A Tale of Two Players

Some years back, I wrote a column about the exact same hand (Q-J suited) being played completely differently when dealt to me twice in three hands. Recently, I picked up K-K and A-A three hands apart, and as was the case with the Q-J suited, they played incredibly differently.

I have often stated that playing poker well necessitates adjusting well to your opponents. You need to take into account your opponents' knowledge, playing styles, and emotional states when determining your best play. Your best option will provide the best return expectation against your opponent's hand range. In order to make that determination, you must read his range with a good degree of accuracy, understand how your hand best plays against that range, and be able to approximate how the blended expectation of those scenarios adds up. Note that, as I have always said, it is often impossible to put your opponent on a specific hand, so you should put him on a range of hands. The pitfalls of constantly narrowing your opponent's range to one hand are great. The more practical approach of defining a range of hands will almost always serve you better.

The difference between the two hands that I played, A-A and K-K, arose from the playing characteristics of my opponents in each hand. Note that heads-up scenarios are less complicated than three-ways, which in turn are less complicated than larger fields. Every time you change a variable -- which opponents, position, number of opponents, and so on -- you change the way the hand plays.

I was playing in a $30-$60 limit hold'em game at Bellagio. A tourist who seemed very intimidated by the stakes limped in from up front. I read him for having played some poker, but thought this was the highest limit and toughest field he had ever faced. He was very nervous and extremely cautious about getting his money in. He was check-calling with any indication that he was beat, folding too liberally, and missing many bets with hands that he obviously should have bet.

I looked down to see K-K in middle position and raised, and was called by the cutoff, the big blind, and Mr. Intimidated. We took the flop off fourhanded.

The flop came 10 6 2, it was checked to me, and I fired $30 into the pot. The cutoff folded, and the big blind and Mr. Intimidated called. The turn card was the 9. Once again it was checked to me, and I fired. The big blind called again, and Mr. Intimidated check-raised me. I thought about what he thought I held and what he would raise with.

I tossed my kings into the muck without much hesitation, thinking that he thought I held an overpair and wouldn't consider raising unless he had that beat. I thought his range of hands was 10-9, 8-7, or a set. I was correct in drawing only against the 10-9, was drawing dead against the 8-7, and had only two outs against a set; plus, the big blind might have a spade draw, further weakening my hand. A spade came on the river and the big blind led and was called by Mr. Intimidated. The big blind showed him the 7 4 for a flush, and Mr. Intimidated showed 6-6, having flopped second set!



Soon afterward, I picked up A-A. An aggressive player who tends to overvalue his hands and is never shy about betting raised in front of me from early position.

I three-bet him with my aces. We took the flop off heads up for three bets. The flop came 7 7 6. Mr. Aggressive check-called me. The turn card was the K. Once again, Mr. Aggressive checked, but this time he check-raised me. Without much hesitation, I three-bet him. He paid me off on both the turn and river and showed me the K Q, having turned top pair! Against Mr. Aggressive, I thought he held a king or was bluffing. There was some small chance that he raised with a hand containing a 7, or 6-6, but most of his legitimate turn-raisable holdings would contain a king.

These hands speak to altering your play in accordance with your opponents' weaknesses. You could obtain edge from Mr. Intimidated by not letting him get value on his good hands. Since he was playing scared, he missed bets and was too easy to read when he did bet. Against him, you could fold many hands with which you would likely pay off other players who are much harder to read.

Against Mr. Aggressive, you could obtain edge by getting additional value out of your good hands. Since he overvalued his hands, he put in too many bets when he was beat, and your adjustment to him is to make sure that you charge him the maximum when you possess edge over his range of hands, which will be much larger than Mr. Intimidated's range.

Against both players, there are other ways to obtain edge. Both players were setting themselves up for bluffs -- Mr. Intimidated by folding too many hands with which he was in good shape to continue play, and Mr. Aggressive by betting too often with weak hands, thereby setting himself up to get moved off those hands. That said, not all intimidated players fold too much; some call too much, out of feelings of insecurity about being unable to read where they are in a hand. And many aggressive players pay off because they understand that the propensity for other players to "move on them" is great.
You must recognize these differences in your opponents, and adjust your style of play accordingly.

It's often said that ours is a game of people, not of cards. Instead of asking yourself how you should play hands differently, focus on how you should play people differently. Even the same or similar hand is a completely different thing against different opponents.

Roy Cooke has played more than 60,000 hours of pro poker since 1972, and is a licensed real estate broker/salesperson in Las Vegas. His longtime collaborator, John Bond, is a freelance writer in South Florida. They have written for Card Player since 1992. Their latest book, How to Think Like a Poker Pro, is available from amazon.com and most bookstores. Please see Roy's real estate ad in Card Player.