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The Oracle's Corner

Where Pros Analyze the Good, the Bad, and the Just Plain Ugly

by The Oracle's Corner |  Published: Aug 01, 2008

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This hand comes from the final table of event No. 4 of the World Series of Poker, $5,000 mixed hold'em. Five players remained: Erick Lindgren, Justin Bonomo, David Rheem, Andrew Robl, and Roland De Wolfe. This was the best final table I have seen yet at this year's WSOP. The level of play was nothing short of phenomenal. I discussed this hand with Roland and Justin separately in the Aces Club at the Rio two days after it happened. It was good to listen to both players discuss their thoughts on how they played the hand. Obviously, Roland was much happier with the outcome; however, Justin's play was no less stellar.

Facts of the Hand
Event: WSOP $5,000 mixed hold'em
Players Remaining: 5
Blinds and Ante: 20,000-40,000 with a 5,000 ante (no-limit)
Roland De Wolfe's Chip Count/Hand: 510,000/6 6
Justin Bonomo's Chip Count/Hand: 1,150,000/J 4
Players' Images: Roland and Justin were seeing a lot of flops and playing back after the flop.



Roland De Wolfe's Read

I decided just to call, because I didn't want to put my tournament life on the line preflop with pocket sixes. Seeing the flop, I knew I was ahead, and Justin, being quite frisky, bet half the pot, and I called, pretty sure that I had the best hand. Also, by limping and calling the flop, I thought it would slow Justin down, which didn't exactly happen. On the turn, I knew I was good; the range of hands that Justin was on could be wide, but I didn't feel behind in the hand. On the river, I couldn't put him on clubs but thought he would represent them, so I called, again thinking I was still ahead.

Justin Bonomo's Read

I thought Roland didn't hit the flop, and I could take it down with a bet of half the pot. I would win it right here 60 percent of the time, which in the long run would make it a winning bet. I decided after he called my flop bet that I was done with the hand -- until I picked up the spade draw, so I fired again. When the club came on the river, it was the perfect card for firing a third bet, but Roland made a good call.

Michael Binger's Analysis

First, allow me to digress a bit on the preflop play, which was tricky because of the stack sizes. With 20,000-40,000 blinds and a 5,000 ante, there was 85,000 in the pot. Since Roland had 510,000 starting the hand, that is an M of 6 (510÷85). Typically, I don't like to move all in unless I have an M of about 5 or less. Then, the range of hands with which I move all in depends on my opponents and my position. When you move all in preflop, your M determines your risk-to-reward ratio. That is, with an M of 6, you are risking six units to win one unit if everyone folds. With an M of 6, it usually is a little bit too much risk for too little reward. However, with pocket sixes on the button at the final table against tough opponents, I might prefer not to have to make tough decisions and instead just ship it and hope for the best. After all, the small blind and big blind combined have only about a one-fourteenth chance of waking up with a bigger pair. Now, if moving in for almost 13 big blinds is too much for you, a standard raise is not very appealing either. Let's say that you open from the button for 120,000; if you are called or reraised, you will have a tough decision. For this reason, the standard raise is my least-favorite option. Finally, we come to the option that Roland chose -- limping from the button. Sure, this is a strange thing to do when you have the button and you are short-stacked, but given the above discussion, we see why it should be considered. You are trying to keep the pot small and play your position. I like this move if you are feeling confident about your post-flop play.

Now, after the flop, Justin chose to bluff about half the pot (which was 145,000), or 75,000. This was a scary bet for Roland, since it was a relatively large portion of his stack, and Justin is a tough opponent who's capable of firing again on the turn with either a big hand or a bluff. When Justin bet 120,000 on the turn into the 295,000 pot, Roland must have known that he was making a tournament-changing decision. He had only 275,000 left after calling, and was likely to have to call again on the river, since the pot was 535,000. It really came down to instinct and guts, and Roland clearly had both of those to make this tough call. However, since he had about half the pot left after calling, I would have preferred to protect my hand and just move all in on the turn. Given that he just called the turn, I think calling the river has to be automatic. Good players rarely will call big bets on the turn and then fold on the river. Justin should have known this, and resisted the temptation to continue bluffing on the river even though a scary card fell. I like his play up to this point, since he applied a lot of pressure on the short stack.

Roy Winston's Analysis

Fivehanded play in a major event at the World Series of Poker with experienced, great players all vying for the win ... it doesn't get any better than this. Roland's choice to control the pot size from the button and take the flop without raising is somewhat dangerous, but I don't hate it. Although in position, pocket sixes are extremely vulnerable, especially against two opponents. I like a raise, either to win the pot right here or thin the field to one opponent. He probably is facing at least two a
and as many as four overcards, which makes him a substantial underdog when playing against two opponents.

The flop was good for Roland's hand, and other than flopping a set, it's about as good as he could have hoped for. I like his smooth-call of Justin's flop bet, which should have given Justin pause. On the turn, I would have had trouble calling Justin's bet, knowing that an all-in call would have to be made on the river. Many players do not look ahead in a hand and play just the moment. Accomplished players such as Roland know what looms ahead. Certainly, Justin could have been holding an 8, which might have played out the same way. I agree with Michael that an all-in raise on the turn would be my preference. I am not big on calling off my chips unless I'm sure that I'm ahead. On the river, Roland makes a great call, and I guess the pot was large enough that he almost had to, but I would have hated it. Justin is certainly capable of firing a three-shell bluff, so I would have to consider it; but honestly, I would have called the flop and most likely folded to the pressure on the turn, or if my read told me I was ahead, moved in. I think Justin played the hand great and would have won the pot against many a skilled opponent. I sometimes find myself in Justin's spot and really hate firing the large semibluff with such a large amount of my chips. You hope it will work, and when it does, it is a thing of beauty, but when you get called down, you feel like a kid who's caught with his hand in the cookie jar. Interestingly enough, Roland said that Justin would have checked the river with an 8, and Justin said that he definitely would have fired a bet on the river with an 8. I guess it was just a simple case of 50-50; you either win or lose.

Pro Conclusions

Michael and Roy agree that Roland should have moved in on the turn and Justin shouldn't have bluffed the river, although these actions would have limited Roland's win but saved Justin some chips.

Roy Winston, M.D., and Michael Binger, Ph.D., have more than two decades of higher education between them. The two, with nearly $8 million in combined tournament winnings, continue to impress with consistent results on the tournament circuit and in high-stakes cash games.