Analyzing a Few Awful Plays

Recently, I was in St. Kitts playing the Caribbean Poker Classic, a tournament with a guaranteed prize pool of $1 million. Having been there two times already, I knew that the quality of play was not always very high at this event – and that heading over there was probably a positive expected value (EV) decision.



In two of the events, I was a firsthand witness of two plays that I thought were very weak, and I will share them with you here.



Situation No. 1: K-10 offsuit out of position versus a raiser

Early in a $500+$50 event, with starting stacks of 3,000 and the blinds now at 25-50 (the second level), I had the A Q on the button. A rather loose under-the-gun player had limped for 50, and with my 3,600 stack, I chose to make it 225 to go. The limper, having started the hand with 3,100, called with the K 10. On a flop of A J 7, I bet 400, and my opponent check-called. After the turn, the 4, he again checked. I took about a minute to gauge his strength and how he would respond to any bets that I might make, and then bet 2,500 – an overbet of the pot, and enough to put him all in. My opponent quickly called, and given the size of my bet, I suddenly thought that my read on him (either a K-10 or Q-10 with one diamond, or a weak ace that he might not lay down to my big bet) may not have been right after all. But as it turned out, I had read the situation properly. My opponent was drawing to just 12 outs (nine diamonds, three queens), and won by catching a queen on the river.



So, my opponent won the pot. But, of course, that didn't mean he played well. A few of the rather obvious mistakes that my opponent made were:



• His initial limp with K-10 offsuit at a full table is asking for trouble – even more so because this player doesn't play much better post-flop than just average.



• His call of my raise is very debatable. He views me as a very good player who isn't out of line very often, and a K-10 out of position against a possible dominating hand is just not good in a situation like that. (In other words, it could have negative implied odds, as he will almost never know where he's at.)



• His call of the 400 flop bet, again, is very loose, drawing to just a gutshot and a runner-runner flush. This call can be justified only if my opponent thinks I am making a move and don't have the strong hand that I represent. (And therefore he's planning some kind of countermove on the turn or river.)



• And then, the worst decision of all is the check-call on the turn. He called 2,475 all in with just one card to come, in a pot that contained just 1,325. Even with the clean 12 outs that he had, this is clearly a negative EV decision. If my opponent (incorrectly) thought his hand was good enough to go broke with, he should have made a play for the pot himself – to possibly try to force me off a better hand. It would not have worked (I would have called instantly with my top pair, decent kicker), but at least he would have been the bettor rather than the caller.



Situation No. 2: K-10 offsuit in the final stages of a supersatellite

Having already qualified for the $6,300 main event through a supersatellite, I had noticed that the level of play was so bad that I would play one or two more (as those who already had qualified were allowed to keep the cash). And in this supersatellite, I again was a firsthand witness of bad play. With 14 players left and nine spots to be given away, the blinds and antes had gone up to such a level that play had become not much more than just raise all in or fold. After all, with blinds of 1,000-2,000 and a 200 ante, the average stack of 19,700 didn't leave much room for play. I had maneuvered quite carefully, playing a little bit tighter than most, not making any big calls, and simply pushing at the appropriate times to stay anywhere from average to a bit below average in chips.



One of my opponents hadn't done that. He had been playing even tighter than I had, but perhaps more importantly, he had not made any use of his opportunities to push. In the previous 35 hands or so, he had received seven or eight hands in which no one before him had entered the pot. In supersatellites (where it's all about survival, and where people tend to avoid making big calls other than with absolute premium hands), these are the situations in which you could/should sometimes go all in almost regardless of the cards that you have.



But this player didn't do that. He had folded three orbits straight. And then, with his stack down to just 12,500, he decided to make a stand with K-10 offsuit, calling all in against my push. As it turned out, he was dominating me, as I had just the K 3 – but I would get lucky by making a flush to bust him out.



When he left the table, he complained about his bad luck – and, indeed, he had been unlucky in losing that specific pot when he was the clear favorite. But what he forgot was that he had violated the golden rule for supersatellites: In the final phase, your play is based much more on stack sizes and who is in the blinds than on the quality of your cards. At this stage, it's about surviving rather than winning, and making big all-in calls with just mediocre holdings is a big no-no. In these situations, it is much better to be pushing with absolute garbage than to be calling with a rather decent holding. This is because the fold equity at this stage of an event is huge, and just as importantly, because calling with a less-than-lock hand carries a high risk of elimination, even against just a random hand.



Rolf has been a professional cash-game player since 1998. He is the author of the successful Secrets of Professional Pot-Limit Omaha, and the co-author of Hold'em on the Come. He is the creator and presenter of the hold'em four-DVD set Rolf Slotboom's Winning Plays. He is the first-ever Dutch Champion, and maintains his own site at www.rolfslotboom.com.