Taking Chances

Sometimes in poker you are clearly ahead; at other times, you are clearly behind. Unfortunately, far more often, you are in that ambiguous zone where you have no clear idea exactly where you may be. The trouble is, if you give up every time, your opponents will run over you, and if you elect to fight every time, you will lose more money fairly often.

No one can tell you definitely when to keep going and when to give up. It depends (the most famous words in poker, perhaps) on many factors, including:
Your image: If you appear to be tight or tough, your opponents may be more likely to concede.

Their images: Are they good enough to fold mediocre hands, or are they calling stations?

Pot size: This is a double-edged sword. The smaller the pot, the more likely your aggressiveness will convince your opponents to fold. However, it costs a lot relative to the pot to try to win it. Larger pots are more worthwhile to win, but it is harder to get opponents to fold. This pot size vs. cost trade-off is a key element in your decision-making.

Board texture: Opponents who call on a dry board are more likely to have a hand than a draw.

Your willingness to tolerate volatility: While giving up will lose the pot, it does not cost several extra big bets, which you may risk in vain.

Here are a couple of hands that I managed to win recently in a $40-$80 limit hold’em game. In each case, I made a questionable play that worked out. I had reasons to try these plays, but it is also possible that I made up some of the reasons because I didn’t want to give up. You decide.

Hand No. 1: I held red nines on the button in an early-morning seven-handed game with all good players. Everyone folded to me, so, of course, I raised. Both blinds called. The small blind was an occasional player from overseas who plays a bit too aggressively, and I was surprised that he did not three-bet. I tentatively put him on a mediocre suited holding. Everyone expects me to raise from the button with a wide variety of hands, so three-betting was almost automatic for an aggressive player. The big blind was a local everyday player who plays quite well.

We saw a flop of K♥ J♥ 8♦. They both checked to me, and I bet. After all, they could have a huge range of hands at this point, and I was probably ahead. I was a bit disconcerted to see both players call. Had I learned anything about their hands so far?

I was morally certain the small blind did not have a king, as a check-raise would be mandatory. He possibly could have a hand like J-10 and call here, although I would not recommend just calling with it. The big blind also did not figure to have a king, although he may have one if he planned to check-raise the turn, knowing that I am an aggressive bettor. It is also possible that he held a jack but was worried about the small blind’s call. With both players calling, I was uncertain if I was ahead or behind.

The turn, the 7♣, looked like it changed nothing. Again, they both checked, and I had to make a decision. The fact that the board was “drawish” helped me decide to bet. If I got check-raised, I would fold, and if I got called, I planned to check the river unless I improved (and even improving was dangerous, as Q-10 was a likely opponent’s hand). I would not put any more money into the pot after this turn bet, but my opponents didn’t know this.

The alternate plan was checking the turn and folding to a bet on the river, or checking the turn while planning to call a bet on the river, and checking it down, otherwise. If I was going to call the river, I might as well bet the turn, as I could induce folds from gutshot-straight draws like Q-9, which would have called the flop. I had eliminated some better hands from consideration, increasing the chances that I was ahead, although this bet could easily cost me $80 that I did not want to lose.
They both folded, so I was glad that I bet. The small blind accidentally flipped over the Q♦, so Q-9 was a likely holding.

Hand No. 2: The very next hand, I got the 4♦ 4♥ in the cutoff. Everyone folded to me again, so I raised. This time, the button, the aggressive overseas player, three-bet, and both blinds folded. I called. It was hard to say what he had here. First, players in this game get annoyed or suspicious when you seem to be raising too often, and I had just raised two positional hands in a row. Second, he lost some money on the previous hand, and may have been anxious to get it back. With this in mind, I assumed that he could have a wide range of hands, from A-A to A-2 and A-K to 6-5 suited. The flop looked almost like the previous one: K♠ J♣ 7♥. I elected to check, and he bet, which I knew he would do every time. So, should I fold with this terrible flop or make a play?

Given that I believed he had a huge range, I decided to make a play, and check-raised. He quickly folded, so again I made the right choice.

Conclusion: Just because these plays worked, it does not mean they were the right ones. Of course, even if neither of them worked and I lost a lot of extra money, that would not necessarily mean that I made the wrong play, either. Much of the time in poker, you make a decision, hope for the best, and accept your fate if it fails. Only over considerable time and analysis of the results of your plays in various circumstances can you determine if your strategies are working or need adjustment. And this adjustment can be in either direction, toward more aggression or showing more respect by folding more often.

Most important is that you realize that any play that works may not be right, and any play that fails may not be wrong. Keep an open mind about your decisions and make adjustments according to long-term results, not short-term success or failure. ♠
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Barry Tanenbaum is the author of Advanced Limit Hold’em Strategy, and collaborator on Limit Hold’em: Winning Short-Handed Strategies. Barry offers private lessons tailored to the individual student. Please see his website, www.barrytanenbaum.com, or write to him at [email protected]. _