Final-Table Takedown: Blair Hinkle Pays Attention to Every Detail to Formulate a Plan of Attack

Blair Hinkle has been playing poker online since 2005, and in early 2008, he turned professional. His accomplishments include winning event No. 3 of the UltimateBet Online Championship in 2006, a Full Tilt Online Poker Series event in 2007, and a World Series of Poker no-limit hold’em event in 2008, for $507,613. His brother Grant also plays professionally, and they were the first brothers ever to win WSOP bracelets in the same year. Hinkle has more than $1.4 million in career tournament cashes.

Event: World Series of Poker Circuit Council Bluffs main event
Players in the Event: 251
Buy-in: $1,500
First Prize: $88,555
Finish: First

Hand No. 1
Stacks: Blair Hinkle – 572,000 Kevin Calenzo – 625,000
Blinds: 6,000-12,000
Antes: 2,000
Players at the Table: 9

Hand No. 1

Key Concepts: Applying pressure; sending a message to the table; re-evaluating your play at the end of every session

Blair Hinkle raises to 29,000 from the cutoff with the A♠ 6♠.

Craig Tapscott: This hand took place on day three. Set it up for us.

Blair Hinkle: Well, this hand came with some history from the previous day. On day two, Kevin Calenzo got moved to my table as we approached the money bubble with 27 players remaining. Kevin had position, and I quickly learned that he wasn’t going to let me push him around at the table. We played a lot of pots, and I noticed that he was three-betting me a lot from the button. I let him get away with it every time. After day two had ended, I was very upset with myself that I hadn’t pulled the trigger and four-bet him — not once.

CT: What did you plan to do differently the next day?

BH: On the final day, he had position on me once again, and by this point, I had enough chips to be able to four-bet him. So, I tightened my opening range from the cutoff, as I knew that he liked to three-bet from the button, and told myself that I would four-bet any hand if the situation arose. Kevin had lost a few pots in the last few orbits, and was looking a little frustrated when this hand came up.

Calenzo reraises to 87,000 from the button.

CT: Did you get any read on Calenzo when he reraised you this time?

BH: Kevin looked down at his cards and quickly started counting out raising chips, which made my decision a little easier, because he didn’t pause at all before reaching for chips.

Hinkle moves all in for 541,000. Calenzo folds. Hinkle wins the pot of 152,000.

CT: Why was this hand so important, leading up to the final table?

BH: While it gave me the chip lead at the table, it also sent a message to Kevin that he would not be able to three-bet me without having to worry about risking all of his chips. It also sent a message to the rest of the table. Because of this, I was able to win a lot more pots uncontested as we moved closer to the final table.

CT: Let’s talk about how you use your aggressive image at the table to your advantage.

BH: Well, when I first hit the live-poker scene, not many people knew how I played, which meant that I was able to get away with very aggressive play. Now that the game has changed a little, and people have learned that I’m capable of pushing in lots of chips without much of a hand, I’ve had to adjust.

CT: After day two was over, did you re-evaluate your play against Calenzo?

BH: Yes. The reason I was most upset about my play against Kevin during day two was that I saw good spots to four-bet that could have slowed him down, if not completely shut him down. The problem was that I wasn’t as confident as I should have been, for whatever reason. Luckily, after the day was done, I was able to realize my mistakes and set up a good game plan, which I knew I would follow through with on the final day.

Hand No. 2

Key Concepts: Game flow; reading betting patterns; previous history

BH: This hand came after an hour and a half of heads-up play. I felt that I had controlled the heads-up match the whole time.

CT: After such a long heads-up battle, had you picked up any edges that you could exploit?

BH: During final-table play, I had noticed that Shiva Dudani was betting pretty big in relation to the pot when he had good cards, and closer to half the size of the pot at other times. I assumed that he was getting away with his bluffs by using the value-bet bluff. So, during heads-up play, I called him down twice with very weak holdings when he was betting smaller to make it look like a value-bet.

Hinkle raises to 65,000 from the button with the K♠ 6♠. Dudani reraises to 180,000.

CT: Did you give the reraise much credence?

BH: I felt he was weak, for the same reason I felt that Kevin was probably weak in the other hand. The stack sizes in relation to the blinds were a little trickier, though, and I thought it would be too much to just move all in, just in case he actually did have a hand. So, I …

Hinkle reraises to 310,000. Dudani calls.

BH: At this point in the match, I knew that he was getting frustrated. I was actually hoping that he might make a small reraise, which I then would’ve shoved over. At first, I was a little surprised that he had just called, and then a bit worried that he might have a real hand.

Flop: 9♥ 7♣ 6♣ (pot: 630,000)

Dudani checks. Hinkle checks.

CT: Why not fire a continuation-bet?

BH: I decided to check behind because if I bet 400,000 and he moves all in for 1.8 million, I have a tough decision to make with only bottom pair.

CT: How do stack sizes influence how you play a hand in situations like this?

BH: We had put a lot of chips in preflop, which made this a tricky spot. And because of that, you have to think about what amount either of you is “supposed” to bet, according to standard play. If I were to continuation-bet, I would bet a little more than my preflop raise. Secondly, a standard all-in raise is going to be three to seven times my bet. Therefore, if I bet, I have to be ready to call an all-in raise, and I didn’t have all the information needed to be confident in betting and calling in that situation.

Turn: 4♠ (pot: 630,000)

BH: The 4♠ was a good card, as it was lower than my pair and didn’t put a four-card straight on the board.

Dudani bets 400,000.

CT: What do you make of this bet when he leads on the turn?

BH: I went into the tank. I was still a little worried that he might have an overpair or a hand like 8-8, which would have me crushed.

Hinkle tanks, and then calls.

CT: You seemed very hesitant about this call.

BH: Yes. But I assumed that he wouldn’t try the value-bet bluff again, so if he did make a smaller bet, I would have to lay down my hand if I didn’t improve. On the other hand, if he bet nearly the size of the pot or moved all in, I thought it would probably be a bluff, and I was prepared to call with just my pair of sixes.

River: K♦ (pot: 1,430,000)

Dudani moves all in for 1,455,000. Hinkle calls. Dudani reveals the J♣ 8♦. Hinkle wins the pot of 4,340,000.

BH: The river king made my decision easy, as I wasn’t folding after improving to two pair. I snap-called, as I was sure that my hand was good. ♠