Two Drawing Hands

Hand No. 1: Middle Pair Plus Nut-Flush Draw

Recently, while waiting for my regular, big pot-limit Omaha (PLO) game to start, I was playing in a $10-$20 limit hold'em game. I got involved in a hand with someone who was killing time waiting for our big game, as well. He's an aggressive and creative player who doesn't like me much, but he respects and fears my play a lot. In the cutoff seat, I found the A 9. With three callers, I oftentimes would raise for value, but since the tight under-the-gun (UTG) player could have limped in with a bigger ace than mine or some other premium hand, I did not want to escalate the pot at this point. I called, the button and small blind folded, and then my fellow PLO player in the big blind raised. Everyone called, as did I. There were five players in a $105 pot.



Now, for this player to raise from the big blind with the tight UTG player in, and especially with me in, I knew he probably had a big hand: A-Q minimum, but more likely A-K or a big pair. So, when the flop came Q-9-4 with two spades and he bet into the field, I was pretty sure he had at least one big pair now – a hand that would certainly beat my current middle pair and nut-flush draw.



When all three players called the bet, it was up to me. What was my best course of action – call, because I was currently behind, or raise, because I had a premium draw and was getting great odds? Well, this was an easy decision: I raised. Using the counting-outs system described in our upcoming book Hold'em on the Come, I had probably nine pure flush outs (unless the bettor had top set, but even though this was possible, it was not very likely), plus perhaps an additional three or four outs by improving to top pair or better. All in all, I had about 12 outs total. (I was hoping the flop bettor had K-K instead of the slightly weaker A-Q, as this would buy me some additional outs: Any ace on the turn would now give me an almost certain winner, instead of costing me a lot of money.) The flop bettor reraised, two of the initial callers called again, and I capped the betting at $40. The total pot size after the flop betting was $275.



To make a long story short, I caught a third 9 on the turn, got called in two places on both the turn and river, and my three nines were good. When the dealer pushed me the pot, my fellow PLO player flashed his cards to his neighbor, saying, "See how lucky this fella is. I read him perfectly for being on a flush draw, I make him pay the maximum for trying to draw out, and yet again he gets away with it. It's just not fair."



What this player forgot was that even though he had the best hand when the money went in, I was actually the clear money favorite. I needed to have only 25 percent pot equity for my bets from that point on to have a positive expectation, and it should be clear that even in this four-way field, I probably would have won the pot well over 40 percent of the time. So, this meant that even though I knew I was behind, I was willing to put as many chips as possible into the pot – provided that both of the other players stayed in, as well – because every bet would theoretically make me money! Now, while my opponent probably had made the right decision to reraise on the flop (with a hand like A-Q or K-K, he probably would have about 30 percent to 35 percent pot equity, and indeed did need to charge the others for the privilege of drawing out), he forgot to acknowledge the fact that I also had the odds in my favor. We both were in good positions in this hand – at the expense of the other two players.

Hand No. 2: Almost The Same Situation

It is interesting to note that just 30 minutes before this hand, I had played almost the same hand in an entirely different manner. Again in the cutoff seat, this time with two weak callers in front of me, I had the A 8 and decided to raise to $20. The big blind called and four players saw the flop with a total pot of $85.



The flop came J-6-4 with two spades, again giving me the nut-flush draw. It was checked to the third player, a young man who was very inexperienced and quite easy to read. He had not made any bets up to that point and had been playing very passively, but now he could not wait to get his chips in. Acting very confused, he actually put no fewer than four $10 chips into the pot, while the betting limit was, of course, just one chip.



Now, while it often would seem normal to semibluff-raise, being in position with my nut-flush draw and thereby possibly giving myself a free card on the turn (and possibly gaining two extra outs if the bettor had a pair of jacks and I could get someone to fold a bigger ace than mine – so that if an ace came on the turn or river, I would win the pot), I just flat-called. I was fairly certain that this young guy had just hit a whopper, and I was equally certain that by raising, I would (a) make the other two players fold, and (b) give my opponent the chance to reraise – a chance he would undoubtedly take. Because both of these things would be bad for my expectation, I made a play that most "good" players would consider weak-tight: I just called, hoping to get paid off if I hit my hand.



On the turn, he bet and I called. When I made the nuts on the river by catching a spade, the young man bet, I raised, he reraised, I reraised again, and he finally called. I had gotten him to do what I had expected him to do – pay me off once my hand had improved to beat his obviously good hand – while keeping the initial costs low and taking advantage of the fact that he probably would not recognize the flush possibility on the board once the third spade had hit.



In hand No. 1, I had done exactly the opposite. I had made as many raises as possible early in the hand while knowing I was behind, but also knowing I would be getting a great return on my investment by putting in my chips before making my hand.

The Point

So, you ask, what is the point of all of this? Well, the point is, you should look at more factors than just your number of outs. You should take into account what your opponents probably hold, and how they will respond to any action you might take – both now and on later streets. And from there, you should try to find the proper balance between minimizing your investment and maximizing your return, in order to make the play with the highest expected value.

This is an edited excerpt from the brand-new book, Hold'em on the Come: Limit Hold'em Strategy for Drawing Hands, by Rolf Slotboom and Dew Mason. The book will be released in March 2006. Pre-ordering is possible through http://www.dandbpoker.com/ and http://www.rolfslotboom.com/.