GT-NO: Some Tough Decisions For Pocket Aces

An interesting $2-$3 hand was recently brought to my attention. The Hero had pocket aces and a big stack and all three of the decisions he had to make were close and pretty much depended on the exact circumstances and the type of players he was against.

Unless of course he was satisfied with the smaller average profit he would make if he blindly followed a solver’s recommendation.

The aces were in the small blind in a full game. The stack size was about $500 which was also the size of the two relevant opponents. The under-the-gun player limped for $3. A second player limped. A mid-position player made it $20. The aces called. The big blind called, as did UTG. The other limper folded.

The Hero deemed UTG to be a good player and the big blind to be deemed a terrible, very loose player. 

The flop came K 6 J. The Hero did not have the A.

The Hero checked the flop. The big blind bet $25. The UTG player called, and the original raiser folded.

The Hero then raised $75 to $100. The big blind called, and UTG moved in for about $500.

The Hero decided to call the $400 more. The big blind then…

Uh… wait! Why should I tell you what the big blind did? Or furthermore, why should I tell you what the other players had, or what came out on the turn or river?

That’s what other authors and coaches would do. And they are all wrong, at least before they discuss the decisions. Because if you know the other cards and the outcome, you risk being biased in your analysis.

There are obviously at least four different places where the aces could play it differently.

He could reraise preflop.

He could bet the flop.

He could check-raise a smaller or larger amount on the turn, or maybe just call.

And he could have folded when raised another $400.

There are two main arguments to reraise preflop and three arguments to just call. One reason to just call is that it’s problematic if the hand you have matches the hand they are putting you on (especially if you are in first position) and a reraise will do that.

A second reason is that it would be a shame if everyone folded to your reraise (say to $75 or so) and you semi-wasted your A-A. Those of you who have read our new book have seen the chapter The Power of Aces, where I show that with specifically pocket aces, you could be happier getting a few callers rather than just one because it increases the chances someone will make a bad call on the flop.

However, that doesn’t hold once your stack passes a certain size. With $500 it could well be that it is worth the risk that you will fold everyone, if the alternative is multi way.

But maybe not in this case. Because another principle that I have written about is that you should be averse to knocking out terrible players. If the big blind really is terrible, that argues for a call, especially if your stack size is moderate.

And of course, there is always the simple fact that a pretty big preflop raise might turn into a bigger profit when the smoke clears.

Weighing all these factors leads me to a conclusion that the way the aces played it preflop would be reasonable if the big blind could be expected to call and the stacks were somewhat smaller. Say $250. When they are $500, I am 90% sure that the better play would have been reraise.

On the turn, the only one of the four alternatives that is almost certainly wrong is a small check-raise. You don’t want to give the other players good odds to call. Coming out betting is also probably wrong since there is a good chance that someone will bet if you check, allowing you to check-raise. Betting might be right though if you think it entices a raise by a worse hand.

Checking and calling is reasonable if you want to decrease volatility, with the idea that you want to see what happens to the board and the other players actions before you commit too many chips. A bigger check-raise than $75 seems okay, but so does the raise that was actually made.

As to the $400 call, this is tough. The aces are getting better than 2-1 odds if the big blind folds and better than 3-1 odds if he calls behind him. Is that enough? It depends on the possible hands of the UTG.

No way he is bluffing or has only a king. That leaves a set, two pairs, or a monster draw (i.e. A X, Q 10, or perhaps Q 9, J 9, or 10 9.)

If against a set, aces are about 8%. Against two pairs about 13%. Against a monster draw about 50%. The weighted average of these numbers is only accurate if he will make these raises with the same frequency. Thus, the result will probably overstate the aces chances.

There are nine combinations of sets and all of them could have been played this way. The only two pair that is reasonable is K-J and there are nine of them. There are about 12 monster draws. (9×8 plus 9×13 plus 12×50 all divided by 30, equals about 27%.)

The call was indeed borderline! With a hundred dollars less in his stack it is undoubtedly a call. With a hundred dollars more in everyone’s stack calling $500 would most likely be wrong.

But the purpose of this column was not to come to a conclusion, but rather to show again the things you should be thinking about instead of pressing solver buttons.

Oh, I almost forgot. Some of you might want to know what happened. The big blind overcalled with 9 3 and the raiser had A 5. I refuse to demean myself further by telling you the turn and river card. ♠

David Sklansky is the author of The Theory of Poker, as well as nearly two dozen other guides on gambling, poker, and other games. The three-time WSOP bracelet winner’s latest book, Small Stakes No-Limit Hold’em: Help Them Give You Their Money, is now available on Amazon. You can contact Sklansky at [email protected].