Lessons With Jeff Shulman — Part IV

In my last few columns, I have been revealing my “lesson plan” for Jeff Shulman at the World Series of Poker “November Nine” final table. Basically, I advised that with 20 million in chips, blinds of 120,000-240,000, and a 20,000 ante, he play extremely tight, with five-times-the-big-blind opening bets when he did enter a pot. Barry Shulman, Jeff’s father, had just won the World Series of Poker Europe by using an extremely tight strategy, and the three of us agreed that this was the best way to play. By the way, I correctly predicted that Phil Ivey would also use this strategy (the Shulmans, Ivey, and I all like the super-tight tactic). I mean, why wouldn’t both Ivey and Shulman use this tactic? Why gamble? Shulman and Ivey were the best players, so why not be patient and wait for a great situation to come up? Why not wait for the amateurs to melt, blow up, and give it away? Massive pressure — created by the chance to make history, playing on ESPN and the world stage, and playing for millions of dollars — causes a lot of self-destruction at the WSOP main-event final table.

In my last column, I defended Shulman’s fold when he raised with 9-9 from the button and Ivey moved all in from the big blind with K-Q; by the way, that hand was shown on the ESPN coverage. That fold was controversial, but the most controversial fold that Shulman made at the final table didn’t even make the television coverage! After Shulman folded his 9-9 preflop, he was left with 14 million in chips, and that’s when Antoine Saout — who was sitting directly to Shulman’s right — opened for 1 million. Shulman then made it 4 million to go with A-K, everyone else folded, and Saout moved all in. It was 10 million more to Shulman now, and after a solid minute of studying, Shulman folded his A-K. On the surface, no one likes Shulman’s fold. I mean, Shulman put 28 percent of his chips into the pot, and to fold A-K “mathematically speaking” here, you would have to know that your opponent had A-A or K-K. If your opponent had A-K, which was likely, it would probably be a split pot. If your opponent had a pair like Q-Q, J-J, or 10-10, which also was likely, you would be roughly a 12-to-10 underdog, but the pot was laying about 19 million-to-10 million (4 million + 4 million + 10 million + 1 million in blinds and antes). No one likes Shulman’s fold except Shulman and me — and even his father had mixed feelings about it.

However, to Shulman and me, the fold was about three things: First, it was probably a coin flip, and Saout actually may have had A-A or K-K, in which case it was nothing short of an amazing fold; second, the fold was about the “rest of the story”; and third, the blinds were still relatively low, so why not wait for a better spot later on? I mean, maybe two or three other players would be eliminated by the time Shulman moved all in.

If it was a coin flip, Shulman would have had 29 million if he won, or finished in eighth place if he lost. And why gamble? If the blinds had been bigger and Shulman knew that it was a coin flip, he would have called. With the blinds the way they were (200,000-400,000), if Shulman knew that it was a coin flip, he could fold because of the rest of the story.

As it turned out, the rest of the story was that Shulman was all in as almost a 3-1 favorite with A-K against Cada’s A-J, and Shulman won a pot of 14 million. Then, Shulman played a pot of 22 million with J-J against Cada’s 3-3 (Cada was all in this time). But, Shulman was extremely unlucky and lost; he would have had more than 30 million in chips and been down to four-handed play if he had won that hand.

So, the level of the blinds and a brilliant “rest of the story” authored by Shulman made his A-K laydown a good one. The laydown was a good one only because the player involved was Jeff Shulman. I believe that 99.9 percent of the world should call with the A-K in that spot.

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