Shoulda, Woulda, Coulda

Poker is a game of risks versus rewards. You assess your risks, calculate the potential rewards and determine your best strategy. Sounds easy, right? But there are multiple devils in the details. Assessing your risks and calculating your rewards requires a detailed analysis of a lot of information, some of it highly subjective. Often your determinations are nothing more than best guess estimates. But evaluate those estimates thoroughly and your best guesses will become more accurate.

I’d just posted the small blind (SB) in a great $40-$80 limit hold’em game at the Bellagio. A loose tourist raised under-the-gun (UTG) and was called by two other loose tourists. I peered down to the 5 4. Generally, I like to have at least four callers in a raised pot with low suited-connector holdings, more when I’m out of position.

But this situation was out of the ordinary, warranting a looser approach than my standard strategy guidelines would advocate. All three opponents played poorly, and I anticipated them providing both additional action and added edge that better playing opponents wouldn’t. Furthermore, the big blind (BB), might call, further extending my price. I tossed in the extra $60. Disappointingly, the BB folded.

The flop was splendid: 10 5 4, giving me bottom two-pair. I checked, looking to check-raise the opening preflop raiser, who bet. The first caller raised to $80 and the second caller folded. I thought about just calling, thinking that Mr. Open-Raiser would three-bet with any pair and not fold any overcards. But feeling that Mr. Open-Raiser would likely call the three bets with any overcards anyway, I three-hit it. It often costs you equity when you slowplay against opponents who are liable to call anyway. Mr. Open-Raiser called, and Mr. First-Caller four-bet.

I was perplexed by the reraise. What did Mr. First-Caller have? He was someone who generally respected my raises, so I thought he held a strong hand. If he had an overpair, I felt he would have rerasied preflop. He might have 10-10 and flopped top set. Even though I held one of each, he could have flopped a set of fives or fours. Just because hands are unlikely doesn’t mean you can discount them wholesale. Mr. First-Caller might also possess a big draw and be raising for value, or with the intent of checking the turn if he missed. I called, uncertain as to the strength of my holding, but in no way giving up on the pot.

The turn card came the 8. I sensed Mr. First-Caller was going to bet again and checked. Mr. Open-Raiser checked, and Mr. First-Caller bet. I didn’t like the bet. The only portion of his range I could beat were one pair hands he would four-bet and draw hands he would four-bet and barrel with on the turn. Considering his playing style, I didn’t think that made up much of his range. That said, the pot was large, containing $920, and I didn’t have to beat much of his range to make calling correct. I tentatively called.

The river turned up the K, I checked, Mr. Open-Raiser knuckled behind me and Mr. First-Caller turned over Q Q. Thrilled with the thought I held a winner, I opened my two-pair. Behind me, Mr. Opener exposed the K 10, having made two-pair on the river. Barf!

Intuitively and in hindsight, it seemed I might have been able to win the pot had I played it differently. But just because playing a hand differently would have netted you the pot, doesn’t mean that it was the correct way to play it. Poker plays need to be judged on expectation, not in hindsight based on results and perfect information.

I analyzed my turn play. Could I have raised and folded Mr. Open-Raiser and thereby won the pot? Would it have been plus expected value (EV) to do so? It only would be plus EV if it increased my percentage chance of winning enough to compensate for the EV loss from the raise’s risk. Keep in mind that at the decision point I didn’t know what either of my opponents held. I must analyze the hand in the context of how a turn raise would perform against my opponents’ ranges.

Assuming Mr. First-Caller was going to call my raise regardless, I would have to have him tied or beat to add value with the turn raise. There just wasn’t a hand in his range that beat mine that folding Mr. Open-Raiser would increase my chances of beating. If Mr. Open-Raiser held overcards, he was drawing dead anyway, and there would be negative value in folding him. If he held an overpair or top pair, would he fold to a turn raise? If Mr. Open-Raiser would fold, it would add value to my hand assuming his outs were different than Mr. First-Caller’s outs. That wouldn’t always be the case. My raise would have “fold equity” if Mr. First-Caller held a flush draw or a single pair, and Mr. Open-Raiser held a pair and would fold.

That’s not many scenarios in the range of possible scenarios. I feel the turn call was correct based on my opponents’ potential ranges. In spite of the fact it might have worked in this particular instance, I don’t think a turn raise was the correct play.

The hand speaks to analyzing situations in order to expand your play portfolio. The more plays you can profitably perform, the higher it will raise your hourly EV. Additionally, it will make your much harder to read. The key to developing plays is the ability to analyze when they will be correct. By scrutinizing options in retrospect, you’ll develop a feel for situations as they occur in the future.

Yes, they’ll often be best guess estimates. But tune your thinking accurately and those best guess estimates will add a lot of value to your game. ♠

Roy Cooke played poker professionally for 16 years prior to becoming a successful Las Vegas Real Estate Broker/Salesman in 1989. Should you wish to any information about Real Estate matters-including purchase, sale or mortgage his office number is 702-396-6575 or Roy’s e-mail is [email protected]. His website is www.roycooke.com. You can also find him on Facebook or follow him on Twitter @RealRoyCooke.