Avoiding Autopilot Hand Selection

I’ve never been a huge fan of hand-selection guidelines. Once a player has committed himself to a rule-of-thumb strategy, his course of action is often to put himself on “hand-selection autopilot,” and just look at his cards and fold, call, or raise depending on how the hand fits into his established strategy. It makes the preflop game so much easier. You have little to think about. But, by being single-minded in this regard, players miss opportunities when profitable situations exist outside their guiding principles. It also creates a huge predictability factor that observant opponents can and will use against them. These small edges add significantly to players’ win rates at the end of the year.

One Saturday night, I was playing in a $30-$60 limit hold’em game at Bellagio, and a terrible-playing opponent opened the pot from two off the button with a call. The cutoff folded, and I looked down to see the A 6 on the button, which is not a hand that I usually play, and certainly not one that conventional starting-hand wisdom would suggest that I play. While I may play A-X offsuit from late position in a blinds-stealing situation, I prefer A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5 over A-6, as more flops hit the lower kickers due to the straight potential, and the 6 as a kicker tends to be pretty useless. But you’ve got to analyze each current situation independently and determine if there is positive EV [expected value] potential. Playing preflop on an “if this, then that” basis will cause you to miss a lot of positive situations and will cost you money over time.

I thought about the current situation. Mr. Terrible played most hands. If he had an ace or a pair, he raised, so I knew that I wasn’t kickered or facing 6-6 or a higher pair, hands against which I was in bad shape. I also knew that I held a better hand than Mr. Terrible, although other considerations came into play. When you play a weak hand, you risk getting “picked off” from behind. It is not good enough just to know that you hold a better hand than the caller(s) in front of you, or a hand that is correct to play; you need to include your expectations of the other players yet to act. And the more there are, the greater the risk of getting trapped. In this case, I had only the blinds to consider. Both were tight. I raised, hoping to fold the blinds and get a $110-to-$60 preflop price with the best hand and position against a weak opponent whom I would likely outplay. That’s a situation that I can play all day, but it wasn’t the one that necessarily would develop; opponents aren’t always cooperative.

The big blind, a good player, called, as did Mr. Terrible. We took the flop off three-handed for two bets.

Swish, nothing but net! The flop came 8 6 6, giving me three sixes and the nut-backdoor-flush draw. Both players checked to me, and I fired a bet forward. They both called. The 5 turned. The big blind checked, and Mr. Terrible bet. I was unsure of what he held. He often checked his draws, so he could have a flush. He also could be bluffing, or he could be holding a non-flush hand that he thought had value. He was a hard man to read, due to his wide range of both hands played and thoughts.

I thought about my next play. If he had a flush, I didn’t want to raise. If he was bluffing, I wanted him to continue to do so. If he held a legit hand that was inferior to mine, I wanted to raise and get value. But I also had to consider the big blind. He might have a hand that beat mine, or he might have a hand with which he would call and be in bad shape. He would not read me for having a 6. I had all of the flush draws blocked with my A, and he might call with an inferior flush draw or a pair, hands with which I wanted him to call, as the pot wasn’t laying him the right price. A raise would likely scare those calls away, and he wouldn’t fold a superior hand to mine.

Since my best play against most of Mr. Terrible’s hand range was to call, and I felt the big blind was likely to call with a hand that was not getting the right price to proceed, I chose to just call. The big blind folded.

The Q hit on the river, Mr. Terrible checked, I bet, and he called. I turned my hand over, and he showed me K-6 offsuit; he also had flopped three sixes, with an inferior kicker to mine.

As I always do, I examined how I had played my hand, and discussed with myself whether my thoughts about the play of the hand were accurate, and if not, why not. The pot felt a little light to me. If I had known what Mr. Terrible held, I easily could have gotten at least $60 more out of the hand. Yet, I believe my thinking was correct, based on the information available to me at the point of decision. And that is all I can ask of myself, knowing that my daughter’s college fund is sure going to appreciate it.

Longtime poker pro and author Roy Cooke’s Card Player column has appeared since 1992. A successful Las Vegas real estate broker since 1990, his website is www.roycooke.com. Should you wish to inquire regarding real-estate matters — including purchase, sale, or mortgage — his phone number is (702) 396-6575. Roy’s longtime collaborator John Bond’s website is www.johnbondwriting.com. Find John and Roy on Facebook.