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Interesting Hand From the 2015 World Series of Poker Main Event Final Table

by Jonathan Little |  Published: Dec 23, 2015

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Jonathan LittleThe fact that the players at the WSOP final table have four months to prepare creates an interesting dynamic. If you happen to make the final table with a short stack, you have four months to diligently study exactly which hands you should be willing to go all-in with and which you should fold. This high-risk all-in or fold situation occurred on the second hand of the 2015 WSOP final table.

Without going into too much detail, there were two short stacks at the table, Patrick Chan and Federico Butteroni, both with 15 big blinds. The next shortest stack had 30 big blinds. This typically implies that Chan and Butteroni should try to outlast each other. However, the WSOP main event has a bizarre payout structure.

1st $7,683,346
2nd $4,470,896
3rd $3,398,298
4th $2,615,361
5th $1,911,423
6th $1,426,283
7th $1,203,293
8th $1,097,056
9th $1,001,020
10th $756,897
11th $526,778
12th $526,778

There is a typical $240,000 jump from 11th and 10th then a $245,000 jump from 10th to ninth. Things get wonky at the final table, with a $96,000 jump from ninth to eighth, followed by a $104,000 jump from eighth to seventh, then a $223,000 jump from seventh to sixth.

For reasons I will never understand, besides “wanting everyone at the final table to get a million dollars”, going from 11th place to 10th place is worth significantly more than going from seventh place to sixth place. This means the short stacks should be gambling much harder than normal because of the incredibly small payout increases. While I understand a $96,000 jump is a lot of actual money, in terms of buy-ins and the jumps near the end of the final table, the payout increase from ninth to eighth place can effectively be ignored. This means, at least initially, moving up the payout ladder is less important than it typically is.

On the second hand of the final table, everyone folded around to McKeehen, the big stack, with 150 big blinds, who went all in for both Chan’s and Butteroni’s 15 big blind stacks. Chan woke up with K-Q in the small blind and had what I thought was a difficult decision. I asked my followers on Twitter (@JonathanLittle) what they thought about this situation and I got a wide range of answers.

Some said Chan should fold because he had to wait four months for this final table, which is completely irrelevant. Others said he should fold because he “only” had K-Q. Others said it was an obvious call. What do you think?

You can actually figure out the optimal pushing and calling ranges for each player involved in this hand using an Independent Chip Model (ICM) calculator. Of course, these programs only look at push or fold scenarios. If McKeehen implements a min-raise or limping strategy, all of this changes. On the second hand of the tournament, you have to guess as to whether he will have a min-raise and pushing strategy or only a pushing strategy. While I would likely use only a pushing strategy in this exact situation due to being able to apply maximum pressure to the two short stacks, min-raising is certainly an option.

Using the ICM calculator, you will find the optimal all-in or fold strategy for McKeehen is to push the top 53 percent of hands, including hands as weak as J-2 suited, 10-4 suited, 9-5 suited, 6-4 suited, 4-3 suited, K-7 offsuit, 10-8 offsuit, 8-7 offsuit, and 7-6 offsuit. Clearly, this is a very wide range. It is important to realize that if the payout jump was “normal,” he could push an even wider range.

Assuming McKeehen is pushing optimally, Chan can call with 15 percent of hands, including 6-6, A-5 suited, K-10 suited, A-8 offsuit, and K-J offsuit. Since K-Q is in that range, Chan has an easy call. In fact, the only time Chan should fold to an all in from McKeehen is when he is pushing with only reasonable strong hands that flop poorly, such as small pairs, A-x, and decent K-x, which implies he is min-raising everything else.

This analysis results in Chan having a somewhat easy call. Had the payout structure been “normal,” Chan would have a very close decision. If you want to succeed in poker tournaments, be sure to study the math away from the table so you know what to do when any tough situation arises. To download the advanced ICM calculator I used for these calculations, go to JonathanLittlePoker.com/icm ♠

Jonathan Little is a two-time WPT champion with more than $6 million in tournament winnings. Each week, he posts an educational blog and podcast at JonathanLittlePoker.com, where you can get a FREE poker training video that details five things you must master if you want to win at tournament poker.