A Quick Exit, World Series of Poker Tournament Circuit, Tunica

Sometimes in poker, as in life, things don't go quite the way we had envisioned them beforehand. Even when a situation seems to be full of promise and all that is so right with the world, it can come crashing down like so many busted open-end straight draws.



Here is a hand I played in the World Series of Poker Tournament Circuit event in Tunica, Mississippi that started out with all the promise of an ice cream cone on a sunny day. Unfortunately, it failed to meet my expectations and wound up being slightly less satisfying than a waffle cone should.

I had pulled a decently tough draw, with Erick Lindgren, Chris Grigorian, Gavin Smith, and Daniel Alaei at my table. Even though it was early, Gavin had been able to build up his stack quickly. I think he was already up to about $17,000 in chips, when we had started with $10,000, before I had even played a hand! We had been playing barely 15 minutes when the following hand came up:



The blinds were $25-$50. It was the first hand I had a chance to play, and I had the Q Q on the button. There were three limpers when the action rolled around to me. I don't really like limpers, so I raised. I bumped it up to $400. I wanted to make sure that anyone with some weak ace or king wouldn't be able to stay in the hand cheaply. Everyone folded back to Gavin, who called the raise. Now, what could Gavin have?



The correct answer is truly almost anything. With some players, you are able to put them on hands much easier than a loose player like Smith. There are so many hands with which he would call that we really can rule out only one type: a big pair. Gavin is a good player, and certainly would have raised two limpers if he had any kind of big pair, so we can safely factor those hands out. Unfortunately, that's about it. We proceeded to the flop.



It came gloriously, Q J 5, and Gavin immediately checked. I decided to make a bet, continuing on with my preflop raise. Many players may choose to check behind their opponent there, but it is usually a mistake, especially against a loose player who could hold any number of hands. There are just too many drawing hands to which you don't want to give free cards.



I bet a healthy $800 into a pot that already held $1,025. Gavin called quickly. What could he be holding, considering his call?



Keep in mind that Smith had me covered by a substantial margin. That meant that he also had the knowledge that he could bust me, and that I certainly couldn't do the same to him. I was pretty confident that I could rule out a few hands. I couldn't put him on K-10, as I believed he would have played it a little faster on the flop. Also, I couldn't see him holding the A X, for the same reason. When you have someone covered, it is better to play hands like that for maximum pressure value, making sure that your opponent feels the threat of going broke. You aren't going to fold to his bet, so it is usually better to add value, in the form of possibly making him fold. I believed the hands that made the most sense were something like the 10 8, or A-J offsuit.



The turn brought an ugly little card, the 6, and Gavin checked. This was a terrible card, not just because it completed the obvious flush draw, but also because it opened up a straight draw and a possible straight-flush draw if Gavin was playing a hand like two medium hearts, which was very possible. Hmm, what should I do now?



I thought about checking behind him. This would prevent me from losing too much on this street, and rob Gavin of the opportunity of check-raising me if he had made his hand. It didn't seem clear to me that this was the correct move, though. Based on the fact that there were still several draws out there, if he hadn't already made his hand, I didn't think it was wise to check and give him a possible free shot at making one. In the end, I decided that with this board, it was just too dangerous to give him a free look at the river. I bet $1,500 … and Gavin moved in instantaneously.



Well, this was certainly the worst-case scenario. What would he move in with there? Let's first take a look at hands with which he could move in that I would have beat.



He may have just decided that the board was too threatening to continue slow-playing a couple of hands. He could hold a set of fives, or possibly two pair with a Q-J, and decided that he just wanted to get it in and not get outplayed because of the heart draw. With the Q-J, though, he had to have been concerned with the two hearts on the flop, and probably would have check-raised my flop bet. I thought that was a pretty remote hand.



He also could have held A-J offsuit with the A, a hand that I originally had put him on. I probably would have played that hand in this fashion, especially with our chip situation. There's nothing like pressuring your opponent when you can bust him, and he can't return the favor. I'm quite sure that Gavin knew this.



The only hand that would have me beat already was, obviously, a made flush. With that said, my initial idea that he had two medium hearts in his hand seemed even more likely now. He wouldn't want to give me a cheap shot at drawing out if I had a big heart, which I did. Also, why wouldn't he want to milk me for a little bit if he had made the nut flush? It all didn't add up.



Still, it was my tournament life on the line if I was wrong. A common mistake that many players make in tournaments is always trying to lose the minimum, thereby usually backing away from aggression when they don't have the nuts. I just needed to feel confident enough that Gavin held one of the hands that made the most sense to me.



If I thought my Q was good if another heart came on the river, it was almost a no-brainer. Let's take a look at the outs: I had 10 outs to fill up or make quads on the river. I was positive that they were all definite wins for me, unless he held a set of fives.



Also, if my queen was going to be good for a flush win, I also had another seven, eight, or nine outs, depending on what Gavin held. I still thought the most likely hand for him to be holding was a medium made flush.



I also considered his style. He is loose and wild, and loves to be the table captain, pushing other players off hands. He had accumulated a good amount of chips, and was well on his way to living up to this style.



It was pretty clear that I had to make the call.



I did so, and much to my dismay, Gavin flipped over the A 3, leaving me flabbergasted and disappointed. I was shocked to see the nut flush in his hand, because he hadn't attempted to take charge on the flop.



The river bricked out in the form of the 7, so it was irrelevant that the flush outs I had considered live actually weren't. Still, I thought that I had made the right play in this particular situation. I still think it was a little strange that Big G played this hand so slowly when it seemed to make more sense to play fast, and then, alternately, so fast when it seemed to be more effective to play it slowly.



When all was said and done, though, Gavin had the chips and I was left to chill and wonder what had gone wrong. I tried not to beat myself up too much, because I believed that I had analyzed the hand correctly. At the end of it all, it was a quick 15-minute tournament for me. Jeez, he didn't even buy me dinner, either.

Joe loves to receive all of your questions and comments. You can reach him at [email protected].