The Berkeley KidPlayers sometimes outthink themselvesby Daniel Negreanu | Published: May 02, 2006 |
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I was looking forward to this tournament (the Shooting Star in San Jose, California), as I was fresh off a recent win in Tunica and feeling good about my game, for the most part. It's been a strange start to the year, as I have made it out of day one only once. I happened to win that one, otherwise this year would be looking ugly so far.
Anyway, I got off to the best start I'd had all year, adding almost 50 percent to my starting stack within the first few levels.
With the blinds at $75-$150, I was sitting with $12,300 when the following hand came down:
I raised from first position to $400 and a young player from Berkeley (who will be known as the Berkeley kid from here on out) called from late position. Then, the big blind raised to $1,200.
I'm not sure why, but I didn't think he had A-A or K-K. I called, as did the Berkeley kid.
The flop came Q 6 4. The big blind bet out $1,500 and had about $5,000 left. His bet screamed of weakness. I called, as did the Berkeley kid. At that point, I figured the Berkeley kid for a queen or a flush draw.
You see, the Berkeley kid had been doing a lot of talking before that hand about getting away from hands, pot odds, and so on. From what I could tell based on the dialogue, he was trying to play the game the "right way." He made it clear that he wasn't going to go broke without the nuts, or pretty close to it.
The turn brought the 8. The big blind checked, and with $9,600 left, I decided to move all in.
The Berkeley kid then went into the tank. Eventually, he called the clock on himself! At first I figured that he must have had a flush draw, but the longer he thought, the more I realized that he didn't have a drawing hand. He finally folded, as did the big blind.
I was curious as to what the Berkeley kid folded. "What did you have, a queen?" I asked.
"No, no, no. You'd never believe me if I told you," he replied. Finally, he explained to the table that he had a set of fours, and gave a full briefing as to why he folded it.
Notice anything different about my description of this hand? That's right, I never told you what I had, did I? Well, wanting to give the kid something to think about, I showed him one card, the 7.
Immediately, he started going over all of the possible hands I could have had, and he correctly narrowed it down to 7-7, the 7 5, or the 8 7. I helped him out a little bit, and narrowed it down to two hands, eliminating the 7-7.
So, what do you think I had? The 7 5 or the 8 7? If you've been a regular reader of my column, you'd know that either hand was possible.
Before I reveal my holecards to you, I first want to walk you through what I was actually thinking during the hand:
Before the flop, I was just making a standard "small ball" type of raise from early position with a suited connector. Then when the big blind made a small reraise, I decided to take a flop and see if I could win a monster pot, getting 2.5-to-1 on my money, assuming that the Berkeley kid called as well.
Then, when the flop came out, the player in the big blind made a very weak-looking bet of $1,500. To me, he was just following through on his preflop raise with either A-K or maybe J-J.
Either way, if I called, it might freeze him, and if the Berkeley kid got out of the way, I could possibly steal the pot on the turn with minimal risk. Unfortunately, the Berkeley kid called, and based on my read, he either had the flush draw or had flopped a pair of queens with a hand like K-Q.
OK, at this point I can't go any further without telling you what I had. When the big blind checked on the turn, I had made a pair of eights, with my 8 7. At that point, here is what I was thinking:
A. If the big blind was trapping with an overpair, it would cost me only half of my stack, and I would still have nine outs against him. If he had J-J or 10-10, I believed he'd fold.
B. If I bet it all, I'd be putting the Berkeley kid in a very tough spot if he had either of the hands I put him on. If he had a flush draw, I'd be pricing him out of a call, while if he had a queen, he'd have to worry not only about my hand, but also the big blind's hand.
In a sense, I was able to make this power move look strong by betting it all, when realistically, all that I believed I was really risking was $5,000 against the big blind in a situation in which I'd be drawing live against him.
Well, it turned out that my read of the Berkeley kid was way off. He seemed pretty convinced that I had the straight on the turn, so this column might be a little bit difficult for him to read.
If I were in the kid's shoes, I would have called. The pot was laying him a decent price against a straight. Of course, if he put me on a set, he'd be dead on arrival. The reason I think he should have called is that he slow-played the hand on the flop, giving the impression that he wasn't that strong. Frankly, considering the size of the pot already, he should have played his hand on the flop. With his call, there was $8,175 in the pot already. Slow-playing a set on the flop isn't "wrong," but this wasn't the time to do it.
It's often very dangerous to play your hand in such a way that it disguises it so much that your opponents will make plays against you that cause you to make difficult decisions. In this case, the Berkeley kid was playing fancy poker when playing in a straightforward manner was called for. He compounded that error by folding on the turn after outthinking himself.
As for my play, it was on the loosey-goosey side, for sure, but based on my read of the situation, it all made sense at the time!
You can read Daniel's daily blog at http://www.fullcontactpoker.com/.
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