Final Table Takedown

Matt Matros is a 35-year-old poker professional, the author of The Making of a Poker Player, and a featured coach for cardrunners.com. He is a known for having a strong theoretical background in the game, and his $2,300,000 in tournament winnings seems to back his theories up.

Hand No. 1

Key Concepts: Don’t value raise if you can’t get called by a worse hand. This has the dual benefit of maximizing wins and minimizing losses.

Craig Tapscott: Matt, congrats on your third bracelet. I’m curious if you can share what you believe are the contributing factors to your consistency over the past few years? Is it your homework away from the table or perhaps mental preparation, etcetera? What’s the secret?

Matt Matros: Well I have consistently gone deep in WSOP events since 2005, and I attribute those deep runs to the long hours I’ve put in both at the table and at home constantly trying to improve as a player. I’ve won three bracelets in the last three years, and I attribute that success to an enormous amount of luck.

Matros raises to 80,000 from the button holding 8 7.

Matros: This is a completely automatic raise heads-up with middle connecting cards on the button.

Radoja calls.

CT: And his call…

MM: It doesn’t mean much. He still has a very wide range at this point, though I can probably rule out or severely discount big pairs.

Flop: J 7 7 (pot: 170,000)

Radoja checks.

MM: Obviously this flop is gin rummy for me and of course I want to continuation bet here as I would with most of my range.

Matros bets 160,000. Radoja calls.

MM: Mark’s call is somewhat interesting. There are basically no draws on board, so most of his range consists of made hands. The rest of his range is the occasional float with a hand that could pick up outs on the turn.

Turn: 10 (pot: 490,000)

Radoja bets 250,000.

CT: That lead out has to strike you as a bit strange.

MM: Yes. Well that’s interesting. I still have quite a big hand, but almost all of Mark’s value range is equal to or better than mine; 9-8 is a plausible hand he could’ve floated with, and that got there.

CT: And if he has the case seven?

MM: Then I’m almost getting freerolled, as I have no kicker. My best hopes for winning the pot are 1) that he check/called the flop with a jack, and is now betting the turn trying to get two more streets of value from a pocket pair or a ten; 2) that he floated the flop with backdoor spades and has now picked up the flush draw to semibluff with on the turn. I don’t think Mark would call a raise on the turn and a bet on the river with worse than my hand, and I think he’s planning to barrel the river with his entire (very strong) range.

CT: So what’s the best play?

MM: I think the highest value play for me is to call the turn, and not raise. I don’t see hardly any situation where I make more money from a worse hand by raising; most of the time when I’m ahead, I do better by inducing a bluff on the river.
Matros calls.

River: K (pot: 990,000)

Radoja bets 850,000.

CT: Looks like a big value bet or a big bluff.

MM: Well that bet sizing is bad news for me. When he bets more than 80 percent of the pot on the end, I expect his range to be polarized, meaning that if he’s value betting, I lose. For this reason I thought for a little bit before acting, even though I have a big hand for heads up. In the end I decided that because I had a seven in my own hand and the flush draw didn’t come in, Mark’s range would have to be overly weighted toward bluffs instead of value bets. So I decided to…

Matros calls. Radoja reveals the Q 9. Ragoja wins the pot of 2,690,000.

CT: What are some keys to hand reading during heads-up play? How do the dynamics change and what situations are you looking to adjust to and flow with?

MM: I’ve been fortunate to win all three times I got heads up in WSOP events, and in all three matches I was significantly behind at some point. That said, I think that’s a bit of a fluke, as I’m not a heads-up specialist. My best answer to your question is that you have to get a feel for how your opponent values hands. Hand valuation is very different heads up than in any other situation, and while some opponents will only value raise with top pair, others will do it with ace-high. So it’s crucial to know the difference. As for game flow, it’s important to recognize that stack sizes change quickly heads up, and an opponent may abruptly change his style with an abrupt change in stack size.

Hand No. 2

Key Concepts: You can make a big semibluff when you’re believably representing a big hand. And sometimes it’s better to be lucky than good.

Radoja raises to 100,000. Matros calls in the big blind holding 6 5.

CT: Suited connectors.

MM: Yes. This is the kind of speculative hand I love to see a flop with.

CT: Would you ever think to three-bet this type of hand?

MM: I prefer calling to three-betting. If I three-bet I probably either play out of position with the worst hand, or am forced to fold to a four-bet preflop.

Flop: 10 9 2 (pot: 210,000)

Matros checks. Radoja bets 100,000.

MM: Clearly folding is out of the question with a flush draw.

Matros calls.

CT: Would a raise ever be appropriate?

MM: Again, I don’t want to raise and then be forced to a tough decision if Mark moves in, and I think moving in myself — risking 1,600,000 to win 310,000 — is a bit of an overbet. I like calling here. I still reserve the right to get aggressive later in the hand. For example…

Turn: 8 (pot: 410,000)

Matros bets 175,000.

CT: Why the lead out?

MM: This turn card should look pretty scary to Mark. I could’ve easily check/called the flop with 9-8, 10-8, 7-6, J-7, or Q-J. For this reason I choose to semibluff and lead out on the turn.

Radoja raises to 475,000.

CT: Now what?

MM: My best choices are to fold or move all-in. I don’t have the price to call with a flush draw, although an advanced play might be to call, planning on moving in on most river cards. I didn’t think that would work here.

CT: Why?

MM: Because I thought Mark’s range was polarized enough so that I gained no fold equity by delaying my aggression another street. Basically, because the turn card should look so scary to Mark, I thought his raising range was either a very big hand, or nothing. Why would he raise with a medium-strength hand facing that action? And why would he raise on a draw when it’s so easy for me to move in? A key to heads-up poker is staying one step ahead of your opponent. Mark is a great player and I’d been very aggressive for most of the match. I expected that Mark would fire back and his stack size was such that he would have to do it sometime very soon.
Matros moves all-in.

MM: I decided to move Mark in because it’s hard for him to have a very big hand and because I could easily have 12 outs if called. 

Radoja calls and reveals J 7.

CT: Oops.

MM: Yes. The situation is sad for me but consistent with my analysis of the hand. Although maybe instead of staying one step ahead of Mark, he was one step ahead of me.

River: 10 (pot: 3,400,000)

Matros wins the pot of 3,400,000 and the tournament.

MM: Guess flush draws were good to both players in this match. Not the way I’d planned on winning my third bracelet, but I’ll take it.

CT: Congratulations on the win Matt. Keep winning one every year. You wouldn’t want to break your streak. ♠