One Hand, Three Levels

Borgata’s multi-million-dollar guarantee tournaments get thousands of entries, and what makes these events especially appealing (aside from the enormous potential payday) is that you face players of all skill levels—many of whom are willing to share their thought process with you between hands. It’s fascinating to see people at so many different stages of their poker development competing for the same prize. I played a huge pot in the first event of the recent Borgata Winter Open, and the comments from my opponents showed how beginning, intermediate, and advanced players could view the same hand from distinct perspectives. I’ll describe the action and show you what I mean.

With blinds of 800-1,600 and a 200 ante, the under the gun (UTG) player opened for 3,200 and four players called. I called 1,600 more from the big blind 1,600 more with 7-4 offsuit. (This decision is debatable, but I’ll say that, at this table, I felt confident I could turn a profit with this hand calling to close the action getting more than 12-1.) The flop came K-7-4 with two hearts and the UTG player checked. The next player bet 5,000 into a 21,000-chip pot, and the next three players folded. I check-raised to 16,000 with bottom two pair, UTG folded, and the bettor called.

The turn brought the four of spades, putting a backdoor flush draw on board and, of course, giving me a full house. I decided to check, and my opponent bet 16,000 into the 53,000-chip pot.

Beginner Concept: I don’t want a longshot to fold when I have a strong hand.

To a beginner, losing a hand you could’ve won is the world’s biggest catastrophe. Beginners don’t understand that poker is about winning money, not pots. It’s often correct to make a play that decreases your chance of winning a pot, if it will win you more money in the long run. To give an example, say you’re a 90% favorite over your opponent on the turn, and the pot is 100. You could move all-in and win, or bet half the pot and get called. If you choose to move in, you win 100 every time. If you bet half-pot, you win 150 90% of the time, and 10% of the time you lose. Even if you always made a full pot bet on the river—meaning you’d risk 200 on the river after betting 50 on the turn—and even if you only got called when you were beat, the overall equity of this play would still be .9*(150) + .1*(-250) = 110. The concept should be clear: if an opponent is making a mistake by calling, then you want them to call. Winning the pot is not more important than winning money.

After my hand was over, the player to my right commented that if I had moved in on the turn, my opponent would’ve folded. He was flabbergasted when I told him that I didn’t want her to fold.

Okay, so if I didn’t want to move all-in, then what did I want to do?

Intermediate Concept: Maximizing value usually doesn’t require extreme deception.

Another player who pondered this hand suggested I should’ve just called my opponent’s bet on the turn, so as not to scare her away. While this is a reasonable plan, it’s important to remember that your goal is to get as many chips as possible, not to be as tricky as possible. When you choose not to bet or raise with a big hand—especially with only one card to come—you need a very good reason. In this case, my opponent had already showed herself more than capable of making loose calls with top pair or a flush draw, even on a paired board. She had 55,000 left after making her 16,000 bet, and I thought there was a good chance she’d call a raise of 26,000 more with top pair, second pair, or a draw. And I thought she’d fold just about everything if I moved her all-in.

I raised to 42,000 total, and sure enough my opponent called, making the pot 137,000. The river brought the king of spades, completing the backdoor flush draw, and more importantly, pairing the top card on board and likely turning my full house into a loser.

Advanced Concept: It might be correct to value bet, even if you’re an underdog when called.

At this point in the hand, I thought there was roughly a 75% chance I was beat, so it might seem like my best option was to check. But what would my plan have been after checking? If my opponent moved all-in for her last 29,000, would I really fold getting 166,000 to 29,000—or almost 6-1 on my money? Against certain players, I probably would. But I like to be very, very sure before I fold a full house when it only needs to be good 15% of the time, and this player’s betting patterns had been erratic enough that I knew I wouldn’t fold to her potential river bet. If I wasn’t going to fold to a river bet, then I was destined to lose the maximum against better hands even if I checked. If instead I chose to bet the 29,000 myself, my opponent might’ve called with flushes, sevens, or big pocket pairs like A-A or Q-Q—all hands she probably would’ve checked back if given the opportunity. One of the better players at the table asked why I bet the river even after the king came—but once I’d decided I wasn’t going to fold, there was no downside in trying to get some value from hands worse than mine.

I bet 29,000, setting my opponent all-in, and she called instantly with K-10 offsuit. I lost that huge pot and busted a few hours later. Not every poker story has a happy ending (and in fact, nearly every tournament has an unhappy ending), but if you can improve your thinking to the advanced level and beyond, good results will eventually follow. ♠

Matt Matros is the author of The Making of a Poker Player, and a three-time WSOP bracelet winner. He is also a featured coach for cardrunners.com.