How To Call Down With Eight-High

Time and time again in my poker career, I find myself thinking back to a hand that happened long ago — a hand I didn’t even play. This hand made me realize that just about anything was possible at the poker table, that a smart player could break any and every rule of conventional wisdom. Sure, the hand happened during modern poker’s infancy, when the bad players were truly abysmal, and sure, it happened in a limit hold’em cash game, a format that lends itself to bizarre calls, but that it happened at all remains remarkable (and instructive). On a board of A Q Q K 2, my friend and poker mentor Russell Rosenblum called a bet with 8-7 offsuit…and it was good. When a bad player does this, we laugh. When a good player does it, it takes our breath away.

I tell my students to pay attention to as many patterns as possible, as pertaining both to individual players, and to the general playing population. Once they’ve recognized a pattern, I urge my students to use their knowledge of poker fundamentals to take full advantage of what they’ve uncovered. Following these two simple steps will make you a better player, no matter what year it is. That’s the beauty of thinking strategically — it doesn’t require memorizing an endless series of plays, or constantly being on the lookout for “spots,” or spending energy trying to “level” the opponent. All that’s necessary is a strong core gameplan. The rest will take care of itself.

Of course, implicit in this advice is that the student have a solid understanding of poker theory and basic strategy to begin with. Let’s go back in time and take a closer look at Russell’s 8-7 hand, so I can explain what I mean.

It’s 2001 and, again, we’re playing limit hold’em. Typical bad players of this time period had the following traits. 1) They limped a lot, but never failed to raise or reraise with big pairs. 2) They never failed to bet vulnerable made hands on a scary board after an opponent had slowed down. 3) They were absolutely terrible at value betting. 4) They would often bluff their missed draws.

Now that you have the setup, I can tell you how the hand went down. Russell raised in late position with 8-7 offsuit and got called by a weak player on the button. The flop came A Q Q, Russell bet, and the button called. The turn brought the K and Russell gave up and checked. Strangely, his opponent checked behind. The river brought an offsuit deuce and Russell checked again. At this point, the button decided to bet — and 99 percent of players would’ve thrown away their 8-7 offsuit without a second thought. Russell obviously didn’t do that.

Before he mucked, Russell wanted to at least make a read and put his opponent on a hand. So what could that hand be? A slowplayed A-A or K-K for a full house, or a slowplayed Q-Q for quads? No, because Russell knew this player would’ve three-bet preflop with all those hands. A naked ace or king? Exceedingly unlikely, because players at this time — especially bad players — were atrocious value bettors, and the button had already proven himself incapable of value betting even remotely thin. No way would he bet a king, and believe it or not, probably not even an ace. OK then, some random queen for slowplayed trips? With three broadway cards and a flush draw on board, almost no one would’ve checked back naked trips on the turn. For similar reasons, Russell more or less ruled out his opponent having jack-ten for the straight. Really, there were only a few value betting possibilities that made any sense. King-queen, for flopped trips and a slowplayed, turned boat. Pocket twos, for a rivered full house. Or an ace-queen that forgot to three-bet preflop (definitely not impossible — players were very passive back then). If it wasn’t one of those hands, then the button had to be doing something very out of character in order to be value betting.

Once Russell got this far in his analysis, he started giving real consideration to calling with his ridiculous hand. But was there a realistic situation where his opponent could’ve been bluffing with worse cards than his? The surprising answer was yes. Looking over the board, Russell actually held one of the better no pair hands. There was, of course, a chance that the button was bluffing with ten-high, and that Russell would catch him bluffing and still lose. But all of the connector type flush draws (6 5, 8 4, etcetera), Russell had beat, or at least tied. Was that reason enough to call?

This is where it helps to have knowledge of the fundamentals. With Russell getting almost 5-to-1 on his money, he knew that he’d earn a profit if his hand was good more than one time in six. Given the slim value betting range for his opponent, a call seemed like the proper choice — even after taking into account that Russell could lose to a bluff. In fact, what looked to be an insane play on the surface, actually seemed a very clear and sensible call when Russell considered all the factors. This is how good players can make strange plays — through a solid application of logic, and a thorough understanding of how to value your hand in any context.

It blew my mind when Russell first told me this story all those years ago. For the first time, I started to understand the complexities and variations that poker could present me with. Neither Russell nor I remember exactly what the other guy had — all we remember is that Russell won. It’s only a slight exaggeration to say that hearing about and thinking through this hand convinced me that I wanted to make poker a career, and that the game was not just an entertaining hobby, but a worthwhile intellectual endeavor. Of course, poker is also fun, and no write-up of the hand would be complete without Russell’s closing comment: “It’s a good thing there were a bunch of big cards on board. Otherwise, there wouldn’t have been anything I could beat!”

Matt Matros is the author of The Making of a Poker Player, and a three-time WSOP bracelet winner. He is also a featured coach for cardrunners.com.