Protection, it’s VERY Important!

“Protection,” I hear it all the time at the poker table. In a mathematical context, what you’re really doing when you’re “protecting a hand” is decreasing the odds the pot is offering your opponents. Your “protection” may cause some of your opponents to fold, but some may still call the larger wager.

Of course, sometimes it’s in your best interest for them to call the larger wager; sometimes it’s not. Part of playing poker well is computing what odds to offer your opponents, as well as timing your moves to your greatest advantage. And while no-limit offers greater variations of the price you can offer your opponents, it’s still a very important concept in limit games too.

It was my big blind (BB) in a $40-$80 limit hold’em game on a Saturday afternoon at the Bellagio. Matt, a top local player, was winning every pot he played and was up about $4,000 in the past hour. He was enjoying the game much more than the rest of us!

Naturally aggressive, Matt’s “rush” wasn’t slowing his way of thinking at all; he was firing on all cylinders. He open-raised under the gun (UTG) plus one, was called by a tourist in UTG plus two, and then was three-bet by another highly aggressive local pro. The button called as did the tourist in the small blind (SB). I looked down to the 7 4, and mucked. The field called, and they took the flop five-handed for $120 each, $640 in the pot.

The dealer flopped the 5 5 3. It was checked to Mr. Highly-Aggressive-Pro, who obligatorily bet. The whole field called, making the pot $840.

The turn was the 2, inserting both straight and heart draws. Mr. SB-Tourist now fired and was called by Matt and Mr. Highly-Aggressive-Pro, creating a $1,080 pot.

The A rivered, any four now made a straight. Mr. SB-Tourist checked, and Matt fired. Mr. Highly-Aggressive-Pro tossed in the $80, as did Mr. SB-Tourist. Matt rolled over the 4 4 for the straight. Mr. SB-Tourist, looking to illustrate how unlucky he was, showed the 6 5, having flopped three fives.

And Mr. SB-Tourist did get unlucky. When Matt called on the flop, he was drawing to a four or a backdoor straight that didn’t contain a six. And if he made either of those hands, it didn’t have to win! When Matt called the turn, he couldn’t catch a six and win, because it would have filled up Mr. SB-Tourist. And the A might be suspect too.

However, what Mr. SB-tourist failed to perceive was how he offered Matt the correct odds throughout the hand to draw. In spite of the fact Matt was 22.5-to-1 to pick off a four and over a 10-to-1 underdog on the flop to win against the 6 5, getting $760-$40 with one player to act behind him, he was correct to call. When he picked up what he thought was an open-ender on the turn, the call was easy. Even if Matt had known Mr. SB-Tourist held 6-5, he still would have retained six outs, and getting $920-$80, he would still have been right to call. When you give a knowledgeable opponent the right price to draw at you, he’s drawing. And when you let a person draw correctly against you, your hand has lost equity!

What Mr. SB-Tourist didn’t identify is that he created his own bad luck. Matt should never have been there to collect the pot. In a pot this size, Mr. SB-Tourist shouldn’t have slow played the flop and let anyone with a wired pair or a gutshot enjoy a cheap shot to beat him. And since there were five players, the probability of those holdings being present was high

Additionally, Mr. SB-Tourist didn’t effectively perceive how his hand would play. By slow playing the flop UTG with a late position bettor, how was he to attain additional value? Yes, there are many varying scenarios in which the hand can play. But on a paired, three-bet volume flop, good hand readers, as this group was, are apt to read any future aggression as trips.

If Mr. SB-Tourist checks the turn to check-raise, he’s going to give a free card a significant percentage of the time. If he leads, comparable to his exploits, his opponents will read him for a large hand, and he is unlikely to get raised. The manner in which Mr. SB-Tourist played his hand was such that he assumed the most risk without maximizing his hand’s equity. In a pot this large, the equity lost by the assumption of risk he was taking in an effort to acquire extra bets overtook any equity he might gain from any negative-equity bets.

Generally speaking, if the pot is large and your hand is in danger to free or cheap cards, don’t slow play it. You’ll just be giving some opponents an equity-rich shot to beat you. Try to design your strategy so that you don’t give opponents correct odds to call. Often, the additional assumption of risk of losing a large pot is too great equity-wise compared to the bets you gain. The bigger the pot and the greater the risk that the free/cheap card will beat you, the stronger this concept.

That said, keep this concept in perspective, and don’t shut out bad-equity calls that would make your plays’ blended expectation be positive, just so that you don’t give another opponent a correct call. If one player is assuming a high-negative expectation by calling and another is receiving small equity out of the situation, don’t force them both to fold. Giving one opponent a small plus equity call is OK if it induces another player to make a serious error.

Fortunately for Matt, he was the recipient of Mr. SB-Tourist’s error. And Matt really doesn’t need the money as countless others have previously made similar errors against him. So, absorb this concept and try not to make any of Matt’s future earnings come from your money! ♠

Roy Cooke played poker professionally for 16 years prior to becoming a successful Las Vegas Real Estate Broker/Salesman in 1989. Should you wish to any information about Real Estate matters-including purchase, sale or mortgage his office number is 702-396-6575 or Roy’s e-mail is [email protected]. His website is www.roycooke.com. You can also find him on Facebook or Twitter @RealRoyCooke