He Would Have Checked

Ah, World Series of Poker time. I love this time of the year. Chips fly. The weather is nice. I get to see lots of out-of-town friends and acquaintances. And I enjoy watching what happens in the poker subculture: Wannabes become poker forces. Has-beens try to rebound; some succeed, but most fail. And egos and bankrolls are built and shattered. The volatility of the poker world exhibits itself every spring.

During Series time, Grant Pittman, a great poker player and one of my closest friends, comes down from Canada to stay with me. My daughter gives him her game room to sleep in, my wife puts up with him for three weeks, and my dog is just infatuated with him. Inasmuch as we are both exciting Las Vegas-type guys, we often stay up until the wee hour of midnight, shooting the breeze and having a good old time drinking Diet Cokes together. There are two things I just can't stand about Grant. First, he hits a golf ball much straighter and farther than I do. Second, he wins more money than I do playing poker. However, neither of these flaws in Grant is fatal to our friendship. Our relationship has been positive both professionally and personally.

We discuss poker strategies together, which is to our mutual benefit. Grant is a tough, sharp, competitive player with an abundance of street smarts developed from a decade as a street cop in the outskirts of Toronto, Canada. His hand-reading ability is superb, and he has a great talent for seeing into the minds of his opponents. His intuitive sense creates many plays for Grant that other players would often overlook, and he has heart and grit. He kills the big-limit games here in Vegas.

We enjoy discussing hands, and we believe we have learned a lot about poker from each other. We critique each other's play, with no holds barred.

In a recent hand that we discussed, Grant opened the pot with a raise from two off the button in a full $80-$160 game with the A 7. A superaggressive local pro three-bet from immediately behind him, folding the button and both of the blinds. Grant called the extra $80, knowing that this player would three-bet with many hands in that situation in an effort to win the pot should neither of them make a hand. They took the flop off heads up, and it came Q-6-4 with one spade.

Grant checked, knowing the aggressive pro would bet. Grant intended to check-raise him, with the aim of taking the lead and thereby taking away the play of his opponent to pick up the pot if neither of them made a hand. Grant wanted to win the pot if that was the case. As predicted, the pro bet, Grant check-raised, and the pro flat-called. The turn brought the 7, giving Grant two sevens and putting two clubs on the board. Grant fired, unsure if his hand was good, but knowing that he would call if he checked and his opponent bet, and he didn't want to give a free card in a situation where his hand was vulnerable. The aggressive pro called.

When he called, Grant was unsure of his opponent's holding. The range of possibilities was large. The aggressive pro three-bet many hands when he had an opponent who was in a blind-stealing position. The pro knew Grant could make plays on him, as they had mixed it up many times previously. The pro could have as little as ace high (unlikely), a straight draw or maybe a flush draw (also unlikely, because he would have the propensity to semibluff raise on the turn in a spot like that), a smaller pair, or a pair in between sevens and queens.

Grant fired on the river and got called by two eights. He bet with the thought in his mind that if he checked, he would call a bet anyway, and he thought he might receive a call from an inferior hand that his opponent would check. In immediate hindsight, he knew he had made a mistake.

If Grant checked his hand on the river, his opponent would check several hands that beat him, thereby saving Grant a bet in those situations. He also would pick up value from calling his opponent's bet after checking when his opponent bluffed with hands with which he could not call. The range of inferior hands with which Grant's opponent would call was very small. The combination of these possible scenarios made betting in that particular situation a mistake.

Making these kinds of value decisions accurately in the heat of battle can add hugely to a player's edge factor. Grant and I discuss thousands of hands, examining the value of such plays in various situations. By doing so, when situations present themselves at the table, our thoughts are generally on the right track to processing the information and coming up with an accurate answer that leads to a correct play. I always recommend that players do this themselves at the table; it is the best way to use your time when you're not involved in a hand. Your decision-making skills and poker game will grow from the practice.

Besides the importance of hand analysis, also learn from Grant's hand that even the best players make mistakes. I see many players beat themselves up mentally over small mistakes, thereby leading them to make even bigger mistakes. Learn from your mistakes, grow from them, put them behind you emotionally, and play the next hand.

If you emulate Grant, analyze your hands, learn to accept your mistakes, and play with heart and grit, maybe next year at Series time you'll be one of those wannabes who becomes a force to be reckoned with.

Editor's note: Roy Cooke played winning professional poker for 16 years. He is a successful real estate broker/salesperson in Las Vegas – please see his ad below.