Going Six Bets on the River

"I was lookin' up to see if you were lookin' back to see"


Recently in one of Daniel Negreanu's blog entries, he discussed a hand that I thought was very interesting, and I wish he'd taken some time to discuss the hand and how it played.



Daniel described himself "grinding it out in a $2,000-$4,000 game" (I couldn't make this stuff up). He was playing fourhanded (limit hold'em) at the time, and came in for a raise with pocket deuces. He got reraised by someone in late position, and then the big blind (it seems) made it four bets. He and the three-bettor both called. That's when the miracle happened: He flopped quads, 3-2-2. Wow. Obviously, his job at this point was to maximize the money that went in.



The big blind (BB) cooperated by betting out, and Daniel and the player behind him both just called.



The turn card was a 10; the BB bet again. Daniel figured that the BB had a big pair and he (Daniel) could get his raise in on the river, and that he might trap the preflop three-bettor for another call here. Unfortunately, that player (quite wisely) got out of the pot.



The river was a king; Daniel still had the nuts. The BB bet out, and Daniel raised, of course. This is when things got interesting. The BB made it three bets. Daniel, knowing he couldn't lose the pot, made it four. The BB made it five. Daniel made it six. That's when the BB finally realized what he was up against, and called. Daniel didn't see the cards, but he (and surely any of us watching) could be quite sure that the poor BB player had pocket kings and had hit the top full house when drawing stone dead.



I got to thinking about that. How many bets would I have gone with kings full there? Would I have lost two fewer bets? Two more?



Well, let's work backward. If I am the BB and have K-K, what causes me to put in a fifth bet on the river? For me to know that, I have to know what causes Daniel to put in a fourth bet on the river. And for me to know that, I have to estimate what hands Daniel would put me on if I

put a third bet in on the river.



I think I (the BB) should put in a third bet with aces, kings, or tens. There seem to be enough hands with which Daniel can raise initially that my third bet with any of those hands should show a profit. I can't really three-bet with Q-Q or J-J – as that king might have hit Daniel. Of course, I'm much stronger than Daniel suspects, and I'm happy to put in a third bet.



Daniel's four-bet gives me pause, however. If he correctly read my third bet, he should have me narrowed down to A-A, K-K, or 10-10. There were two clubs on the flop, and Daniel didn't mention if the river king was a club. If so, he could throw some club flushes (A Q, A J) into the mix of my possible hands.



When all is said and done, however, I (the big blind) would put Daniel on one specific hand: 10-10. He raised before the flop, then backed down after the reraise and the four-bet to see how the flop looked. He got exactly the flop he hoped for (everything smaller than a 10). So, he called, planning to raise the turn (or perhaps just minimize his investment in case there was a larger pocket pair out). Then, a miracle happened: He hit tens full on the turn. Rather than raise, he decided to call, hoping to keep the third player in the pot. What he didn't count on, of course, was my hitting a king on the river to beat him.



From a Bayesian perspective, it's more likely that I have A-A than K-K. In short, if I'm the BB, I put Daniel on 10-10 and put Daniel on putting me on A-A. So, I put in the fifth bet.



When Daniel puts in the sixth bet, there is essentially only one hand he can have (remember, he's been doing all this thinking, too), and that hand contains nothing but deuces.



This, of course, raises an interesting point. If there's really no hand that Daniel can have other than the feared quads, why should I bother calling that last bet? Well, there were six big bets in the pot before the flop (four small bets each times three players), then one and a half big bets on the flop, two more on the turn, and now a brutal 11 big bets on the river. That's a total of almost 21 big bets in the pot. If Daniel moves me off these kings just 5 percent of the time with a pure bluff (or just by overplaying 10-10 – it's the same thing to me), he shows a profit. I'm not going to permit that, so I call, but wishing I could find somebody to bet me that Daniel has anything but 2-2.



So, I suppose I'd lose the same six bets on the end that Daniel Negreanu's opponent lost. Of course, that would first require that I be playing $2,000-$4,000 hold'em, and there's basically zero chance of my doing that.



Here are two final things:



1. You'll note that I didn't talk about the dollars involved when discussing the hand. It's very important that you learn to think of the chips as bet units. Whether this was $2,000-$4,000

or $2-$4, the principles are the same. Of course, it would be silly to ascribe the same series of thoughts to a random $2-$4 opponent that you would to Daniel Negreanu and his opponent. But if you find yourself thinking about the chips as money rather than bet units, you're probably playing too big.



2. Daniel, or the BB player (whom I've allowed to remain anonymous here), if you're reading this, I would be delighted to hear your thoughts on how those bets went in on the river. Please drop me a note and tell me. "If I was lookin' up to see if you were lookin' back at me."



Lee Jones is the author of the best-selling book Winning Low Limit Hold'em, and the poker room manager for PokerStars.com.