A Gift at the WSOP

The following hand took place during the second level of Day 2 of the $10,000 buy-in World Series of Poker main event. I have been decently active, but certainly not crazy. With blinds at 300-600 (75), I raised with 7 7 out of my 54,000 chip stack to 1,300 from first position. Everyone at the table had more chips than me.

From first position, I much prefer raising medium pairs than either limping or folding. Developing an aggressive dynamic is usually a good thing when somewhat deep-stacked.
The player in second position, the cutoff (CO), and the button all called. The small blind (SB), a super-tight, passive, straightforward player reraised to 4,500. I decided to call 3,200 more. Everyone else folded.

Once the SB reraised, with a hand that has huge implied odds, calling 3,200 more to see a flop is the only play that makes sense even though I likely have the worst hand at the moment. Notice I am risking 3,200 more for a chance to potentially win around 60,000, giving me roughly 19-to-1 implied odds. Since I only need around 10-to-1 implied odds to justify set mining, 19-to-1 was more than acceptable. I was fairly surprised to see everyone else fold. They should only fold hands that are usually dominated, such as A-9 and K-10.

The flop came K 6 2. The SB checked and I checked behind.

Since I thought the SB’s preflop reraising range was A-A, K-K, Q-Q, A-K, and perhaps J-J and 10-10, I don’t think betting in attempt to force him to fold Q-Q, J-J and 10-10 made much sense. Even though I am known to take aggressive lines when my opponent shows weakness, when he could easily be slow playing A-A, K-K, or A-K, I am fine with giving up.

The turn was the 7. My opponent bet 6,000. I raised to 13,000.

When my opponent bet 6,000, I assumed he had a hand he perceived as strong because I thought he would continue checking with Q-Q, J-J, and 10-10. Knowing this, I decided my hand was good enough to raise even though I lose to the obvious K-K. Based purely on math, my opponent has A-A and A-K way more often than K-K. I thought he would play A-A, K-K, and A-K in a similar manner, assuming they are all effectively the nuts. Raising on the turn is the only logical play when you have a hand that is almost certainly the best and you think your opponent has a strong, but second best, hand he will not fold.
My opponent quickly reraised all-in for 36,500 more. I called.

This is exactly what I wanted to happen. Even though I will be drawing to one out if my opponent has K-K, he will usually have A-A or A-K.

My opponent proudly flipped up his A-A, assuming he had the nuts. I got a nice double up.
To the untrained eye, this situation may appear to be a typical “set up” where my opponent was going to double me up no matter how he played it. However, I think he made a few significant errors.

First, he reraised way too small before the flop. When out of position with deep stacks, you want to make sizable reraises in order to cut down on your opponents’ implied odds. By reraising small, he forced me to play well. If he made it 7,500 instead of 4,500, I would have folded due to a lack of implied odds.

On the flop, he should have made a small bet, perhaps 4,000 into the 10,975 pot. This would have put me in a tough spot, especially if I thought he was capable of bluffing. Since I would have assumed he had a strong hand, I would have folded. Notice that by checking, he gave me a free shot at peeling a 7 on the turn. Even though giving me this opportunity will rarely hurt my opponent, five percent of the time he will lose a gigantic pot. Assuming he knows I will never turn my hand into a bluff, which I certainly wouldn’t in this situation, checking the flop is a disaster. However, if he thought I would lose my mind and bluff with my entire range, checking would be an excellent play.

When I raised my opponent’s turn bet, my hand became very polarized. Either I had a monster or I was bluffing. As I just stated, I am never bluffing. This should have allowed my opponent to make a super tight fold. If he decided he didn’t want to fold, he should have called, forcing me to stay in the pot with all of my potential bluffs and also allowing him to save some chips on the river if I happen to not make an all-in bet. By reraising all-in on the turn, my opponent again forced me to play perfectly.

I hope you have enjoyed this hand. I recently produced a new ebook available on Amazon titled The Main Event with Jonathan Little, In-Depth Analysis of 54 Hands from my WSOP Main Event. If you like reading about my thoughts regarding deep-stacked tournaments, you will love that ebook. Thank you for reading. ♠

Jonathan Little, 2-time World Poker Tour champion has won more than $6 million in tournaments since 2006. He is sponsored by 3bet.com, Instapoker and BlueSharkOptics and teaches poker at FloatTheTurn.com and www.JonathanLittleSecrets.com. Follow him on Twitter @ JonathanLittle.