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Thunder Strikes! - Part II

by Thomas Keller |  Published: Oct 08, 2004

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Falling asleep can be a challenge after an ordinary day, but getting to sleep the night before a final table can be almost impossible! My mind was jellified after the previous 16-hour marathon day of poker, but at the same time, I had a lot of restless energy as I kept replaying hands in my head and thinking about my strategy for the final table, which was less than 12 hours away. I finally got back to my room at Bellagio and wound down for a while with a very late dinner (is it still called dinner if you eat it at 6 in the morning?), and got maybe five hours of sleep before my 11 o'clock wake-up call. Normally, five hours of sleep is very little for me, but going into the final table, I felt completely rested and confident, as the excitement of playing for my first bracelet in the 5K no-limit hold'em event at the 2004 World Series of Poker made up for any sleepiness that I might have otherwise felt under different circumstances.

When we started the final table, I was in the No. 3 seat with 216K, Sam Batshon was in the No. 4 seat with 190K, Frank Sinopoli was in seat No. 5 (50K), Phillip Marmorstein was in seat No. 6 (40K), Lee Watkinson was in seat No. 7 (203K), James Sousa was in seat No. 8 (234K), Martin de Knijff was in seat No. 9 (158K), Young Phan was in seat No. 1 (45K), and Paul "Eskimo" Clark was sitting directly to my right in the No. 2 seat with 121K.

A few rounds into play, a big hand developed: Eskimo limped in, I made a moderate raise to approximately 14K with pocket kings, and Frank went into deep thought with his short stack. He finally decided to smooth-call my raise, leaving himself with about 40K in chips. I felt at this point that he probably held a decent-sized pocket pair (nines, tens, or jacks), and that with A-K he would have just gone all in preflop. I didn't think he would play a pair smaller than nines in this spot after I had raised from early position (especially with Eskimo limping from under the gun), nor did I think he would smooth-call my raise with any speculative hand or just facecards, given his short stack and the early position of my raise. The flop came 7-6-2 and I slowly checked to him, figuring that if I was right about his holding, he would commit himself to the pot, putting me on big cards and not wanting to give me a free card. Sure enough, he fired 24K into the pot and I check-raised him all in for his remaining 16K, which he unhappily pushed into the pot, believing he was beat but getting overwhelming pot odds to make the call with an overpair. Sure enough, he had nines, and two blanks came off and he finished in ninth place. He put on a great performance throughout the tournament, and took an awful beat right before the final table to come in so short-stacked. I'm sure we'll see a lot more of Frank Sinopoli in the future.

Unfortunately, after this hand, things started to turn bad for me. I had a clear chip lead, but things turned cold for a while and my stack got whittled down quite a bit. Then, a hand came up in which Eskimo raised 15K from early position and I made it 35K with pocket jacks directly behind him. The other players folded back to him and he immediately went all in for another 120K. I went into deep thought, and counted out my chips. If I called and lost this pot, I would have only 60K left, which would be one of the shortest stacks at the table. However, if I won, I would regain my sizeable chip lead. At this point in the tournament I liked my chip position, since I was close to the chip leaders and well above the several short stacks, so I did not want to gamble unless I was confident I had by far the best hand. Eskimo's immediate all-in raise made me think he did not have aces, because I thought he would have at least considered slow-playing aces after my reraise. The more I thought about his hand, the more I put him on kings or queens, or at worst, A-K. My jacks would be crushed by two of these hands and a coin flip against A-K, so I decided to fold the jacks, flipping them up to show that I had a hand and wasn't just trying to run over him by reraising preflop. I asked him what he had after the hand, and he told me he had pocket fours, but based on his displeased body language when he saw my jacks, I thought he was just telling me a story. Sure enough, later I found out he was holding two queens, and that my read had been solid.

A round later, I again picked up jacks in early position and made a standard raise to 20K, and everyone folded to Young Phan, who made a huge reraise from the small blind, making it 80K. Phan had me barely covered, with each of us having about 150K. Phan's huge raise from out of position made me think he held a big hand, but at the same time did not want me to call, wanting to pick the pot up right there. I had already shown a round earlier that I was capable of laying down a big hand, and now I felt I needed to make a stand so that my opponents wouldn't try to run me over. I thought he certainly could be making this play with a relatively strong pair like nines or tens, against which my jacks would be in great shape, but what I really believed he held was A-K. I didn't think he would reraise that much with aces or kings, but I thought queens were a possibility, too. Actually, pocket queens was the only hand that really worried me at this point. Given my read that he likely held A-K, I could have just called his raise with position on him and seen the flop before possibly committing the rest of my chips, but I decided to move in for my remaining 70K, putting him to the test right then, figuring that he would likely feel pot-committed and call with any of the hands I had put him on. As he pondered calling me, I was hoping he had nines or tens, but those hopes were dispelled when he finally called, flipping over his A-K, and we had a classic race situation. Luckily for me, the final board read 10 high, and I doubled up. The very next hand, I won Phan's last few chips when I made eights full with pocket eights in the big blind, and Phan finished in seventh place, another great finish for this talented fixture on the tournament circuit.

