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Analyzing Your Plays

Taking Another Look

by Roy Cooke |  Published: Nov 02, 2011

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Roy CookePoker isn’t all about knowing when to hold’em and when to fold’em. Nor is it all about knowing when to walk away and when to run. Poker is much more complex than that. Amongst many other concepts you’ve got to know how to play your hand in the best possible manner to give yourself the greatest chance of winning the pot, all while keeping in mind the price the pot is laying you.

It was a Tuesday afternoon, and I was playing $40-$80 limit hold’em at the Bellagio. A solid Las Vegas pro raised under the gun and was called by a loose-passive opponent and another solid player. On the button, I peered down at the AHeart Suit 5Heart Suit. Getting 3.75-1, I considered calling. Contemplating what might happen next, I considered the texture of the blinds. Neither was likely to three-bet an upfront raiser without a huge mitt and both would call with a wide range of hands. The situation seemed to be positive EV. I called the $80 cold, the small blind folded and the big blind called. I was receiving 4.25-1 on my button call with $420 in the pot.

The dealer flopped the 6Spade Suit 3Heart Suit 2Club Suit, furnishing me with a gutshot-straight draw, a backdoor nut-flush draw and an overcard, albeit with a weak kicker. The BB checked, and Mr. UTG Solid Pro and Mr. Loose Passive knuckled behind him. Mr. Play Solid, immediately to my right, fired a bet.

What to do in this difficult spot? If I called, anyone in the field could check-raise, significantly lowering my price. Worse yet, Mr. Play Solid or anyone else for that matter could reraise any check-raise, reducing my price even further or forcing me to fold, creating a situation where I put in a dead bet. Catching an ace didn’t have to be good as ace big-kicker was a large part of Mr. UTG Solid Pro’s range. The gutshot was to a one-carder making it more likely to be a split if I made it. All that said, the pot had $460 in it, offering me a large price. I deliberated over my best play.

I thought through my opponents hand ranges and how they would likely react. Mr. Play Solid’s range was a set, a medium-sized overpair, a paired hand, possibly with an ace kicker and a small number of bluffs. I thought a medium pair was his most likely holding. I didn’t think the loose-passive player had much of a hand, but then again, he might call anyway. And, if his hand included an ace or a 5, I sure didn’t want him in there. The BB seemed uninterested. Mr. UTG Solid Pro would call a single bet with overcards, but not a double bet. I theorized that if I raised, I was highly likely to eliminate the players behind me. If they had either an ace or 5, my raise would increase my odds of winning, and Mr. UTG Solid Pro probably had an ace. Mr. Play Solid’s most likely reaction to my raise would be a flat call and check on the turn unless he had a set. If he checked, I would be able to check the turn if I missed. If it played out that way I would be getting $500 to $80 from the pot at the point of decision, and I’d be able to get my hand to the river. With seven wins and a backdoor-flush draw, the price was right. Of course, it didn’t have to play out that way. If I improved my hand, it might not be good. But there was enough overlay from the pot to be able to compensate for the negatives in order to make the play EV correct. Plus, if I made my hand, I might be able to win additional bets on later streets.

I hit it a lick. To my delight the field folded and Mr. Play Solid flat called. He checked the turn when the 9Spade Suit came. I knuckled it right back. Mr. Play Solid checked again when the river came the ADiamond Suit, making me top pair. I fired a wager and Mr. Play Solid called. I flipped over my hand and he showed me two 7s to let me see how lucky I had been.

Well, I was lucky to win the pot. But I also read the situation correctly and made a play that allowed me to get lucky. I understand that it could have played differently, but I netted $580 from the point of decision with a actualized risk of $80 with only a small chance I’d be beat on the river. I received over 6-1 on the flop with a hand I was over 30 percent to improve. Yeah, I could have been against a set and improved,only to put in more money bad. But the overlay when I was putting my money in more than made up for the lost expectation when I was putting it in bad.

When analyzing how a play performs in a given situation you need to blend how the play performs against your opponents’ hand ranges with the price the pot lays you in all scenarios. Some plays work well against parts of your opponents range and not others. In order for the play to be correct, the blended EV overlay from the scenarios in which you have the best of it needs to be greater than the blended negative EV in the scenarios in which you have the worst of it.

While nearly infinite permutations in many poker situations make precise answers impossible, understanding this concept will deepen your thinking and produce better overall decisions. And the better your decisions, the more chips will come your way.
And chips make me happy! ♠

Roy Cooke played poker professionally for 16 years prior to becoming a successful Las Vegas real-estate broker/salesman in 1989. Should you wish to get any information about real-estate matters — including purchase, sale, or mortgage — his office number is (702) 396-6575, and his e-mail address is [email protected]. His website is www.roycooke.com. You also may find him on Facebook.