Tutoring Another Newbie

I've told you about my friend Eugene, who's a poker newbie. Well, we have a mutual friend, Berend, who's also learning the game. Berend recently sent me some hand histories from an online poker session and asked for my critique. For better or worse, Berend has learned just about everything he knows about poker from me. So, until he starts developing his own style of play and learning tricks from other sources, I can generally take the credit (or the blame) for most of his play.

First, I noticed that he was extremely selective before the flop. That was good to see, as it's very important. But sometimes it seemed that he had decided to play certain hands and didn't pay attention to what happened before it was his turn. The biggest mistake he made like this was calling two bets cold with hands like K-Q offsuit and Q-J offsuit. These hands (particularly the latter) are somewhat awkward to begin with, because they're dominated by hands that everybody plays (A-K, A-Q). After running into trouble playing those hands for two bets cold, Berend started avoiding them, and his results have gotten better.

Second, he occasionally succumbs to Fancy Play Syndrome. He has obviously read the section about check-raising in my book, and he thinks it's a great idea: "Why should I get only one bet when I can get two?" Well, I'm all for maximizing your bets when you've got a good hand, and I think the check-raise is a powerful play, but consider this example: Berend had J-10 offsuit in the big blind in one game and saw the flop for "free." The flop was raggedy, 10 high. He bet out, got raised, and called. The turn brought a jack, giving him top two pair. He bet again. Now, you can make an argument for check-raising here, but it's often correct to bet out in this situation. If his opponent has a 10, the jack might scare him into checking – and if you're in doubt with a big hand, it's always better to bet than risk a free card. Anyway, Berend's opponent called again. Now, the river brought another 10, giving Berend a full house – and he checked! Not surprisingly, his opponent checked, too. Berend bet the flop and called a raise, and then bet the turn. I asked him, "What is it that you didn't like about the river? Nothing! You loved the river, and your opponent realized it and didn't fall into your silly trap." Checking didn't make any sense – there are times to be sneaky to try to trap your opponents, but this wasn't one of them. Actually, his best hope for getting action was that his opponent had the case 10 and would (unwisely) raise on the river, giving Berend a chance to reraise. It's fine to confuse your opponents, but they tend to become more passive when you confuse them. If you have a big hand and want action, do straightforward things that encourage assertive behavior.

Third, Berend says he's never quite sure what to do on the river with moderately good hands. "Your book," he complained, "says, 'Bet on the river only if you want to be called.' But then it says, 'Bet the river, almost always.'" Well, yes, it can be confusing. And this is where you need to understand your opponents. If you watch people in low-limit games, you'll find that many of them will call you down with second or third pair – or worse. Against these people, value bet mercilessly, especially on the river when you might be tempted to check down a moderately good hand (such as top pair with a medium kicker). Against tighter opponents, pay closer attention to the former advice, and bet on the river only when you'd like them to call (of course, we're not talking about bluffing here). In general, there are more loose callers than tight players in low-limit games. So, if you're not sure what to do, tend to err on the side of betting the river too much.

Finally, and most importantly, my friend is learning to develop a sense of humor about the game. A few days ago he sent me a hand transcript in which he'd had a pair of eights in early position. There was a raise in front of him, and he wisely abandoned his hand. Then, he watched in horror as the flop brought both of the other eights. I reviewed the hand and pointed out that nobody really had much, and that he wouldn't have gotten much action anyway. But, of course, the key point was that what happened on the flop didn't mean anything. He made the correct decision by folding pre-quads. Making the right decisions, even when the cards fall the wrong way, is how you profit in poker.

Thank you to Berend for sharing this information, and thank you for reading.