Damn, He Check-Raised Me!

Play poker and you’re going to get check-raised. If you play quality opponents, it will happen often. How to effectively counter the check-raise is largely based on your opponents’ tendencies. The fact that check-raising is both widespread, and the range of circumstances substantial, makes your counterstrategy both tricky and very important to your overall results.

In the cutoff in a tight afternoon $40-$80 at the Bellagio, I looked down to the K 8 and open-raised, hoping to pick up the blinds. With that texture of holding, much of the equity of my raise comes from picking up the blinds uncontested. The value of winning the $60 is greater equity that I’m generally going to obtain if I get called.

The steal didn’t work; the big blind (BB), an aggressive quality-thinking pro, called me. Now I was going to have to win the pot the old–fashioned way, by earning it!
The flop ensued, the 10 9 6, giving me an overcard, a gutshot and a backdoor-flush draw. It wasn’t the flop I was dreaming of, but when it was checked to me, I fired. Getting 4.5-to-1 on a continuation semibluff gave me a good price. I could win the pot right there, make a hand, or outplay my opponent on future streets. Also, should I miss, the fact that I bet the flop would add fold equity to a bluff on the turn, both by making the pot bigger and by the fact that betting twice would signal that my hand had greater strength than it really did.

My semi-bluff didn’t work either, Mr. Quality-Pro check-raised. I pondered my best strategy. I compartmentalized my opponent’s range as being a big hand, a marginal hand, or a draw. Since the flop was uniform, I felt an “air” bluff was unlikely from this knowledgeable opponent. From his perspective, virtually all of my range paired the flop, contained a straight or flush draw, had overcards or some combination of each.

That being the case, I decided to flat and, if the turn was an encouraging card, possibly bluff-raise him to fold his marginal hands. With this specific opponent, three-betting the flop to obtain a free card on the turn wasn’t the correct play, as he knew I knew that play, and on a draw-rich board, he would bet the turn.

The turn came the 4, adding a four-flush and enhancing the equity of my semibluff turn-raise play. Since I added the club outs, I would win more often when my opponent’s hand was part of his calling/raising range. I raised Mr. Quality-Pro’s bet, hoping for a fold.

Again, it didn’t work, he called. I’d most likely fire the river to take the pot if he held a draw that nominally beat my holding, or if I thought the river card would change his perspective on the strength of my hand and cause him to fold some of his marginal hands.

None of that thinking mattered one iota when the 7 hit the river, awarding me the straight. He checked to me, I bet, he called, and I turned my hand over. He gave me a wry smirk and tossed his hand into the muck.

Yeah, I got lucky. I’d made a draw when semibluffing when my opponent possessed a holding that was within his calling range. But at my decision points, I didn’t know that. He might have held a marginal holding that would fold to a raise. Furthermore, since I was calling the turn anyway, the pot contained $410, and I had significant outs against most of his range, he didn’t have to fold very often to make my raise equitable. In hindsight, while none of my decisions actualized the desired result, my thinking was sound.

With a different texture of opponent I would have played my hand differently. Had my opponent been one who wouldn’t have led the turn if I three-bet and was highly call-prone, I would have three-bet the flop with the intent of taking a free card on the turn. However, I likely would have bet the turn when I picked up a flush draw as, once again, I wouldn’t have to increase my probability of winning very much to give my bet equity. Even if I checked the river, the turn bet added additional value by nullifying river bluffs from drawing hands that I had beat, assuming that if I checked the turn it increased my opponent’s propensity to bluff the river.

Against an aggressive, call-prone opponent, I would have flatted the flop and called the turn. Against this texture of opponent, I might bluff-raise the river if I thought the turn and river cards missed most of the draws. When playing an aggressive opponent whose hand is polarized between a strong hand and a draw, and you’re drawing yourself, a river raise on a draw-rich board that blanked off often has good fold-equity.

Knowing the correct plays in any given situation in advance will provide you with quicker and better recall when you’re in the heat of battle. If you spend your time at the table compartmentalizing your opponents’ ranges and assessing which plays work best against those ranges, you’ll be able to transition your plays to the current situations effectively.

So, make a list of options, memorize them, and assign the best option to ranges of hands. That way, when a situation occurs, you’ll make the best equity play.

And over time, making the best equity play generates the most profit. ♠

Roy Cooke played poker professionally for 16 years prior to becoming a successful Las Vegas Real Estate Broker/Salesman in 1989. Should you wish to any information about Real Estate matters-including purchase, sale or mortgage his office number is 702-396-6575 or Roy’s e-mail is [email protected]. His website is www.roycooke.com. You can also find him on Facebook or Twitter @RealRoyCooke