A round or so later, I picked up another big hand – pocket queens – and made a moderate raise of 16K or so. Everyone folded to James Sousa in the small blind, a very unpredictable and aggressive player who was capable of almost any play. I could tell even before he looked at his cards that he was dying to play a pot with me. He looked down at his cards and meekly called my raise, giving me an immediate sense that his hand was very weak. The flop came down K-K-2 with two diamonds, and Sousa immediately went all in for more than 350K, having me slightly covered. This was a huge bet given the pot was less than 40K at this point, and now I had to decide if I wanted to risk my entire tournament with queens and this board. If I called and Sousa had a king, I was drawing very slim to the remaining two queens. If I called and Sousa had a flush draw with the ace, I was only a 3-2 favorite, and he still had more than a 30 percent chance of winning the hand if I called and he held just a small flush draw. I decided I wanted to call Sousa here only if I thought there was a very good chance he was on a pure bluff, since I had second chip position out of the six remaining players and could fold here and still have a great chance of winning the tournament. This was a very suspicious-looking bet, as most players would slow-play a strong hand in this spot, or at least not move all in on the flop with a strong hand. But Sousa did not play like most players; he was capable of having a king or a flush draw, or even 9-7 offsuit, so I was pretty perplexed. The question I had to answer was: How often would he really risk almost his entire stack here on just a pure bluff? Even if he thought I would fold anything but a king or pocket deuces on this flop, it hardly seemed worth it for him to try to pick up a 40K pot while risking 300K with no outs if I decided to call. My preflop read that his starting hand was very weak came to mind, and I ruled out the chance that he could have jacks, tens, or any pocket pair. I finally decided it would be ridiculous for him to have nothing in this spot, and he probably had some kind of flush draw, with a slight chance of a king. I decided I did not want to jeopardize my great chip position at this point in the tournament, so I folded. Once I folded, Sousa gleefully turned up 5-4 offsuit and raked in the pot, leaving me quite stunned, as he had made an extremely reckless play for a very small pot. This hand was initially a huge mental setback for me, given that I could've easily doubled up had I called him (he had almost no outs), and then taken great control of the tournament with a stack of almost half the chips in play with five other players left. I tried to look at the situation positively, though, and grew confident that Sousa would eventually make another reckless play that I could take advantage of and bust him on.

Play progressed quickly after this hand and we were soon down to three players – Sousa, Martin, and myself. I had a slight chip lead with just over 500K and Sousa had about the same amount. Martin had the shortest stack with 260K. He had just busted Lee Watkinson when Lee held the big blind, so for the next hand, Martin was first to act, I was on the button, and Sousa was the lone blind, posting the big blind of 8K. Martin folded and I looked down to see a truly awful hand, J-6 offsuit. Despite the weak nature of my holding, I decided to call, figuring I could afford to gamble for 8K with the chance of possibly busting Sousa if I caught the right board. Sousa checked behind me, and the flop came J-J-10. Much to my surprise, Sousa immediately moved his entire 500K stack into this meager 20K pot. I had already seen him make this play before, and immediately called him despite having a 6 kicker with my three jacks. I felt that he was likely making another reckless play and that I had him in terrible shape. Sure enough, he had only 10-5 offsuit and I busted him out in third place.

Now, I was heads up against Martin. I had one million in chips and Martin had 260K, so I had about a 4-1 chip lead on him. Despite this, Martin accumulated lots of chips by making a series of all-in bets that I could never call, winning pot after pot and almost evening the chip count. I had a 6-5 chip lead when the final hand came down. I was on the button (posting the small blind) and looked down to see pocket tens. I made my standard button raise of three times the big blind (a bet of 24K total) and Martin called. The flop came 9-4-2 with two clubs, and Martin checked to me. I loved this flop with my overpair and made a strong, almost pot-sized, bet. Martin made what had become his customary all-in check-raise, and I called instantly. At this point, I was hoping he had a 9 and I had him in bad shape. I figured that unless he had a set, I was in good shape, or worst case a coin flip if he had a big flush draw. I didn't think he had caught two pair on the 9-4-2 flop, or had slow-played an overpair. To my displeasure, Martin turned over the Kclubs 2clubs, which was actually a tiny favorite over my tens, since any club, deuce, or king would be a winner for him. Needless to say, I had lots of bullets to dodge in the next two cards. The first card off was a 9, a beautiful 9. My heart was racing fast now; I was one card away from winning my first WSOP bracelet and the biggest tournament of my life or losing almost all of my chips and taking a devastating blow against the very talented and fierce Martin de Knijff, aka "the Knife." The dealer burned one last card and popped another 9 down on the river, and I threw my fists up and yelled in absolute joy! I had made nines full of tens to win the 5K no-limit hold'em event at the 2004 World Series of Poker! The rush of winning was absolutely indescribable. I felt like I was floating around the room as I ran and hugged my new wife, Andra, my twin brother, Shawn, my older brother Randy, and my cousin Kevin, who were there throughout the final table, cheering me on and giving me much needed support.

I shared a warm handshake with the amazing Martin de Knijff (who had just won the World Poker Tour Championship and $2.5 million a few weeks before), and congratulated him on playing such a terrific tournament. I even saw my good friend Annie Duke in the crowd and gave her a nice bearhug before I was dragged back to reality to do interviews for ESPN and various other press. I hope you enjoyed reading about this tournament, as it was a pleasure writing about it and reliving such an amazing event!

Check in with me next issue as I discuss some of my insights into the world's most popular poker game, no-limit Texas hold'em. spades



Editor's note: Thomas "Thunder" Keller is a 23-year-old professional poker player and one of poker's young and rising stars. To learn more about him, go to his website at www.thunderkeller.com.