Ben Wilinofsky Does Homework to Capitalize on Player’s Tendencies

Ben “NeverScaredB” Wilinofsky is a Canadian native who graduated with an honors degree in business administration in 2009. He won the 2011 EPT Berlin main event for $1,174,143.

Wilinofsky’s largest online cash was for winning a PokerStars rebuy event in 2010 for $95,000. He has more than $4,000,000 in combined live and online career tournament cashes.

Wilinofsky’s EPT win was his first live title, first EPT cash, and first cash on the live tournament circuit. He considers himself a master of karate and friendship to everyone.

Hand No. 1

Key Concepts: Adjusting to a player’s tendencies; Awareness of previous hands that an opponent has played

Craig Tapscott: I understand that you did a lot of research to be ready for the final few tables in this event, in regards to hand histories and player tendencies.

Ben Wilinofsky: Yes. Prior to day four, I had done some research on the field left in the tournament.

CT: Can you share a bit more in depth about the kinds of things you are looking for in your homework on the players left in the field and how that helps you prepare a plan of attack for the following day?

BW: Hands that go to showdown are really critical. It’s impossible to get a large sample size of meaningful hands on a player from online news coverage, so we’ll never learn things like about someone who is continuation betting too much from watching continuation hands available where they do continuation bet. But if they showdown hands that are really weak after continuation betting, you get the idea that they are betting the flop way too often.

CT: In this hand what helped you versus Andrulis?

BW: From my research about Kristijonas Andrulis I could tell that he was barrel happy.

CT: Anything else?

BW: I also saw a hand where Andrulis four-bet and folded to a five-bet, so I expected him to apply aggression preflop and postflop.

Wilinofsky raises from UTG+1 to 55,000 holding 8 7. Andrulis reraises to 134,000 from middle position. Wilinofsky calls.

CT: What were you thinking about when you called this reraise? What’s the plan?

BW: I don’t have a specific plan when I call this three-bet. I am simply getting a good price with a hand that has good odds and can continue on a variety of flops, against a range that I perceive to be wide. I’m going to be semibluffing some flops that I have some equity on, pure bluffing some flops that his range is weak on, and making some strong draws and strong made hands. So it all adds up to a call.

Flop: 8 7 2 (pot: 318,000)

Wilinofsky checks. Andrulis bets 128,000. Wilinofsky raises to 306,000. Andrulis folds. Wilinofsky wins the pot of 446,000.

CT: You mentioned previously to me that you were unhappy with your decision in this hand. Why?

BW: I believe I should have check/called the flop instead of check/raised.

CT: Why do you like that play better?

BW: I expect him to have very little equity quite often, and apply lots of pressure, since it looks like I have a weak one-pair hand. On any jack, queen, king or ace, I expect him to barrel the turn. And as in the previous hand I’d seen him play, he has no problem barreling on cards that don’t change the board texture that much when he perceives weakness.

CT: By just calling on the flop, what hand range do you think he would have put you on?

BW: I think he’ll expect my range to be pretty weak when I check/call this flop since he’d expect me to check-raise anything strong with so many draws possible on that flop. So I think a check/call maximizes my expectation in this hand.

CT: Did it cross your mind as the thing to do at the time?

BW: Yes. I remember wanting to, but not having fortitude to pull the trigger on a non-standard play deep here that could end up losing me a big pot to a hand with not much equity (exactly the kind of hand he turned out to have) by letting him get there.

Hand No .2

Key Concepts: Research into player’s tendencies; Extracting value

Wilinofsky raises to 65,000 from UTG holding A A. Daniel Pidun calls in the big blind.

CT: So what’s the intel on Pidun from your research?

BW: From examining a few previous hands he’d played I expected him to be a bit of a calling station.

Flop: 7 4 4 (pot: 166,000)

Pidun checks. Wilinofsky bets 110,000. Pidun calls.

CT: Have you put him on a hand range at this point?

BW: He defended the big blind against a small raise. So I expect him to have a very wide range.

Turn: 2 (pot: 386,000)

Pidun checks. Wilinofsky bets 300,000.

BW: Once he called the flop, I bet the turn big for a couple of reasons: The big bet gets him to fold most draws, which are hands that have a decent amount of equity against me. But he is a bit of a calling station and I don’t expect him to fold many paired hands. That means we get more chips in the pot from hands with less equity, and less chips in the pot from hands with more equity.

Pidun calls.

River: 3 (pot: 986,000)

Pidun checks.

CT: What can you do now to extract the most value?

BW: Well after we get another small card on the river, I decided to bet really big, expecting to get maximum value from any overpairs and possibly a seven.

Wilinofsky bets 900,000. Pidun tanks and calls holding 8 8. Wilinofsky wins the pot of 2,786,000.

CT: Can you share a bit of your thinking when it comes to choosing bet sizing in regards to knowing a player’s tendencies?

BW: Basically, given my research and his calling station tendencies, I was planning on betting bigger on a 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, 9, and 10 rivers, but smaller on jack, queen, or king rivers. On an ace I have to bet smaller because he is less likely to call. But this isn’t a complex situation. He’s a stubborn player on a board that hasn’t improved any of my hands against his hands that call the flop bet. So I expect him to call a lot, so I chose to bet bigger and win more chips when he does.

CT: Let’s go a bit deeper to help our readers who get stuck in situations like this and get confused as to how to proceed. It’s tough to play a mid-pair that’s an overpair to the board all the way to the river in this hand versus an aggressive player. What keys can you share from your experience about the kinds of things that a player has to think about in this spot and then be willing to lay down a hand or make a hero call?

BW: This is a pretty tough hand from Pidun’s perspective because I’ve been so active at the table all day. Obviously the fact that the board doesn’t improve my range at all is good for him, but he has to understand that I understand that. Facing bets against good players, you have to ask yourself “what does this player think about me? What is he trying to get me to do, and why?” While Pidun can’t know that much about my thought process, if he knows I’ve done my research, he can probably guess at what I think his thought process is, and work from there. I just didn’t expect him to make those adjustments.

CT: Why?

BW: Well it’s not because he’s a bad player necessarily, but he has very little information to work with other than that I’ve been the most aggressive player at the table. He probably hasn’t played enough to make an accurate guess at what types of adjustments I’m making based on what he knows of my play and what I know of his. These adjustments are the infamous “game flow” issues that separate the good, technically skilled players from the great ones, and often mean the difference between a middling finish and closing a tournament.♠