I Let Him Suck Out!

In limit hold’em, situations commonly arise in which you must weigh the risks of betting against the potential negatives of giving a free card. In these circumstances, you need to consider how the hand will play out and incorporate any additional value gained or lost into the equation. This includes any equity on extra bets that you may gain or lose, plus any value from impressions that you may make on your opponents by playing your hand in a nonstandard manner.

I was holding the K J under the gun in a seven-handed $30-$60 limit hold’em game at Bellagio. Frequently, I limp with this type of hand, suited big cards with straight potential, commonly known as a volume hand. Since it can make a strong hand like a straight or a flush, it plays better against several callers, who are available to give you action when you make a big mitt. Your opponents in those situations are often drawing very slim or dead, making the bets high in value.

But this game wasn’t likely to produce volume, because it was both shorthanded and reasonably tight. I tossed in a raise, hoping to increase my EV [expected value] by either winning the blinds or bluffing a shorthanded field. My hopes were dashed when Ken, an actor from L.A. who was sitting immediately to my left, three-bet. Because he was solid preflop, I knew that Ken held a big hand, most likely a big ace or a big pair. The field folded and I flat-called, and I was heads up with Ken.

The dealer flipped up the K Q 4, giving me top pair. I checked, unsure of how I would play my hand, but confident that Ken would bet the strong board. To my surprise, he checked!

When Ken checked, it “polarized” his hand. He either was slow-playing a big hand or totally missed the flop and was taking a free card. These spots can get tricky to play, as you want to obtain value when your opponent’s hand is weak, but don’t want to trap yourself into losing extra bets when he is strong. And you sure don’t want to fold the best hand!

The turn card was a blank, the 6. I decided to check once again, thinking that Ken would bet even if he held a gutshot or an underpair to the flop. My thought was to check-raise and see how Ken reacted. If I got reraised, I would have to make a decision, as my hand would be reduced to a bluff catcher. By playing it in that manner, I thought that I might obtain three big bets from an underpair to the queen. Ken once again disappointed me, and checked.

The river brought the 9. I fired, thinking it was unlikely that Ken had checked a big hand twice. He raised me. My hand was reduced to strictly a bluff catcher, and I didn’t think Ken was bluffing. I read him as having two nines, although I thought there was a small chance that he held K-K or Q-Q, had flopped a set, and had slow-played it twice. I tossed my hand into the muck, and Ken showed me wired nines, having rivered a set.

The way that I had played my hand cost me the pot. Had I led on the flop and/or the turn, I probably could have gotten Ken to fold. Errors that cost you the pot are usually sizable errors. If I had read Ken correctly and known that he would check an underpair twice, I would have played my hand differently and not given him the free cards.

But, as they say, “Hindsight is 20/20.” When I scrutinize how I played a hand, I evaluate my performance based on the information that I had at the point of making the decision, not on the information that I obtained later in the hand.

When I made my decision on the flop, I was pretty sure that Ken would bet. That flop was likely to have hit his hand or given him a good opportunity to represent a strong hand. Virtually all experienced players would automatically bet a flop like that. So, I felt that my check on the flop was warranted. If he had bet, I would have gauged the manner in which he bet and determined if I wanted to trap or check-raise.

I often check quality hands on the turn after everyone has checked on the flop, as it induces bluffs. It also causes some opponents to fear betting marginal hands, which gives me free cards that I otherwise might not have received, thus saving myself value when I would have called with the worst hand. I also feel that my likelihood of getting paid off three big bets is pretty good, as most of my opponents know that I am capable of bluff-raising.

So, while I knew that my play had cost me the pot, I didn’t beat myself up over how I played it. My thinking was sound, though incorrect. That may sound flawed to you, but it’s not. As long as my thoughts are logical and based on sound information, I know that I’m on the right track.

Poker is a game in which your decisions are based on incomplete information; you can hardly ever be sure of what your opponent holds or will do. Even the world’s best players misread poker situations. If you clearly think things through, critically review your thinking, and learn from your experiences, the chips will come your way.

Roy Cooke played poker professionally for 16 years prior to becoming a successful Las Vegas real-estate broker/salesman in 1989. Should you wish to get any information about real-estate matters — including purchase, sale, or mortgage — his office number is (702) 396-6575, and his e-mail address is [email protected]. His website is www.roycooke.com. You also may find him on Facebook.