Final-Table Takedown: Ben Hamnett Captures the WPT Borgata Poker Open

Ben Hamnett started playing limit hold’em poker in college at the University of Pittsburgh. During his junior year he made time to grind in the local underground games. After graduation he transitioned to online play and continued to put in 60-80 hours a week to make rent and expenses. Hamnett eventually placed all his focus on tournament play and never looked back. In 2011 he finished eleventh for $37,000 at the WPT Bay 101 Shooting Star main event. After winning the 2012 WPT Borgata Open he claimed another victory for $40,000 at the PokerStars France Poker Series Sunfest Mazagan High Rollers event in Morocco. Hamnett has a total of $959,000 in career tournament earnings.

Hand No. 1

Key Concepts: Preflop play; Stack-to-pot ratio

Craig Tapscott: When did this hand occur at the final table?

Ben Hamnett: This is the third hand we played.

Burnitz raises to 325,000 from under the gun (UTG). Hamnett reraises to 525,000 from the button holding A Q.

Craig Tapscott: Why that bet sizing for your three-bet?

BH: I chose to min-raise for value. Just calling gives pocket small pairs a good price to make sets and gives the big blind a chance at a cheap flop. I don‘t think the players behind me we are likely to do any light four-betting, so I could fold to a four-bet. This min-raise also keeps most of the original raiser’s weaker hands in and gives me a good stack-to-pot-ratio if I flop top pair or I can make bluffs that leverage my stack and make it awkward for him to call me down.

Burnitz calls.

Flop: J 8 4 (pot: 1,290,000)

Burnitz checks. Hamnett bets 445,000.

BH: I continuation bet to protect my hand against random unpaired cards. I’m not planning on three-barreling, but I might bet some rivers. I have backdoor straight and flush draws that might benefit from a free river.

Burnitz calls.

Turn: A (pot: 2,180,000)

Burnitz checks. Hamnett bets 1,210,000.

CT: So you’re not afraid of the flush coming in at all.

BH: No. Not really. I discount his flush possibility because I have the queen, the ace is on the board and combo draws would probably check-raise the flop. There is also a chance he would donk bet with a flush. If he raises all-in here I will call. The queen might be good if another diamond comes. I’d extracted a lot by value betting thin against this player on day four so this is a clear bet with the intention of calling a jam or shoving the river.

Burnitz calls.

River: 7 (pot: 4,600,000)

Burnitz checks.

BH: This is a good card for me. I didn’t really want the flush to hit and a 7 is unlikely to have improved his hand. I shove here for value expecting to get called by any ace. Any hand better than mine would likely have jammed sooner.

Hamnett moves all-in. Burnitz tanks and calls with A 9. Hamnett wins the pot of 12,120,000.

CT: Well played.

BH: Thanks. The rest of the table seemed pretty surprised after the hand. I think many players who really take their time and pay attention will play the hand the same. Because of the preflop stack-to-pot-ratio, I don’t think Matthew really ever had a chance to get away from this hand.

CT: Please explain in a little more depth how preflop stack-to-pot-ratio is used?

BH: When I decided to three-bet I’m balancing the fact that A-Q offsuit plays better heads-up and my desired stack-to-pot ratio with the risk of reopening the action against an under-the-gun raiser. When you’re learning poker, an early intermediate idea comes along that says “if you don’t know what to do if you get (re)raised then don’t (raise) bet. Once you internalize an aversion to marginal spots, you can begin treating them as part of the cost of taking a line. Here I don’t want to face an under-the-gun four-bet this deep, but the benefits of min-raising, isolating, extracting value, and simplifying future streets clearly outweigh having to make a marginal decision in the unlikely event I get four-bet.

CT: And when he calls your three-bet what goes through your mind?

BH: I know there will be 1,300,000 in the pot and I’ll have 4,500,000 left postflop. Now when I bet 10 percent to 20 percent of my stack on a lot of flops I will be putting him in an awkward spot. There won’t be enough money in the pot for him to feel justified in jamming, but if he calls the flop he is likely to be similarly confused on the turn. When I connect with the board, I’m mostly likely going to make top pair with a good kicker and I can either be comfortable putting in two big nearly pot-sized bets on draw heavy boards or I can make a more confusing series of smaller bets on dry flops as we see in the actual hand. The reason he gets stuck calling three bets is because I’ve spread the pain out to each street so that at no point should he feel uncomfortable giving up so many chips for the size bet he is facing.

CT: And you didn’t slow down when the board brought a flush. You continued to fire away for value.

BH: Well I think a lot of players would see the turned flush and think about pot control and just try to get a bet called on the river. This is why taking your time and seeing why a situation may be different than it appears is important. It’s hard to win a tournament on autopilot.

Hand No. 2

Key Concepts: Taking your time before calling with a weak hand; Running through the possible hand ranges

Hamnett raises to 600,000 from the button holding A 4. Patterson shoves all-in from the big blind.

CT: What’s your read on Patterson? Is this an easy call?

BH: This is normally a snap call. This is what went through my mind. Tyler had been playing solid all day. His play so far made me think he was either very card dead or focused on moving up the pay scale. Matthew and I had been playing pretty aggressively. At some point Matthew had stated he wasn’t concerned about the money and was playing accordingly, which means very aggressive. In fact we had played a few big pots in the recent hands before this. So from Tyler’s point of view, he stood an unusually good chance of moving into second place money without winning a big pot. 

CT: Were there any other variables you had to mull over?

BH: Well I was benefiting from having Tyler in that spot because I was effectively playing in position for two out of three hands per orbit against the other big stack. For two days now, Tyler had seen me pick up a lot of small pots uncontested and when he called down or played back I’d usually have it. But I also drew out a couple times in small pots. I felt he had to be frustrated. So while this is normally a snap call I expect Tyler was not raising as many kings here as you would expect and I wasn’t in as much a hurry to eliminate him as usual, nor did I need to incur the variance. 

CT: Did you go through the math in your head?

BH: Yes. There’s 3,100,000+600,000
300,000150,000 = 4,150,000 in the pot and I need to put in 2,500,000 to call. If this were a cash then I only need, to win 2.5/ (2.5+4.15) = 37.5 percent of the time to break even. I’ll win 40 percent of the time if he is shoving any ace, any pair, K-Q and K-J. In this case I need better because of the other implications. At the table I guessed he’d shove most suited kings and K-T offsuit so I…

Hamnett calls. Patterson reveals A 6.

Flop: J 5 2 (pot: 6,600,000)

Turn: 4 (pot: 6,600,000)

River: K (pot: 6,600,000)

Hamnett wins the pot of 6,600,000.

CT: How does your game change and adjust when the table gets down to three and four-handed play?

BH: You’re forced to play more hands because you’re in the blinds half (or two thirds) of the time and almost all hands will be heads-up. Stack sizes are even more important now. People will tend to take hands more personally now, but it’s still poker and despite what people think, the one running over the table is still probably more often than not the one picking up the best cards. Payout structure and stack sizes will have a strong effect on people’s play, making some people tighten or loosen up even more. In other words, how the other two or three players play matters even more shorthanded than earlier. And if you’ve been watching, you should have a good idea about how they play. ♠