Not Smart Enough

I have oftentimes written that poker is a situational game, as much if not more dependent upon the styles of your opponents as it is on your holdings. Being able to accurately read those situations and conceptually adjust your strategy to them is a large part of what separates the great performers from the also-rans. It is the fine-art side of poker that is hard to acquire.



I was playing the Bellagio Saturday night crowd, $30-$60 limit hold'em. The table was loose and passive, with many callers seeing the flop and little preflop raising. I was dealt the A 8 in first position. With that holding in a passive game, I am going to limp in, hoping to get several callers – callers who will increase my price to draw if I happen to flop a flush draw, and weak-playing callers who will most likely get involved in the pot if I make a flush. When players get involved after I make the flush, they are often drawing dead – and the value of those bets is obviously much higher than the bets called when they are drawing live.



After I limped in, five players limped in behind me, and the small blind called. The big blind, a tight, passive, very straightforward player, raised to $60. When he made the raise from that position, I knew he held a very strong hand, as he was not the type to splash around in the first place, let alone when we were playing a volume pot. He was trying to play well, but didn't understand that he was playing too predictably, and even the inexperienced tourists could read him with a reasonable level of accuracy. All of the players in the field called, including me.



The dealer flopped the 10 8 3, giving me second pair and the nut-flush draw, a powerful flop for my holding. The small blind checked, the preflop raiser bet, and it was my move next. As I always do when analyzing a situation, I thought about the mindset of the bettor. Several times I had seen him raise with big cards and then check when he missed the flop. Generally, with a powerful holding such as a pair and the nut-flush draw, I raise a bettor, particularly a preflop raiser who may be betting overcards, even if I risk blowing out players behind me. The value of the raise is just too powerful to give up when my holding is the best hand.



But this situation had a different feel, due to the style of the bettor. Because of his straightforward nature, betting when he thought he had the best hand and checking when he thought he needed improvement, I knew my hand was not the best hand! He held an overpair, otherwise he would not have led into the large field. If he held an overpair, much of the value of a raise was lost, significantly weakening the play.



Calling was a better play in this situation. I had to improve my hand to win. If I let in the players behind me, not only would I improve the price on my draw, but they would also be engaged in the action and be around to pay me off if I made my hand. The value of those bets more than made up for the small edge I would gain by playing the hand heads up. I do understand the concept of raising to increase your chances of winning the pot when a significant amount of money is in the pot. However, in this situation, there were few hands, if any, that my drawing opponents would fold to a raise that could beat my hand if I improved it. Most of my opponents would routinely call a single bet on the flop with hands as weak as overcards, which would likely be second best if I made my flush, and I wanted to induce them to make that call.



I called the single wager and several players called behind me. The turn card was the Q, the preflop raiser led again, and once again I called. Two other players also called.



On the river, the dealer turned the A, giving me aces and eights. The preflop raiser led again. I didn't like the fact that he bet. Since he was timid and didn't like to bet unless he had top pair or better, and could not hold a single ace because he would not bet overcards into a large field, it stood to reason that he could beat two aces. If he could beat two aces, what holding could he have that aces and eights could beat? I couldn't think of one!



I rethought the situation through. The pot was large and I wanted to be sure I didn't fold a winner. The hands I put him on were 10-10, A-A, or Q-Q – all of which would take the pot against my aces up. But could he have K-K? If so, would he lead out into the river ace? Probably not. A-K? He wouldn't have led on the flop from out of position with a clean miss and overcards. Was I sure of my read on him?



The pot was large. Could one of the two players behind me have hit the ace? Was there some risk I would get raised? I contemplated my degree of accuracy about my read of him. With my gut roiling with uncertainty, I called my opponent's bet. One player overcalled behind me. The preflop raiser turned over wired queens, having made a set of queens on the turn. Disgusted with my call on the river, I tossed my hand into the muck.



I hate it when I read a situation and then through lack of confidence in my read, I call when I know I should have folded, or muck when I should have called. Generally, I make those errors when I am lacking confidence, either because I have not been performing well or because I have not been playing much and don't feel as in tune with the game as I do when I am performing well and playing often.



I have written before that most players have an MO; they either call too much or fold too much, and you should make plays against them that are designed to encourage them to make their mistake more often.



On the river, most players have an MO, as well. It's sort of a subset of their overall play, and also is related to calling and folding. Some people are pot-savers – making crying calls on the end for the size of the pot even when they're sure they are beat. They almost never can be bluffed on the end. Others are bet-savers – laying down hands that have some small chance of being good, even though the situation and pot odds indicate a call to be correct. They can often be moved off a pot on the end.



I am sometimes a bet-saver and sometimes a pot-saver, depending on the texture of the field and the play of the hand. But when I'm feeling unsure of myself, I tend to lean to the pot-saver side. My thinking is that if I'm unsure, I don't want to make a mistake that costs me a large pot. I need to be right only once in a while to make up for the times that I'm wrong.



Of course, when my analysis tells me it's obvious that I'm beat, and especially when there's some risk of a raise behind me, I'm supposed to be smart enough to do the right thing and toss my hand into the muck and save that 60 bucks to buy something for my daughter. Then again, on some days – like this one – I'm just not smart enough to do what I know is the right thing.



Roy Cooke played winning professional poker for more than 16 years. He is a successful real estate broker/salesperson in Las Vegas. His books are available at http://www.conjelco.com/. His longtime collaborator, John Bond, is a freelance writer in South Florida.