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Final-Table Takedown -- Eric Baldwin

Attacks With No Fear on the Way to Capturing a Coveted Gold Bracelet

by Craig Tapscott |  Published: Aug 07, 2009

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CP 2215 FFT Table1

Eric “basebaldy” Baldwin is a 26-year-old professional poker player from Beaver Dam, Wisconsin. He recently moved to Henderson, Nevada, and travels the tournament trail, specializing in no-limit hold’em multitable tournaments. He has cashed for more than $1 million in online tournaments. After winning event No. 34 of the World Series of Poker, for $521,932, Baldwin went on to finish third, for $259,534, in event No. 45, the $10,000 pot-limit hold’em world championship.

Key Concepts: Wielding a big stack against another big stack; understanding an opponent’s tendencies.

Craig Tapscott: Set up what’s been going on before this hand now that the event is down to the final 13 players.

Eric Baldwin: On the previous hand, there had been a lot of action, and players were still reacting to it. This is often a good time to try to steal the blinds and antes, as players are not prepared for the upcoming hand, and will often pass on a good opportunity instead of three-betting or calling in position.

Baldwin raises to 52,000 from under the gun with the 8Heart Suit 7Spade Suit. Bradbury calls from the big blind.

Flop: JDiamond Suit 7Diamond Suit 3Club Suit (pot: 135,000)
Bradbury leads out for 75,000.

EB: I had seen Steven lead previously from out of position with top-pair hands. I was very confident that he had a pair of jacks. In the past, I would fold here, with the reasoning that he holds top pair and I have only middle pair and five outs. So, I’m getting 3-1 odds on my call, and I’m about 8-1 to turn the best hand.

CT: What do you think is going through Bradbury’s mind?

EB: First, I believe that Steven was happy to have hit top pair and was betting to find out where he stood, and take the pot down if he had the best hand. Second, I was a big stack at the table and could really put a hurt on Steven’s stack. Being a tight player who can smell the final table of a World Series of Poker event, he will want to avoid confrontations with me. Third, I raised from early position. To a tight player, this still carries a lot of weight. I may be able to convince him that I have an overpair and get him to lay down the best hand.

Baldwin raises to 158,000.

CT: Do you map out each possible scenario before you act?

EB: Well, before I raised, I had planned the turn. If an overcard or diamond hit the turn and Steven didn’t appear to love it, I would fire a second barrel, which would likely induce a fold. If I hit a 7 or an 8, I would then assess whether or not I could get two streets of value from Steven.

CT: I don’t usually hear quite so much advanced planning for possible future outcomes from players.

EB: A common mistake that players make after putting in this raise is to sit there hoping the opponent folds. This does absolutely no good, and in fact causes harm. If Steven folds, the hand is over and there is nothing to be prepared for. If he raises, you’re done with the hand; again, there’s nothing to be prepared for. Instead, you should be preparing for a call, thus feeling and looking more confident when a turn comes and your opponent checks to you.
Bradbury folds. Baldwin wins the pot of 210,000.

CP 2215 FFT Table2
Key Concepts: Playing the situation, not the cards; fold equity; always having a plan for every street.

The button folds. Taylor raises to 180,000 from the small blind. Baldwin calls from the big blind with the ADiamond Suit 5Spade Suit.

CT: I like the way that you think through each and every option. Reel them off for me.

EB: (Laughing) OK.

Fold: James had been raising from the small blind often, and when three-handed, I feel like folding an ace, even ace-rag, is incorrect.

Raise: If I elect to raise with the intention of folding to a four-bet shove, I have lost all the value of my hand. In this situation, good, aggressive players are never just calling my three-bet when out of position unless they are slow-playing a monster hand. If I three-bet and he folds, I may as well have made the same play with 5-2 offsuit.

Call: I have what may very well be the best hand, and I have position. It also will play somewhat deceptively if I flop an ace, as most players expect a reraise out of an ace-high hand here.

CT: So, you choose to …

Baldwin calls.

Flop: 9Heart Suit 9Spade Suit 2Diamond Suit (pot: 375,000)

EB: This flop is very dry, and most good players will follow up with a continuation-bet here, assuming that this flop missed my hand and thinking that they will pick up a nice pot.

Taylor bets 235,000.

CT: Let’s do it one more time.

EB: Sounds good.

CP 2215 FFT EBaldwin
Fold: I fully expect a continuation-bet in this spot. I have ace high, which still has a very good chance of being the best hand. If I fold here, why did I call preflop, unless I was trying to flop a monster with a poor hand?

Raise: Raising all in is not optimal. I would be risking about 2,000,000 to win a pot of 600,000, which is not a great ratio post-flop without a monster draw. I would need James to fold a vast majority of the time to make this a good spot to raise all in. I also may still have the best hand, and would only be getting a small number of hands that I have beat to fold (a successful bluff). Making a standard raise to around 600,000 is even worse, as I would leave room for James to reraise all in with fold equity, perhaps with a hand that would have folded had I raised all in.

Call: By calling, I get to see what James does on the turn, giving me more information before I have to commit more chips to the pot. I also get to see a turn card, which may improve my hand, making it the best. In addition, if I call, the pot size in relation to the remaining effective stack sizes will be perfect for raising all in with fold equity on the turn.

Baldwin calls.

Turn: 4Heart Suit (pot: 845,000)
Taylor bets 425,000.

CT: What’s your read of this bet?

EB: James’ lead does not look very strong to me here, for several reasons. A lot of players will feign weakness here with a 9, not believing they will get all three streets of value, thus increasing the chances of a call on the river. And the bet size of just over half of the pot does not look like he’s trying to milk value out of me. It looks more like he would be quite happy to end the hand right here.

CT: Which means …

EB: It means that I think there is a good chance James doesn’t want to play for all of his chips. My line adds up to holding a 9. He has to fear that I was slow-playing the flop and am now playing fast since a heart draw appeared. Also, I’m almost certain to have four outs, and more likely seven if my read is wrong.

Baldwin moves all in. Taylor folds. Baldwin wins the pot of 1,270,000.

EB: After one of the longer 10 minutes of my life, James folded what he swears were two queens. I picked up a very nice pot, the chip lead, and the momentum at a very tough final table. Spade Suit