There is a school of thought in limit hold'em that if you can't raise preflop, you shouldn't play the hand. It's the old "If you can't raise, don't play" theory.
That's a concept that is fundamentally flawed. With many hands, you want multiple opponents; if you make a big hand, more opponents increases the likelihood of action on your hand. Hands such as small or medium wired pairs and suited cards do better with several callers; that's why they're often referred to as "volume hands."
I was under the gun in a $30-$60 limit hold'em game, holding wired sevens. It's a holding with which, depending on the texture of the game, it can be correct to call, fold, or raise.
It's a hand with which I call if I'm in the type of game in which I most likely need to flop a set to win, the odds of which are just over 7-1 to do. Calling begets calling, and by limping, I induce opponents to call. By inducing opponents to call, I am increasing my chances of action when I flop a set. Many of those limping opponents are likely to be making post-flop calls that do not play well against a made set. This improves the implied price of my hand. By not raising, I also keep my initial entry price as low as I can control. A low entry price increases the likelihood of getting positive implied odds. In short: Generally, when you need to make a set to win, you want several opponents and a cheap entry price.
I'll fold 7-7 in a game that is tight with tough, aggressive players. I don't want to limp or raise and find myself putting in several preflop bets, out of position, against tricky opponents. The additional chances of getting raised, not getting volume, and the fact that my decisions will be much tougher, with a higher likelihood of making mistakes, create lower implied odds on my hand.
I raise with wired sevens up front if the game is shorthanded, and in many situations from later position. Shorthanded games require a higher degree of aggression, and having fewer opponents strengthens the value of medium wired pairs. I also may raise if I have an intimidating image at the table and my opponents are the type who tend to make mistakes by playing too tight, folding when they should call. By raising, I want my opponents to fold preflop holdings that contain two overcards or, better yet, a bigger pair (which is much less likely). I'm happy to take the blinds, but even if they call, I have position on them. While the texture of game/situation in which early raising with this hand is correct is rare, it does have application.
The game in which I held the wired sevens was tight-passive with little preflop raising, but also few players. Like many situations in poker, the current situation did not fall into an obvious decision category; instead, concepts needed to be blended to arrive at the best decision. While the game was tight, thereby restricting volume, it also reduced the likelihood of my getting raised. It was also a game in which I thought I could read well, making the case for playing looser than if I was in a game that I found difficult to read. My image was tight; I'd been card-dead for several laps. I thought the decision to call or fold was close, and I decided to limp in, hoping for some volume and to either flop a set or get a favorable flop.
Sometimes the game, like life, just doesn't cooperate with your plans. A player behind me raised, another opponent called, and a third challenger made it three bets. I was not in a good spot; I was faced with the decision of calling two more bets with the chance of facing additional raises against only three opponents or folding with my initial $30 in the pot. Neither choice was favorable, but calling the $60 was a better play than leaving $30 of dead money the pot. I called. Leaving $30 in at 100 percent negative edge is significantly worse than putting in $60 with something significantly better than 100 percent negative edge.
The worst possible scenario presented itself. The original raiser four-bet, and the three-bettor capped the pot. Leaving $90 of dead money in the pot would be horrendous - so I reluctantly tossed an additional $60 forward. I took the flop off with wired sevens fourhanded for five bets! Ugh!
I was certain that at least two of my opponents held higher pairs (one had A-A, the other K-K), increasing my potential to be "set-undered." It was a big negative-EV (expected value) situation, not one I liked. Yet, each individual decision that got me into that spot was correct at the time it was made.
Just because a bad situation had evolved didn't make any decision incorrect. Poker decisions are based on incomplete information. You can never be sure what your opponents are going to do; you can only make best estimates. So, if you get money in bad, think through your decision from the information available at the point it was made. And if it made sense, don't beat yourself up for getting the money in bad.
I blanked off on the flop, mucked my sevens, and kissed my $150 goodbye.
Roy Cooke has played winning professional poker since 1972, and has been a Card Player columnist since 1992. His longtime collaborator John Bond is a freelance writer featured in Best American Mystery Stories 2007. Their poker books are available from www.conjelco.com.
