Vulnerable, and Waiting for the Turn

If I played it the same way every time, they'd always know what I have – especially inasmuch as they get to peek at my thinking regularly in this column. Sometimes I just have to get unconventional, as all players must.

Recently a poster on the poker forum www.UnitedPokerForum.com observed a hand I played in a $30-$60 hold'em game, and questioned the correctness of my play. He made the post, stating the situation without ever revealing my cards and asking the other posters to guess my cards. No player on the forum correctly guessed my holding, and I've taken some pummeling on the boards for the way I played the hand. Such is the price of writing a poker column.

I was in a loose and passive game. By that I mean many players were calling preflop, and there was little creative raising before the flop. In this game, most of the players who raised preflop had some serious goods. If they bet post-flop, their hand would generally warrant it.

In the hand in question, the under-the-gun player folded and the player in the 2-hole raised. The 3-hole folded and I was in the 4-hole, holding the Q J. I contemplated my best play.

The correct play in this type of situation varies greatly based on the tendencies of both the raiser and the players yet to act. In some situations, I might three-bet, hoping to win the pot in all situations in which no one had a hand. In order for that play to be correct, there would have to be a high likelihood that the remaining players and the initial raiser would fold. In situations in which the initial raiser was a tight player with good playing knowledge and the remaining field was unlikely to join the conflict, I would pass on the hand, sending it straight into the muck. In the current situation, I had little doubt that the raiser had a hand measurably superior to mine.

I looked for compensating factors that might add value to an alternate play to folding. While the initial raiser held a superior hand, I thought he was an easy read. In situations in which you can read an opponent's hand with a high degree of probability and play off that read, you can play much looser than when facing a player who forces things to payoff and you have a tough time outplaying him. Conceptually, if you are in a preflop situation in which your play-of-hands skill will gain you additional equity post-flop, you can (indeed, you must) loosen up your starting hands. Another factor inducing me to call was that I believed, in this game, I was likely to pick up callers behind me. I tossed six $10 chips forward, calling the preflop raise. To my surprise, we picked up only the big blind as a caller. The rest of the field folded, making my current situation pretty marginal at best.

The flop came down K Q J, giving me bottom two pair. The big blind led into the pot, and the initial preflop raiser raised. It was up to me. I went into one of my "huddles," thinking about the range of hands the preflop raiser might have. I thought he might hold any one of the following premium hands: A-A, K-K, Q-Q, J-J, A-K, K-Q suited, or the A Q. As tight a raiser as he was, I could not put him on any other hands with which he would raise preflop and again on the flop. I thought wired tens was an unlikely holding, as he probably would not raise with that hand after the flop that came.

I analyzed the mathematical likelihood of each hand. There were 25 combinations he could hold: six possible combinations of A-A, three of K-K, one of Q-Q, one of J-J, 12 of A-K, one of K-Q suited, and one of the A Q. I was a favorite against A-A and A-K, but a dog to the rest; and in some cases I was drawing practically dead. Fortunately, I was a favorite in 18 of the 25 scenarios I envisioned. That said, I was no huge favorite over A-A or A-K, and in the other seven scenarios, I was in deep trouble in all of them except the A Q, to which I was only a small dog. Being a favorite in the majority of cases does not make the play necessarily correct. You must include the likelihood of victory in all cases, and incorporate into the equation the potential equitable gain/loss of the pot in all situations. In some situations you can be a favorite to have the best hand, yet have negative equity in continuing to play the pot.

I decided to flat-call the raise. I wanted to see what the initial bettor would do and what came on the turn, and then make a decision on what to do with my hand at that time. By waiting until the turn, I could make the decision with more information, get away from my hand easier if a bad card came, and put in a raise that would have greater value against a hand drawing against me than a flop raise would. Part of my reason for not raising and allowing the big blind to play to the turn for a single bet was that I thought that if I had him beat, it was likely that many of the cards with which he could "suck out" on me would also likely improve the initial preflop raiser's hand into beating me, thereby reducing the value of eliminating him.

The turn card was the 8. The big blind checked and the preflop raiser bet. I slid $120 forward, raising him. The big blind showed a king and tossed the hand into the muck. (Yes, this is poor etiquette; you should never show your cards while another player is still active in the pot.) The preflop raiser called.

The river brought the 8, putting bottom pair on the board and counterfeiting my two pair. My opponent checked and I checked behind him, knowing I could not beat either A-A or A-K. He turned over the A Q – the one hand I could still beat. Lucky me!

Reflecting on the situation, I do not think I could have played the hand any better. I got the winner to fold and it won me the pot. That said, winning the pot does not make your decisions correct. In hindsight (all my decisions are better in hindsight), the preflop call was marginal. After the flop, each decision was warranted by the situation.

Delaying raises on the flop with multiple opponents is a tricky play. Sometimes you give opponents free or cheap shots to beat you, which can be a very bad thing. (Note that I am not talking about slow-playing a big hand, which certainly wasn't the case here.) Generally when I make this play, it is with a hand that is in jeopardy with many draws out, and I want to see a card before committing several chips to the pot. That way, I can see the card that comes, and if it doesn't do me any damage, the drawing hands will be much bigger underdogs with one card to come rather than two, making my raise a much better proposition.

The play is stronger if you think none of your opponents are likely to fold to a flop raise, anyway. Also, the original bettor's position and likelihood of betting again are major factors in this type of decision. If he is likely to check the turn, you cannot raise him, and the delay-raise play has lost some of its likelihood of happening. If you are looking to fold players, you want to be to the left of the bettor. If you are looking to trap other players, you need to have them between the bettor and you.

Oh, and most important of all … be lucky.

Roy Cooke played winning professional poker for more than 16 years. He is a successful real estate broker/salesperson in Las Vegas. If you would like to ask Roy poker-related questions, you may do so online at www.UnitedPokerForum.com.