After I wrote the first installment of this series, something happened that provides real-life evidence that my pontification has practical value. I won a $20 plus $2 buy-in pot-limit draw tournament. (See? I'm more than just another pretty face.) There were 168 entrants, and my prize was $924. The tournament lasted just over three hours.
I remained well below average in chips for most of the tournament, and started the final table (six players) in fifth position. The chip leader had nearly four times the amount of my chips. I would not even have made the final table had I not gotten extremely lucky, going all in and winning a pot in which I was nearly an 11-to-1 underdog.
I played conservatively until I was in the money; 24 places were paid. Several times, I declined to get involved when it looked like I was beat, and I was right most of those times.
Early in the tournament, I did not draw to straights and flushes. I did not risk anything when I thought I was behind. That is, I did not take the worst of it even if making my hand could potentially have doubled or tripled my stack. I didn't want to contribute too great a portion of my chips when the most likely outcome was that I would miss completely or end up with a hand with which I would not want to risk even more of my chips if faced with an after-the-draw bet.
I also did not play two pair at all when there was a bet and a raise, or a raise and a reraise, when it got to me.
I got raised out of some hands that would have cost other players substantial portions of their stacks - or, if they got lucky or guessed right, put them at the top of the leader board.
Early on, I played two small pair for a small raise, against four others. I gave up after the draw to a pot-sized bet.
I opened for three times the big blind with queens up, and got reraised nearly four times my raise. Again, I quit.
Generally, the play was weak. Players limped in with small pairs, called rather than raise with two pair, called with big pairs, and called with come hands. Most often, raising indicated a strong hand. Players underbet big hands after the draw, and called when likely beat.
In one unraised pot, I made three queens from the big blind against a one- and a two-card draw. I bet $300, about half the pot. The one-card draw raised $1,200, nearly half of my stack. If the one-card draw had two pair or even three of a kind with a kicker, he likely would have just called. He either had made a complete hand or was bluffing. I wasn't going to risk that much to find out. In another hand, I started with three fives and got check-raised my whole stack after the draw. I gave that one up, too.
With the blinds of $100-$200, I was down to $1,305 and had to make a move. Two players limped in, and I raised the maximum with a pair of aces, leaving me with $65. The first player reraised and the second limper folded. I figured my tournament was over, but I couldn't fold. I was thrilled when the reraiser took three cards, and even happier when my aces beat jacks. I was now back to 15 times the big blind, and no longer desperate.
With blinds at $1,000-$2,000, I had $12,315. My cards were A
K
Q
J
8
on the button. The table had been moderately tight. When the first three players folded, I tried a steal, opening for $8,000. The small blind raised me all in. If I folded, I would have barely two big blinds left and little chance to go farther. I knew I was beat, but I didn't want to continue virtually crippled. I was in the money, but the only way to win the tournament was to try to win this hand. I was in much worse shape than someone in a comparable situation in a hold'em tournament, in which first-round matchups are rarely worse than 2-to-1. I called. The small blind drew one card, as did I. I caught the 10
. My straight beat two pair, kings up. This win put me second at the table, with everyone hovering between $21,000 and $28,000.
I went back to folding most hands, once in a while managing to open-raise from the button with a marginal hand and take the blinds.
When the final table assembled, I was fifth. In one hand, chip leader D-RedLox came in for a raise. I reraised all in with queens up, and she folded. That put me second with $51,830 versus her $80,800.
With blinds of $1,500-$3,000, I raise-opened to $6,000 on three nines. D-RedLox reraised to $15,000. I reraised the maximum to $46,800, and she put me all in for another $4,730. My trips held up against her aces up. Still sixhanded, I was now the chip leader with nearly 40 percent of the chips.
When it became threehanded, I had two-thirds of the chips. I kept pounding away, raise-opening from the button with a pair of nines or better and with any straight or flush draw, and from the small blind with any pair, and sometimes just two high cards. I won all of those uncontested. I did not play when either of my opponents came in for a raise.
With the blinds at $3,000-$6,000, I opened for $18,000 from the button with A
K
Q
J
7
. D-RedLox, in the small blind, went all in for another $7,075. I had the same hand that had gotten me back into the tournament before, but this time I wasn't desperate. However, the raise was a twenty-fifth of my stack and I was getting about 6-to-1. I called. She drew three and I took one. She had a pair of nines and I did not improve, but I had had a lot more outs than before. Any 10 or higher would have given me the pot. I still had more than two-thirds of the chips.
The third player had been playing very tight all along, but was now short-stacked. He raised to $19,800 from the small blind. I had a pair of kings in the big blind, and raised the rest of his $4,265. We both took three. He lost with unimproved queens, and it was heads up.
D-RedLox's stack was about one-third of mine, and we traded blinds back and forth. One would raise, and the other fold. I suspected that all of her raises were legitimate, but I stole a few or came in very light for a raise.
And then, with about one-sixth the amount of my chips, she chose the wrong moment to make a stand. She put in half of her stack on what was possibly planned as a steal. I reraised her all in with three nines. She called and drew one card to an 8-high inside straight. This situation for her was not at all like my previous situations. On one of my hands, I had had many outs, and there was a reasonable chance that I might have on the other. She should have picked a better hand to risk all of her chips.
Michael Wiesenberg's The Ultimate Casino Guide, published by Sourcebooks, is available at fine bookstores and at Amazon.com and other online book purveyors. Send encomiums, exprobrations, and enjoinments to [email protected].
