Down Goes Lessinger

I know that more than 8,700 people have stories to tell about how they got knocked out of the World Series of Poker main event. Mine is no more special than any of theirs. However, it was a fairly interesting hand, so I thought it might be worthwhile to explain my thought processes as the hand was taking place. I will describe the action in boldface, and then my thoughts will appear in italics.



The Setup: We were in the first limit of day two. The blinds were $250-$500 with a $50 ante. I had started the day with $11,350, significantly less than the average stack, which was about $26,000. In the first hour and a half, I played exactly one hand and merely stole the blinds with it. I had neither the cards nor the situation to make a play at any other pot. In the second hand I played, I was able to double up my short stack to almost $15,000. So, by the time the following hand came around, I had a little less than $14,000 and we were less than a minute away from going on the first break.

The Hand: Everyone folded around to me in middle position, and I made it $1,800 to go with the J 10.



My Thoughts: I would probably open-raise with this hand from middle position in most situations. In this case, there were a couple of extra things in my favor. I had played exactly two hands in two hours, winning both of them, so my table image was (deservedly) tight and solid. Also, we were about to go on break, which gave my opponents less incentive to play a questionable hand. If they had something marginal, I expected them to fold and go on break immediately, giving themselves a few extra seconds compared to the rest of the room. I know it doesn't sound like much, but when a thousand people are headed for the doors, you are happy to get a head start, no matter how small. Also, most players are happy to fold and go on break, rather than risk losing a pot and then having to think about it throughout the break.



Everyone folded to the button, a young Internet qualifier with a slightly above-average stack, and he cold-called the $1,800. The blinds folded, leaving us heads up.


My Thoughts: The button was not an unusually loose player, so I had to give him credit for something legitimate. I had seen him cold-call preflop raises only twice previously, but both times he had folded on the flop. In those cases, I thought he most likely had small or medium pairs that failed to flop sets. I felt pretty sure that was the case again. Therefore, I was confident that as long as he did not flop a set, I would be able to win the pot with a single flop bet.



The flop came A-J-5 rainbow. I bet $2,500, and he called with no hesitation.


My Thoughts: It was time to reassess his hand. Obviously, I no longer thought he had an unimproved small or medium pocket pair, because the ace would have scared him out. However, I also did not think he had pocket fives. A player who flops a monster will usually at least consider raising on the flop, or will show some hesitation before calling. My opponent did neither. His call was made in such a way that it suggested he wanted me to stop betting. For that reason, I also was not willing to give him credit for having A-J.



So, what could he have? I did not think he had A-K, because not only would he have probably reraised me preflop, he also would have considered raising me after the flop. I also did not think it likely that he would cold-call a preflop raise with A-10 or any worse ace. That left me with A-Q. The way he had played the hand so far was very consistent with an A-Q, so that was what I put him on. But the more important thing was that I was pretty sure he had an ace, so unless I improved, I was done with the hand.


The turn was a 10, giving me two pair.



My Thoughts: I spent at least 30 seconds contemplating my play. My post-flop read was A-Q, and I had to make sure I felt good about it before committing myself entirely to the hand. After giving it some thought, I decided that not only was I confident of my read, but even if I was wrong, I could not see getting away from the hand. Was I going to fold two pair and save my remaining chips? If I had a solid read that he held a monster, I might have considered it. But given the situation, I had less than $10,000 left, and I needed every bit of it to make a turn bet that might keep him from chasing me.


I moved all in for my remaining $9,500 or so. He hesitated very briefly, but then called and revealed the A 10 for a higher two pair. The river was a king, and I was eliminated.



My Thoughts: I was genuinely surprised when I saw his hand. Admittedly, my initial reaction was to lament to myself about how unlucky I was, because the only way I was going to go broke on that hand was by having one of the two remaining tens appear on the turn, which is exactly what happened. But as quickly as that thought came, it disappeared. I really did not want to become one of "those" players who think bad luck is the reason for losing. The simple truth is that he had the best hand the entire way. I said my goodbyes and left the table quietly.



In the end, my read was wrong. I couldn't put him on A-10, because I really did not expect that someone would cold-call a preflop raise from me with a hand that weak, given that I had played only two hands in two hours. Was I giving my opponent too much credit in the observation department? That question is part of a larger discussion that I've had recently with some of my poker-playing peers, and it is a topic that I will continue in my column next month. See you then.

Matt Lessinger is the author of The Book of Bluffs: How to Bluff and Win at Poker, available everywhere. To find other articles of Matt's, check out the Online Poker News newsletter at http://www.cardplayer.com/.