The Greatest TV Hand I’ve Ever Seen

Having already covered a Tom “Durrrr” Dwan hand in this series, I had no intention of reviewing another one of his hands. However, recently when I watched the latest High Stakes Poker (episode two) I saw a hand that almost made me fall of my chair. In all the televised poker I have ever seen, this is by far the best hand. It is one of the only hands in which I had no idea what was going on until afterwards, when I finally managed to put the pieces together.

They are playing eight-handed, the blinds are 400/800 with a 200 ante. Barry Greenstein, who is playing extraordinarily tight (so tight that at one stage Eli Elezra chides him over it), opens under the gun to $2,500. Durrrr then calls with Q-10 suited. This sets off a chain reaction where Benyamine calls with 3-3, Elezra calls with J-9 offsuit, Ilarie “Ziigmund” Sahamies calls with 7-6 offsuit, Daniel Negreanu calls on the button with K-4 suited, Peter Eastgate shrugs and calls from the small blind with 4-2 offsuit, and then Doyle Brunson closes the action with A-9 offsuit.

The flop comes 10-2-2 rainbow. The blinds check and it is up to Greenstein, who has aces. Now, from his point of view, this is one of the best flops he could hope for that doesn’t contain an ace. Against seven players he has to be worried about being out-flopped. Preflop, against varying ranges, he has an average of about 42 percent equity in the pot. On a flop of 10-2-2, where four of the callers ranges are from 20 to 40 percent of the best hands, and two of the player’s holdings are random. (The reason two are random is that the players in the blinds are likely to call with almost any two, you can see this as Eastgate who is normally quite tight calls with 4-2 offsuit, whether or not this is correct is a topic for another article). Aces now have equity of just under 60 percent. On random other flops, aces equity is somewhere between 20 and 45 percent. The flop is great because there is a pair on the board, which is useful for an over pair, and the pair is so low that it is very unlikely anyone has trips. However against seven players you always need to be cautious.

So this is a great flop for aces, however that doesn’t mean Greenstein should bet. I think betting here is bad because it shows so much strength. Barry is a tight player, and knows the others know he is a tight player. Raising under-the-gun and then leading this flop makes it very obvious that he has a good overpair.

He is clearly representing the exact hand that he has, which is a very bad idea when playing against good players (unless you have gone past the point of commitment). I think he would be much better off checking and seeing what action develops. This has the huge advantage of possibly inducing a bet with a marginal hand from one of the more aggressive players, who will just muck when Barry leads. The pot has $20,000 in it, but Barry’s stack is about $190,000, so his stack is far more important than the pot.

I never would have predicted what happened next. Durrrr, instead of folding like he should have, because he is almost certainly behind Barry, (not to mention there is another six players to act after him), raises.

There has been much discussion on poker forums between great players about whether this is genius or madness. Personally, I think it lies somewhere in between. Durrrr knows that although he has a reputation as extremely aggressive, no one is going to put him on a bluff here because a bluff would be madness.

It’s folded around to Peter Eastgate, who now probably slightly regrets calling with 4-2 off. This is a very tough spot for him, he has the second worst possible trips, (effectively the worst). His hand may be good, but what makes it so tough for him is two factors.

A) He is very deep against Durrrr who he should be more concerned with; since he is much more likely to have a 2 than Greenstein, and they both have at least $500,000.

B) Whatever action Eastgate takes, he is going to make it very clear that he has at least a 2. This is a bad situation because he is showing a lot of strength, but his hand is at the bottom of his range.

Eastgate takes the least bad option, and calls. I’ll get back to point A later, which I think is related to probably the biggest mistake made in this hand.

Greenstein thinks for a while and calls. This is probably a slightly bad call. Against a single raise his hand is marginal, (although perhaps not against Durrrr), but against a raise and a smooth call from a tight-thinking player he should know he is very unlikely to have the best hand. He spoke about the hand afterwards and said that he thought the chance of him having the best hand, plus that chance of drawing out made it a call. I don’t agree, but it’s probably not a massive mistake.

A seven comes on the turn, and Eastgate and Greenstein check to Durrrr. There is now $133,000 in the pot. At this point I thought Durrrr would realise his mistake and check. But he bets $104,200. I nearly fell off my chair when this happened.

At this stage it’s clear that Durrrr has by far the worst hand, however he was able to correctly analyse the situation and realise that Eastgate was likely to have called with a weak hand given what preflop odds he had been getting. He is tight enough to muck weak trips here, fearing Greenstein and Durrrr. Durrrr knew however that Greenstein was much more likely to have an overpair than a two or a house (he probably would not bet 10-10-10-2-2 on the flop). He also realised that Greenstein would understand that Durrrr should know that Eastgate has trips. Because both Greenstein and Durrrr know this, Greenstein has to give Durrrr a huge amount of credit, and put him on a hand like 10-10 (for a flopped boat), or A-2 for top trips.

The massive headache for Eastgate is now that he has about $500,000 to go into the pot. If he has the best hand Durrrr will not commit any more chips. There is no chance of Durrrr calling a check-raise with a worse hand, and no chance of him value betting worse on the river. (He may bluff though.)

This is a horrible spot to be in, out of position to one of the best players in the world, and $500,000 deep. Had Eastgate bought into the game for $100,000, (which is roughly what most of the weaker players buy in for) this scenario could not have developed. Durrrr would not be able to bluff here, and Eastgate would have probably stacked Greenstein, or at least won several bets from him. This I feel is the biggest mistake of the hand, and a mistake good players make in live cash games all the time. If you are playing in an unfamiliar game for large stakes, just buy in for 100 big blinds. You can always add to your stack later if you think it’s worth it.

So Eastgate folds. Greenstein then thinks and folds, probably for the reasons I gave above. What makes this hand even more special is that afterwards Durrrr bet Doyle that Eastgate had a two. The fact that he did this is proof (for people that need it) that he was fully aware of where each other player was in the hand, and used that information against them.

To me this hand is a special sporting moment, equivalent to seeing Tiger Woods sinking a 16-foot winning putt in the fading light, or Lionel Messi bewilder a series of Malaga defenders. Poker is very much a long term game, but for this hand you could see Durrrr’s brilliance crystalised in a single $104,200 bet.

Daragh Thomas has made a living from poker over the last three years. He also coaches other players and writes extensively on the boards.ie poker forum, under the name hectorjelly.