Laying Down a Hand in a Big Pot

With the recent growth of poker, the cardroom at Bellagio has been rammin' and jammin' these days. On weekends, I have to go in early to get a seat. The state of poker is as good as I have ever seen it. The only time I think it was close to this good was when California first opened up hold'em games. While there are more tough players than there were in the old days, there are many, many more new players just beginning to learn the game.

I had been playing $30-$60 hold'em for about an hour. The game I was in was as good as it gets. Several players had preflop "raiseitis" and the other players didn't seem to care what the cost was, they just wanted to play. The game was wide open and fast and furious, and had huge pots. It was the kind of game in which a mistake that cost you a bet mattered much less than a mistake that would cost you a pot.

Two players limped in from early position and the woman in front of me raised to $60. I held the A J;. I called the $60, knowing that in this type of game, other players would enter the pot behind me. I was not disappointed, as only two players folded, and when it came back to the under-the-gun caller, one of the players with raiseitis, he three-bet. The woman who raised originally called, as did I. Another player with raiseitis made it four bets to go. The under-the-gun player capped it at five bets. The whole field called the cap; eight players, $150 to go, $1,200 in the pot already. It was a meaty bone for us junkyard dogs to chase, and we hadn't seen the flop yet.

The flop came down J-8-5 with two hearts and one spade. The under-the-gun player led and was raised by the preflop-raising woman. The style of the under-the-gun player was such that he did not necessarily have a hand. The woman did have a hand, but I didn't necessarily read her for having one that could beat mine. While I questioned whether my hand was good or not, the pot was extremely large and I wanted to give myself as much chance as possible to win it. Conceptually, as pots get larger, making and saving bets is much less important than giving yourself greater opportunity to win the pot. With that in mind, I reraised, hoping to fold some players who would have a shot at beating me if my hand was good now or improved.

My raise knocked the field down to five, although the under-the-gun guy hit it again. I knew reraising would not move anyone out who had already called three bets, so I just called the additional $30. The turn card was the 3;. I'd picked up a flush draw. The under-the-gun fellow fired once more. This time, the woman between us called. I chose to hit it again.

The fact that I had picked up a flush draw added value to my raise, and there was still a chance that my hand was good. The under-the-gun player could be on a draw or have a jack, and the woman was the type of player who could easily have a worse hand than mine. Plus, I could check the river if it was checked to me and likely still see their hands. A poor-playing woman behind me called the two bets cold, one player folded, and the under-the-gun player and woman called one more bet. There were four of us to see the river card, and $2,280 in the pot. I beseeched the poker gods, "Spade, spade, spade!"

Alas, the gods did not smile on me. The river was an offsuit 9. Both players checked to me. Before I acted, the woman behind me overanxiously slammed chips down on the table to bet. She did it with confidence, force, and vigor, whereas previously she had been shy and reserved, the very picture of a humble caller. I checked.

The under-the-gun player and the woman in front of me both called, and I mucked my hand, confident I was beat by the woman who bet and unsure of where I stood with the other two. That said, the fact that they called still devalued a call on my part. If there was still a very slim possibility that my hand was better than the poor-playing woman's, I still could be beat by either of the other two callers.

The poor-playing woman turned over a J-9 offsuit, having caught a 9 on the river to make jacks and nines. The under-the-gun player showed two aces. The other woman didn't show. My laydown was correct, as I was beat in at least two places.

After the hand, a discussion arose at the table as to what I might have held. One player correctly stated A-J and was immediately countered by the under-the-gun player, who argued there was no way I would fold a hand that strong for one bet in that large a pot with no risk of a raise behind me.

Conceptually, the under-the-gun player was on the right track. The larger the pot, the better the price the pot is laying you to call. The larger the pot, the more it costs you when you make a misread and fold a winner. Therefore, you need to be very careful not to make laydown errors in large pots. That said, the calling equation is still an equation based on the cost of a call to the price of the pot, and all of the available information. There was $2,460 in the pot at the point that I folded. I was getting 41-1 on a call.

Was the price right to call? I didn't think so. As a matter of fact, I didn't think it was close. From the nature of the river bettor's play and the manner in which she acted, I was certain the river card had hit her hand and she could beat A-J. Was it indubitable? Well, nothing in life is indubitable. But, I was certain I was worse than the 41-1 the pot was laying me.

Conceptually, it is correct to pay off in large pots when you are suspect that you are beat. You don't have to be right very often on a call or wrong very often on a laydown to make a big difference in your results. But, calling for the size of the pot is not always correct. If you are 100-1 on a 41-1 shot, your call is very poor. Of course, it won't feel that way the one time in 100 that you drag in the chips.

Roy Cooke played winning professional poker for more than 16 years. He is a successful real estate broker/salesperson in Las Vegas. If you would like to ask Roy poker-related questions, you may do so online at www.UnitedPokerForum.com.