This column is the first in a series of columns on big slick. Big slick is the most common nickname for A-K. I guess A-K suited might be considered "bigger slick," while A-K offsuit could be looked on as "little big slick." Most poker authorities rank A-K suited after top pairs - aces, kings, queens, and maybe jacks - and A-K offsuit slightly lower, definitely after A-K suited, jacks, and probably tens. This is great on paper, but in the real world, A-K is much tougher to play than any pair, and leads to more disasters than anyone can possibly imagine. I'm going to begin by describing a typical A-K disaster.
T.J. Cloutier recalls that in the very tough no-limit hold'em games in Dallas, A-K became known as "Walking Back to Houston." This was because so many Houston players played it too strongly and went broke with it. Some of them ended up hocking or selling their car to continue playing. When they went broke again, they were "walking back to Houston."
There are two ways to overplay A-K in no-limit. The first is to raise or reraise and then call a big bet preflop. This often leads to getting all in or almost all in before the flop against an opponent who has you crushed. This happens when your opponent has aces (a 13.5-to-1 favorite), and you have made a colossal mistake. When you end up all in against kings (a 2.3-to-1 favorite), you are usually making only a small mistake by calling the final raise, since there is already money in the pot. You are a small dog against lower pairs, but getting all in against those hands is usually correct. Since there is already money in the pot, you often will be laid a price that makes it correct to call. If you are the last aggressor, you also have a chance that your opponent will fold.
The other way is to get all in after the flop against a hand that has you crushed. This is usually a set or two pair. While this is always a colossal blunder, it can't always be avoided. The best way to avoid this kind of trap is to know your opponents really well.
By some strange coincidence, the most famous instance of misplaying A-K was perpetrated by a man from Houston. The main event of the 1993
World Series of Poker was down to three players. The prize money was: first, $1,000,000; second, $420,000; and third, $210,000. The chip counts were as follows: Jim Bechtel had $1,150,000, John Bonetti was second with $935,000, and in a distant third place was Glenn Cozen with $95,000.
John put up the small blind of $5,000 and Glenn posted the big blind of $10,000. This meant that both Jim and John had very deep stacks, in the range of 100 big blinds.
Jim, on the button, raised to $35,000. John, an excellent tournament player, looked down and saw the A
K
and called. Glenn thought a long time and also called. While his hand was never shown, he later stated that he had a pair of fives and was thinking of moving all in.
The flop came K
6
4
. John and Glenn both checked. Jim bet $80,000, John raised to $180,000, Glenn folded, and Jim called.
Fourth street produced the J
. With almost no hesitation, John moved all in, and after a little thought, Jim called. Jim had pocket sixes and had flopped a set. There was no way that John could win. He ended up third, and had to "settle" for only $210,000.
Let's examine all of John's players - an incredible series of unfortunate decisions and outright mistakes:
• Calling Jim's raise before the flop: Faced with a choice of calling or reraising (folding would have been unduly conservative, although it would have worked out well if Glenn had ended up losing all of his chips to Jim, which probably would have happened if John had folded, since Glenn had given some thought to moving all in against two opponents), John sensibly elected to call. This was clearly better than raising, given the relative chip counts. Glenn was likely to go out third unless he won a big pot soon. If, however, Jim won a huge pot from John and busted him, Glenn would make at least an extra 210,000. By just calling, John maintained a reasonable chance of winning the pot without jeopardizing his whole stack. Note that in this particular hand, a big reraise before the flop probably would have won the pot right then. Jim was unlikely to risk most of chips with a pair of sixes against a big reraise.
• Checking on the flop: After he had flopped a king, John was certainly a favorite to have the best hand, but losing a huge pot to Jim would be a disaster. His primary objectives should have been to break Glenn and/or win some chips from Jim without risking going broke if he had a losing hand. His first decision was whether or not to bet on the flop. Checking was right for two reasons: First, Glenn might bet the remainder of his chips and go broke. Second, Jim might bet a worse king (K-Q or K-J) or even try to steal the pot with a middle pair, and John would collect some money from a hand that was a big underdog.
• Raising when Jim bet on the flop: Then, Jim bet $80,000 and John faced a tough decision. He clearly couldn't fold. He probably had the best hand and had shown weakness by checking, so there was a reasonable possibility that Jim was betting a much weaker hand. Thus, his choice was either calling or raising. He went wrong when he chose to raise a relatively modest amount. First, any raise made it easy for Glenn to fold and hope for an all-in pot between Jim and John. If he had just called, Glenn might well have called and gone broke on this hand. Second, he now was creating a situation in which he could lose a huge pot to Jim, and this was something he clearly wanted to avoid. A raise was wrong, but it might have enabled John to win the pot immediately. But if that was his reason for raising, he didn't raise enough. If he had raised more and gotten called, he would have known that Jim had a real hand and that he could try to play the rest of the hand as cheaply as possible. The small raise was an attempt to set a trap for Jim. John, unfortunately, was trapping himself.
• Moving all in on fourth street: The J
came on fourth street and John now had to decide what to do. He had represented a very strong hand by check-raising on the flop, but Jim had still called. This should have alerted John that he was in a dangerous spot. Jim's call might have meant that he was already beaten or tied. The third spade on board was also dangerous. Jim could have had a hand like the A
Q
and turned a flush. He might have had A-K with the A
and been tied, but with a free chance to get a spade. There was even some chance that he had K-J and had now made two pair, or J-J and had now made a set. It was correct to bet an amount in the $200,000-$300,000 range and be prepared to fold if Jim raised. Notice that this huge all-in bet made it easier for Jim to fold a worse hand, such as K-Q or something like that. (In all likelihood, Jim would have been afraid of the flush, but would have called the smaller bet, too, hoping that he had the best hand or would fill up.)
No one knows what would have happened if John had made a big reraise before the flop. A preflop reraise probably would have won the pot. If he had just called on the flop or bet less on fourth street and then checked on the river, it is quite possible that he would have survived with a stack of several hundred thousand - substantially more than Glenn, who was left with only $60,000. Instead, he was "Walking Back to Houston."
Steve "Zee" Zolotow, aka The Bald Eagle, is a successful games player. He currently devotes most of his time to poker. He can be found at many major tournaments and playing on Full Tilt, as one of its pros. When escaping from poker, he spends Thursday afternoons and Friday nights at his bar Doc Holliday's, on Avenue A and 9th Street in New York City, where the lovely Joanna will pour drinks and talk poker, if it is not too busy.
