A Bold All-In Call

In my last column, I wrote about what I thought was by far my most interesting hand from the Bay 101 $10,000 Shooting Star tournament. I correctly laid down K-K on a Q-3-3-4 board. Instead, it turns out that the hand that has generated far more discussion was my next-to-last hand, which crippled me beyond recovery. First it became blog fodder among my friends, and then it was featured in a “Tournament Hand Matchup” in Card Player (Vol. 22/ No. 8). But the nice thing for me, and one of the great advantages of writing a Card Player column, is that I have a platform to explain all of the reasons why I made the play that I did.

The action was simple enough: At a five-handed table, with blinds of 2,500-5,000 and a 500 ante, the action was folded to Joe Sebok on the button, who moved all in for about 72,000. The small blind folded, and with a stack of 82,000, I called from the big blind with 4-4. He showed the K 5, and a 5 on the flop sealed the deal. He doubled up, and I was eliminated on the following hand in 29th place.

If an outsider told me about this hand, and merely said, “Some guy called off almost all of his chips with 4-4,” I too might immediately say that it was a bad play. First, as we all know, a small pair figures to be a small favorite against two overcards or a significant underdog against an overpair. Second, I would suggest that the guy should have waited for a situation in which he could have been the aggressor rather than the caller
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But that is what makes poker such a great game. Every situation is different, and 95 percent of the time, I probably would not make that call. But, a bunch of factors were in play here, and I’ll mention a few of them. That way, you can get an idea of what goes into making a decision as seemingly simple as calling an all-in bet with a small pair.

1. I thought I was close to a 60 percent favorite against what I felt was his range of possible hands.

The average stack was around 300,000, so both of us were pretty short, and we both badly needed chips. With that in mind, I did not think Sebok would make an all-in overbet with any strong hand. He would raise smaller, and take a chance at accumulating chips rather than trying to win just the blinds. I could have been wrong, but that was my analysis, and I was going with it.

Given that read, I did not think he had a premium hand, or any decent pocket pair. Let’s say that he would have raised smaller with 7-7 or better. Therefore, my odds of being up against an overpair (6-6, 5-5) were the same as being up against an underpair (3-3, 2-2), so those scenarios cancelled each other out. That meant that I needed there to be enough situations in which his non-pair hands contained a 4 or lower. Was that the case?

Absolutely! I didn’t think he’d push with a complete garbage hand such as 7-2, but I thought his range contained almost any two cards. However, since “any two” did not include many strong hands with which he would have raised less, I could assume that my chances were even stronger. The argument of 4-4 being a “small favorite or big dog” doesn’t apply when you are up against opponents who understand the importance of being first in and are willing to gamble in those spots with subpar hands. Any ace or facecard in his position was playable, so given all of the A-2, K-3, and Q-4 types of hands that I could have been facing, 4-4 was nearly a 3-to-2 favorite against what I felt was his range. For that reason alone, I think it was correct to call.

2. There was no guarantee that I would find a better spot before I became desperately short-stacked.

I was at a solid, aggressive five-handed table, every round would cost 10,000, and I had only 82,000. Sure, I’d rather be the bettor than the caller, but if I didn’t find a hand quickly, I would be forced to push all in with essentially a random hand. Would I rather push with a random hand or try to call and double up with an above-average one?

I know many players who prefer the former, but I think they overdo the concept. If you push with a random hand, you usually will either win the blinds or get called and be a dog for your entire stack, and often a substantial one. I’d rather call and take a stand as soon as possible. That way, I can hopefully be a favorite when my tournament life is on the line. Also, my goal is to double up before my stack gets any shorter, so that I can really be in contention if I win the hand. At the time of getting the 4-4 hand, two double-ups would have gotten me back to having an average stack. That would not have been the case if I was forced to wait an orbit or two.

3. Given the structure of the remaining prize pool, I was willing to gamble in order to give myself a better shot at the top spots.

There were 29 players remaining and I was in 26th or 27th place. I was guaranteed $20,000, and the prize money basically crept upward until eighth place, which paid $90,000, and then it went up sharply from there. My goal was not to try to hang on and sneak up a few spots on the ladder. Even 13th place was worth only $10,000 more than 29th. My goal was to give myself a realistic shot of reaching the final table, and that meant that I was OK with making a high-risk call to try to gather chips.

4. Sebok had a $5,000 bounty on his head.

This was by far the least of the considerations, since $5,000 was practically meaningless compared to the $3 million in the prize pool. However, it certainly couldn’t hurt, and if I felt that a call was correct anyway, the bounty could only make it more correct.

The basic counterargument that I’ve heard the most is that I didn’t “have to call.” Well, you rarely have to call. I chose to call for numerous reasons that I believe were correct, and if the same situation came up again, I wouldn’t do anything differently.

That’s not true. I’d put a 4 on the flop, or give him the K 3 instead of the K 5. If he had shown the K 3 instead of the K 5, would I suddenly be a genius? Of course not, but I would argue that the two hands were equally likely. Oh well, it’s time to move on. World Series, here I come.

Matt Lessinger is the author of The Book of Bluffs: How to Bluff and Win at Poker, available everywhere. You can find other articles of his at www.CardPlayer.com.