrative side games. The $30-$60 limit hold'em game I was seated in was fast and loose, with many players seeing the flop.
I was in the small blind with the A
J
. Four players limped into the pot, the button raised to $60, and it was up to me. The button was a highly aggressive player, one who played fast both preflop and post-flop. I thought about three-betting, as my hand would not necessarily be inferior to his. I weighed that thought against my situation.
Was there much chance that my hand was good? There was at least some chance. Mr. Button-Raiser would hit it with a wide range of hands from the button, some of which I either had beat or dominated. But he also would raise with superior hands to mine, and could possess a hand that had my hand beat or dominated.
Would any of the limping players fold for three bets? Folding players who leave "dead money" in the pot greatly add value to your hand, and it is worth taking some risks for it. But I didn't think three-betting would eliminate any of the callers. Once they called a single bet, it was not in their nature to fold preflop.
Furthermore, my position was poor, as I would be first to act on all streets.
I decided to flat-call, liking the texture of my nut suited hand against a field. If I made a big hand, there would be plenty of available players to give me action. Much of that action was likely to be high-value. The big blind called, as did all of the limpers. We took the flop off sevenhanded.
The flop came J
4
3
, giving me top pair and a backdoor-flush draw. I thought about how to play my hand. I wanted to either eliminate players or charge them the maximum that I could to draw. That said, my hand didn't necessarily have to be good, either. I didn't think one pair would bring this meaty bone home if most of the field took off the next card!
If I led, I thought the players in between me and Mr. Button-Raiser would be less inclined to raise, because I had a tight image and they would be afraid of a possible raise from a superior hand of Mr. Button-Raiser behind them. If I checked, Mr. Raiser was the type of player who always bet when checked to. I checked, hoping the field also would check to the raiser and I could make it two bets back to the field. I wanted to eliminate some players, but worst case, if my check-raise play worked, they would pay at least two bets to draw.
It did work! The field checked and the button fired $30 into the pot. I check-raised! Only two players in between me and Mr. Button-Raiser called, and he three-bet me.
When he three-bet, I thought about his range of hands. I thought, being an aggressive player, he would raise with any jack or any overpair. He also was capable of raising as a free-card/cheap-situation play. By free-card/cheap-situation play, I mean overplaying a hand on a "cheap" street in order to be able to check later on in the hand, thereby either getting to a showdown cheaper or receiving a free card along the way. I wanted to take that play away from him. There were two ways to do that: flat-call and bet the turn, or four-bet and lead. I thought there was more value in four-betting, as the callers might fold or put in money with little chance of winning, thereby increasing the value of my hand.
They didn't fold, and neither did Mr. Button-Raiser. We took the turn fourhanded.
The turn brought the 8
. I led into the field and everyone called. The river was the 8
, pairing the board. I thought about checking. The value in checking was that someone might check a better hand. I didn't think anyone would bluff at this pot. I believed the likelihood of any of the callers having a better hand was minimal, while they might have a hand with which to make a "size of the pot" call. Mr. Button-Raiser might have a better hand, but with his style being so aggressive, he definitely wouldn't check it, and since he also would likely bet any jack, I would be calling anyway. So, I decided to bet, thinking that I would gain bets from hands with which my opponents would check if I checked, but call if I bet.
I fired $60 forward, both callers folded, and Mr. Raiser called. I showed my A
J
, and he smiled and turned over the A
J
. We split the pot. It was not my favorite result, but it definitely was not my least favorite, either.
Protect your hand in large pots. The larger the pot and the more vulnerable your hand, the more risks you should take to protect it. Conceptually, think in terms of what will increase or decrease the value of your hand and make the correct play. Keep that in mind and maybe I'll be seeing you at the next
Five-Diamond World Poker Classic at Bellagio.
Roy Cooke has played more than 60,000 hours of pro poker and has been part of the I-poker industry since its beginnings. His longtime collaborator, John Bond, is a freelance writer in South Florida.
