Overdoing the Free-Card ConceptUtilize it selectivelyby Matt Lessinger | Published: Jul 18, 2007 |
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When in doubt, take the aggressive course of action. I firmly believe in that basic poker concept. Good things happen when you seize the initiative. You might sometimes cost yourself some bets, but you also can end up with entire pots that would have gone elsewhere had you taken the passive route.
However, some players clearly overdo this idea, and it comes up all the time in a common limit hold'em scenario. You raise preflop from late position with two high cards. You get one or more callers. The flop doesn't pair you, but you have two overcards. Someone bets into you, and now you have a decision to make. It's one of the few situations in which, depending on the circumstances, the correct play could be to raise, call, or fold. Let's distinguish some different scenarios, because some overaggressive players continually raise in this situation, and I believe they are taking the "raise-to-get-a-free-turn-card" concept too far.
Scenario No. 1: J 10 on a 9 7 2 flop
There is some clear value to raising here. Besides your gutshot-straight draw, any jack or 10 could give you a winner. If there are players yet to act behind you, raising helps clear out hands like A-10 or K-J, which might peel off a card for one bet. If they fold, you minimize the danger of hitting a jack or 10 but still losing.
Furthermore, other interesting cards could come. A queen improves your straight draw, and the presence of a high card might slow down your opposition. In some ways, a king or an ace might be even better. If your opponent was betting a 9-8 type of hand, and then an ace comes on the turn after you've raised, he's not going to like his chances. Continued aggression could win you the pot if a scare card comes that your opponents don't have.
All in all, the idea of raising on the flop with overcards was tailor-made for a situation like this one. Even if the turn is a blank, there's a good chance that your flop raise will buy you a free ride to the river, and you will still have at least four outs to make the best hand. More likely, you will have seven or 10. Spending two small bets on the flop is an excellent investment.
Scenario No. 2: A K on a J 10 10 flop
I think the correct play here depends on the number of opponents and what you know about them. With one opponent, a raise in position is probably the right play. Even with two or three opponents, if the bettor is capable of betting a draw, I think a raise still could be justified. However, if you have three or more opponents, or you're facing a bet from someone who would bet only a made hand, it's time to slow down and just call. There is too much risk of getting three-bet, plus the value of your potential free card might be less than you think. An overly optimistic player would count 10 outs. More likely, you have three or four, and sometimes you're even drawing dead.
This exact hand played out recently in a five-way pot, with the button holding the A K. After the J 10 10 flop, the first two players checked, and the third player fired. The next player called, and the button raised. The small blind, who originally checked, now three-bet, and even though he cleared out the player to his left, the next two immediately called, and the button capped it.
I cannot justify the button's aggression. Perhaps a dubious argument could be made supporting his initial flop raise, but it's definitely not the play I would choose. The three non-spade queens probably give him a winning straight, but beyond that, his outs are questionable. He can't know if an ace or king is any good, since hands like K-Q and K-J easily could be out there. Someone also could have trip tens, and anyone with Q-10 or J-10 would have him drawing dead. Furthermore, the presence of a flush draw hurts his chances even more.
I would prefer to call and watch the future action unfold in front of me, making my remaining decisions easier. I suppose that raising was not terrible, but I clearly cannot defend putting in the fourth bet. The small blind's actions scream that he has a big hand, and it doesn't help that two other players are taking enough interest in the hand to spend three bets. To me, capping the betting serves no purpose at all. It simply wastes a small bet.
As it turns out, the flop bettor had the K Q, for a monster draw. The player to his left had top pair with K-J. And the small blind? He had J-10 for a flopped full house. I admit that those are much bigger hands than the A K could normally expect to be up against. But even if we give them somewhat lesser hands, such as K-Q offsuit for the flop bettor and 10-9 for the small blind, we still can see how the button's hyperaggression was a mistake, given that he would have hardly any ways to win.
Scenario No. 3: K Q on an 8 7 6 flop
This is another hand that I witnessed recently in a relatively passive game. After three players limped, the K Q raised from the button. That's perfectly fine. The blinds and limpers all called, so there was six-way action to the flop. After the flop, the small blind checked, and the big blind came out betting. Call, call, call. The button then raised, and that's the point where I'm left shaking my head in bewilderment.
The value of getting a free or cheap card here is practically nil. Right off the bat, the K Q easily could be drawing dead against a straight or a set. If someone flopped two pair, the K Q is as good as dead. Plus, the K and Q are doubtful as outs, given the multiway flop action.
The difference between this example and the previous one is that in Scenario No. 2, the button should at least call on the flop with his A K. The chance that a queen would give him a winning straight, coupled with the lesser chance that an ace or a king would make him a winner, certainly justify calling one flop bet.
In this hand, I can't condone calling even one small bet. Even if we optimistically say that catching a king or queen on the turn would give the button the best hand, there are still so many likely draws going to the river that his pair will probably hold up less than half the time. In a situation in which folding was the play, this was a clear-cut case of taking the free-card concept too far.
When raising for a free card, you must have enough outs to give your raise sufficient value. There also must be a good chance of getting the desired free river card if the turn is no help. If you raise without both of those factors holding true, you are being overly aggressive. Selectively aggressive poker is winning poker. Overly aggressive poker can give those winnings right back.
Matt Lessinger is the author of The Book of Bluffs: How to Bluff and Win at Poker, available everywhere. You can find other articles of his at www.CardPlayer.com.