One Hand, Two Perspectives

This column will dissect a hand that I played online during a World Championship of Online Poker event. It’s not a hand that I would play the same way every time, but I have no regrets about how I played it. I discussed it with my friend and top professional player Wes Huff, and he felt that he would have done several things differently. Here is the hand, along with my reasoning. You will also read Wes’ explanation to me of what he would have done differently, and why.

The Hand
We were two hours into the tournament, and a little more than half of the field had been eliminated. We had started with 5,000 in chips, and I was up to 14,500, which was slightly above average. The only player at my table with more chips was an online pro I recognized. He had more than 35,000, which he had accumulated mostly through extremely aggressive play and partly from getting lucky the one or two times that opponents took a stand against him.

The blinds were 100-200, with a 25 ante. I was in second position, and the pro was on the button. The under-the-gun (UTG) player, who had about 10,000, raised to 450. I was next, with the A K.

My logic: A-K suited is usually a reraising hand, but in this specific situation, I preferred to flat-call. In a deep-stack tournament, I don’t want to commit a large percentage of my chips from early position without more information. I figured that one of three things would happen, and I was fine with any of them:

1. If everyone else folded, I’d be heads up with position on the preflop raiser, and hopefully I could play the rest of the hand optimally, based on the board and on his actions.

2. If one or more players called behind me, I could just play to hit the flop. If I were to miss, I would cost myself only 450 out of a 14,500 stack.

3. If someone sees my cold-call as being weak, he may attempt a squeeze play.

This was my main reason for cold-calling, because having watched the very aggressive pro, I thought it would be tough for him to resist an attempt to reraise and steal the pot. And with a hand as strong as mine, I wanted someone to make a squeeze play, and I was hoping that my cold-call would induce one.

Wes’ logic: Inviting the squeeze play is the best argument for cold-calling. However, you’d prefer to play this hand heads up, and more often than not, putting in a reraise will leave you with scenario No. 1, which is favorable.

More importantly, I think you are minimizing the danger of scenario No. 2. The UTG player put in a small raise, so if you don’t get squeezed, it’s very likely that some players behind you will call, and that could induce the blinds to call. Then, if the flop comes ace high or king high, you are setting yourself up to go broke if someone outflopped you.

What happened next: I called the 450. Two players behind me also called, and the pro on the button made it 1,800 to go. The blinds and the preflop raiser folded, and the action was back to me.

My logic: Given that I expected him to raise with just about anything, I was 90 percent sure that I had the best hand. It was possible that he found some pocket pair, but I certainly was not going to play in fear of A-A or K-K. So, I knew that I wanted to reraise; the only question was, how much?

I didn’t want to go all in, because an overbet like that usually reeks of A-K. And if he correctly put me on A-K, he was going to fold all non-pair hands and call with all pocket pairs, and that’s exactly what I didn’t want. I wanted there to be some chance of him folding a low or medium pocket pair. With that in mind, I thought a reraise to 4,800 was just about right. It would clear the remaining field, represent strength, and possibly cause him to make an incorrect play. If he flat-called, I was likely pushing all in on the flop, no matter what came.

Wes’ logic: I prefer reraising all in here, for three main reasons:

1. No matter what he has, your hand is vulnerable. A-K isn’t aces. At best, you’ll be 70-30 or so. Since you’re basically committed to going with it on the flop even if you miss, you’ll go broke much more often by letting your opponent see the flop for only 3,000 more than moving in preflop. Sometimes you’ll pick up an extra 3,000, but protecting your tournament life is more important.

2. I wouldn’t assume that he’d put you on A-K, especially since you smooth-called and then moved all in. He could easily assume that you chose to take a stand with some pocket pair, and if he puts you on 7-7 or 8-8, you could get action from an A-Q or A-J type of hand.

3. Finally, if he has a pocket pair and decides to flat-call, there’s a good chance that he’ll make the correct play post-flop. That is, if an ace or king comes, he’ll fold; otherwise, he’ll call your all-in bet. If he has 10-10 or J-J, that’s a very likely scenario. And even though the smaller preflop reraise does a better job of representing strength than an all-in bet does, I don’t think he’ll lay those hands down preflop for an extra 3,000.

What happened next: I made it 4,800 to go. He called time and let his clock tick down, which I didn’t think was an act, since he had played fast prior to that, even with his monster hands. Eventually, he made the minimum reraise to 7,800. I shoved all in, hoping that he would fold some medium pair, but he called with Q-Q, flopped a queen, and that was it.

As long as I’m analyzing the hand, I’d be remiss if I didn’t mention that although it didn’t make a difference, my final all-in shove was probably a mistake. With more than half of my stack already in, it was unlikely that he would fold anything preflop. However, if I flat-called and then shoved, there was some non-zero chance that he would lay down a small pair or A-K, and that would have been quite a coup. Of course, he flopped a set, so it was clearly a moot point.

Just so that there’s no misunderstanding, Wes and I both saw the merit in each other’s plays. I wouldn’t play the hand the same way every time, and I doubt that Wes would, either. Maybe next time I would play the hand more like Wes. Then again, maybe I would revert back to my personal preferences. It’s usually tough not to do so.

After all, if we all played the same way, poker would be a pretty boring game.

Matt Lessinger is the author of The Book of Bluffs: How to Bluff and Win at Poker, available everywhere. You can find other articles of his at www.CardPlayer.com.